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ABSTRACT
Extreme Liberal Cynicism is a product of mourning, guilt, and the experience of

powerlessness stemming from the trauma of holding liberal investments in a world in

which they rarely flourish, in which they are perceived to have failed, and in which they
are vulnerable to ideology critique. Consequently, the cynic is torn between liberal

ideals and the obstacles to their success. This can compel the Liberal Cynic to extremes,
fantasizing invulnerability through disavowing the efficacy of its constitutive ideals.
This is achieved via a reified hopelessness which eclipses trauma, guilt, and

disempowerment. Despite serving an immediately ameliorative purpose this leaves the
cynic unhappy, alienated, hostile, obstinate, delusional, and desperate. Thus, this is a

failing self-defense mechanism. At these extremes, Liberal Cynicism can be rationally
unjustifiable as well as intrinsically and instrumentally harmful. It is rationally

unjustifiable if it reifies the inefficacy of its constitutive idealism, if it assumes itself

post-idealistic, the logical conclusion of enlightenment, or of intellectual activity, and if
it refuses to engage in self-critique. It is intrinsically harmful because it is selfv

destructive and painful. It is instrumentally harmful in virtue of enabling the problems

that compel it. Nevertheless, cynical painfulness also provides the impetus and evinces
the resources for Extreme Liberal Cynicism to avoid or overcome these extremes. A
Critique of Extreme Cynicism coupled with the libidinal release of Neokynical

cheekiness, a Butlerian reckoning with grief, and the skillful reappropriations of its

complex desires and losses could compel the extreme cynic to maintain a moderate
critical liberal cynicism committed to critiquing and reinvigorating its constitutive
ideals.
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Introduction
Refusing to wear clothes, performing intimate acts in public, sleeping rough,

barking at strangers, begging for bones, and urinating on passersby may not be

everyone’s idea of practicing philosophy, but the Kynics were far from conventional. 1

Coupling this exaggerated eccentricity with face-to-face argumentation, belittlement,

and mockery, the “dogs” sought to expose the meaninglessness, hypocrisy, and
arrogance of civil life. When the Kynical archetype Diogenes, who Plato described as
‘Socrates gone mad,’2 was given an audience with Alexander, he famously asked the

living god to get out of his sun. 3 Impressed, the emperor later said that if he could be
anyone else he would be the tub-dwelling renunciate, appreciating that while he had
conquered much of the known world, Diogenes’ was closer to a true sovereignty than

the dependence and fragility of political rule. 4 Operating within the boundaries of social

life yet openly flaunting propriety, the Kynic was not outcast but outside caste, defiantly

disquieting conformists with an unmasking glare and biting satire. Unsurprisingly
Kynicism attracted a mixed response, and after transforming into a form more

amenable to Roman civility was absorbed into Stoicism and eventually relegated to the

cultural periphery. Capturing a familiar mood Hegel said that ‘there is nothing

Following Sloterdijk, Žižek and Foucault, I will refer to Greek Kynicism and the appropriations thereof
mentioned in this dissertation with a “K” and refer to contemporary cynicism with a “C.”
2 Per Diogenes Laertius in Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Book 6, Chapter 54. Trans. Robert Drew Hicks.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950.
3 Laertius, Diogenes, and Tiziano Dorandi. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013.
6.38
4 Ibid 6.32
1

1

particular to say of the Kynics’ that ‘they possess but little philosophy,’ 5 and that they
were ‘swinish beggars […] worthy of no further consideration.’ 6 Although attracting

some weighty admirers in the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Post-Enlightenment
eras, 7 this admiration was highly qualified and from the fringes of mainstream
philosophy defying the general view that after its demise in antiquity Kynicism has
descended to historical artifact.

This low status is attested to by the crude anecdotes which remain in the

popular consciousness and by cynicism’s contemporary usage meaning both the view,

and the embodiment of the view, that outwardly selfless or honorable people are

ultimately self-interested and immoral. Indeed, contemporary cynicism is a very
different creature, sharing little with its namesake. When Kynicism criticized
conventional values, it presupposed that happiness could be achieved through natural

virtues typically obscured by civilized life. By contrast, cynicism merely criticizes. Gone
is the call for self-discipline, critical self-reflection, moral self-regulation, and

harmonizing speech and act. Gone too, is the hope. From unscrupulous bankers and
their nannied children to the rappers who sell them music, from presidents and
politicians to the poor and unemployed, and from jaded social workers to welfare

abusers, cynicism is “common sense,” a collective, democratic, “realistic” view of things.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, and J. Sibree. "Book I." The Philosophy of History. New York: Dover
Publications, 1956. 479-81. about Antisthenes, Diogenes’ main influence; that ‘it is … superfluous to say
anything further about him’ Ibid. 479-81.
6 Ibid. 486-87
7 Plutarch, Erasmus, Montaigne, D’Alembert, Diderot, Rousseau, the Marquis De Sade, and Nietzsche. The
latter famously said: ‘the highest one can reach on earth [is] Cynicism’ Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. The
Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings. Trans. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman.
New York: Cambridge UP, 2005 and that ‘before one seeks men one must have found the lantern’ “The
Wanderer and his Shadow”, §18 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. The
Portable Nietzsche. New York: Penguin, 1976.
5

2

Having gained anonymity through conventionality the cynic disappeared into the crowd
and submitted to late capitalism. As Peter Sloterdijk, the prominent philosopher of
cynicism, claimed: ‘where Diogenes expressed the wish “Stop blocking my sun” modern

cynics strive for a place in it.’8 Today there are few Kynics, more cynicism, and the
optimists have become the pariahs.

That we live in cynical times is a familiar charge, and the bitter cynic cuts a

familiar figure but here we risk being cynical about cynicism. It is not necessarily toxic,
it is not exhaustive of subjectivity, and it is not the opposite of moralism. 9 Indeed,

moralism and cynicism are two sides of the same pessimistic coin. Both offer armor

against despair in a fallen world but while moralists seek to impose ideals, cynicism
counsels complicity. Furthermore, Cynicism, in nearly all its forms, is ambivalent. To
condemn the corrupt, cynicism remains within the conventions of purity and

corruption. Therefore, when the cynic calls out purity as sham, she remains invested in
the very values she professes to dismiss. Even if the cynic resigns from the world it is a

resignation compelled by persistent engagements, ideals, and values which relate to a
belief in how the world should be but isn’t. Assuming with William Chaloupka that
‘telling a cynic to stop being cynical is like telling rain to stop falling’ 10 this dependence

on persistent investments suggests the possibility of a more productive response than

moralizing condemnations, 11 smug endorsements, or broken submission. This
Ibid.
In The French Enlightenment and the Emergence of Modern Cynicism. Sharon Stanley argues that we
should ‘conceive of cynicism as tactic rather than an exhaustive identity’. (Stanley, 17-18)
10 Chaloupka, William Everybody Knows: Cynicism in America University of Minnesota Press, 1999. P. xv.
11 The following from Paul Tillich captures the essence of many a moralizing dismissal: cynics ‘have no
belief in reason, no criterion of truth, no set of values, no answer to the question of meaning.’ (Tillich,
Paul “Courage to Be” in Main Works/Hauptwerke, 5:2II). Similaloiry moralizing response include:
8
9

3

dissertation attempts such a response. It does so by clarifying the ambivalent structure

of cynicism and responds to a form associated with the ideals of freedom, justice, and

equality broadly conceived. I chose to call this “Liberal Cynicism” to speak to cynicisms
which, although hailing from different contemporary political designations, and in
varying degrees of depth and specificity claim, or remain committed to, despite
protestations to the contrary, these ideals, both within and beyond the academy. This
breadth includes both the differences in theoretical conceptions and the more
colloquial ways in which people may identify “liberal.”

Liberal Cynicism is a product of guilt and powerlessness stemming from the

trauma of holding liberal investments in a world in which they rarely flourish, in which

they are perceived to have failed, and in which they are vulnerable to critique.

Consequently, the cynic is torn, and because of this, suffers. This pain can compel the
Liberal Cynic to repress the efficiency of its ideals through a reification of hopelessness.
This “Extreme Liberal Cynicism” is often rationally unjustifiable as well as intrinsically

and instrumentally harmful. It is rationally unjustifiable if it denies dependency on, or
reifies the inefficacy of, its constitutive idealism, if it assumes itself post-ideological,

post-idealistic, the end of enlightenment or a natural conclusion of intellectual activity,

and if it refuses self-critique. It is intrinsically harmful because it is painful. It is
instrumentally harmful in virtue of self-perpetuation and enabling the problems that

Goldfarb, Jeffrey C. The Cynical Society: The Culture of Politics and the Politics of Culture in American Life.
Chicago: U of Chicago, 1991. Stivers, Richard. The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline.
Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994. Lerner, Michael. The Politics of Meaning: Restoring Hope and Possibility in an
Age of Cynicism. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996. Arnett, Ronald C., and Pat Arneson. Dialogic Civility
in a Cynical Age: Community, Hope, and Interpersonal Relationships. Albany, NY: State U of New York,
1999. Giroux, Henry A. Public Spaces, Private Lives: Beyond the Culture of Cynicism. Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2001. Caldwell, Wilber W. Cynicism and the Evolution of the American Dream. Washington, D.C.:
Potomac, 2006.

4

compel it as well as being both ill-equipped to oppose, and vulnerable to succumbing to,
“Master Cynicism”: a condition which couples a conscience-free disavowal of all ideals
in the pursuit of power.

A philosophical treatment of Liberal Cynicism is a desideratum because

prominent figures in 20th/21st century Continental Philosophy and postmodern theory

have identified cynicism as a ubiquitous and uniquely contemporary problem 12 and
because although there are numerous works on the subject few go beyond diagnosing

or moralizing and of the few that address its ambivalence even fewer propose effective

solutions. 13 This dissertation attempts to fill these gaps by distinguishing, and
prescribing a skillful appropriation of, Extreme Liberal Cynicism.

12 Peter Sloterdijk, Slavoj Žižek, Michel Foucault, David Mazella, Louisa Shea, William Chaloupka, Timothy
Bewes, Sharon Stanley, D.S. Mayfield.
13 For historical analyses of Kynicism see Navia, Luis E. Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study. Westport, CT:
Greenwood, 1996, and Dudley, Donald Reynolds. A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century
A.D. London: Methuen, 1937. For a collection of on the Kynical legacy see The Cynics: The Cynic Movement
in Antiquity and its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie–Odile Goulet–Cazé (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996). Three excellent modern genealogical studies of contemporary cynicism (Mazella,
Shea, Stanley, Bewes’ and Chaloupka) appreciate the ambivalence of cynicism. Mazella is wary of
moralistic responses to cynicism that dismisses legitimate feelings of alienation, he also lauds this
‘invaluable critical concept […] because it complicates some of modernity’s most cherished self-images,
its myths of rationality, dynamism, and progress.’ (Mazella, 7) However, Mazella only points to a
mobilization of this ambivalence, says little of its pain, and nothing of its fecund latent idealism. Louisa
Shea argues that the positive elements of an ambivalent cynicism were purged by the enlightener’s
attempt to do the opposite, causing a branching-off in the 18th century of the respectable cynics, those
answering Diderot and D-Alembert’s call for a “Diogenes of the Letters,” and the reckless sociopathic
element typified by De Sade who ‘paved the way for the contemporary cynic.’ (Shea) Thus, although
holding Kynicism to be ambivalent, Shea rejects that contemporary cynicism is ambivalent. Shea also
focuses on the origins of contemporary cynicism and not theorizing a response. For Chaloupka ‘cynicism
is not uniformly an affliction or injury,’ (Chaloupka, xv) repeating the familiar critique that cynicism
mobilizes the least scrupulous and must be overcome by a commitment to partake in the messy business
of malleable political discourse, but that it nevertheless carries vital critical insights. But Chaloupka too
fails to mobilize this promise. While for the most part Bewes’ work is levelled against postmodernism as
an ally of de-politicization he recognizes it is a diverse concept and speaks for a “critical postmodernism.”
Since Bewes defines cynicism as a variety of postmodernism, or at least inextricably linked with
postmodernity he too appreciates something of its ambivalence. But while Bewes’ notion of policing
cynical decadence with a critical postmodernism in its aim to challenge the current realities by bringing
out the invisible, the unpresentable, and opening space for transformation falls short of articulating a

5

I will be looking primarily at the work of Peter Sloterdijk and Judith Butler, both

together and independently. Liberal Cynicism is defined in part in contrast to
Sloterdijk’s model. I use Judith Butler in three ways, as resembling Liberal Cynicism, as
an example of an effective overcoming, and for providing grounds for theorizing a

generally applicable heuristic for fruitfully engaging Extreme Liberal Cynicism, for

which I also appeal to Sloterdijk. The primary purpose of this dissertation is to provide
a critique of Liberal Cynicism as a valuable condition within which lie the motivations

and resources for overcoming its pernicious extremes, theorizing this overcoming, and

showing how this overcoming may contribute positively to politics. Finally, given
Liberal Cynicism finds sure footing in a contemporary academia all-too-often reductive

and overly dismissive of enlightenment liberalism, this dissertation is also devoted to
contesting this disavowal.

specific and politically viable normative aspiration. Sharon Stanley promises, but does not provide, a
form of democracy equipped to incorporate and benefit from cynicism.

6

Part 1: Two Cynicisms
We can destroy ourselves by cynicism, just as effectively as by bombs.
- Sir. Kenneth Clarke 14
Where there is danger, a saving power also grows.
- Friedrich Hölderlin 15

Part 1 defines “Master” and “Liberal” Cynicism by engaging the existing

theoretical literature and some illuminating literary examples. The primary purpose of

focusing on literary examples is to signpost the phenomenology of a complex
experience without claiming to capture it. 16 The purpose of part 1 is to clarify the

phenomenology, causes, and dangers of Liberal Cynicism and argue that it contains the
motivation, impetus, and resources for overcoming its pernicious extremes. Chapter 2

defines “Master Cynicism,” a post-ideological “enlightened” consciousness which takes
advantage of naivety, ideals, ideology critique, and enlightenment in the pursuit of

power. It also explains why Extreme Liberal Cynicism is both poised to succumb to, and
ill-equipped to oppose, Master Cynicism.

14 Clarke, Kenneth. "Civilization." Prod. Peter Montagnon. Dir. Michael Gill. BBC2. London, 1969.
Television. Book version: Clarke, Kenneth. Civilization. Ney York: Harper & Row, 1969.
15 Hölderlin, Friedrich Selected Poems and Fragments Penguin Classics, London 1998
16 Part of the purpose of focusing on literary phenomenologies rather than psychoanalytic and
psychological studies was for several connected reasons. Firstly, there are no existing phenomenologies
or psychological studies of Liberal Cynicism to draw from. Secondly, first-personal experience may be
theoretically insufficient. Through a literary phenomenology I hoped to imagine relatively simple cases
analogous enough to forms of cynicism which the reader could attest to, and to provide a partly extraphenomenological theory to explain it. And while a further reason to remain in the realm of literature
was to avoid the mistake of attempting to psychoanalyze a general condition without psychoanalytic
training beyond theory, I want to nevertheless propose forms potentially amenable to psychological,
psychoanalytic, and psychiatric models. Footnote 518 on page 178 goes into more detail about the
relationship between psychoanalysis and cynicism.

7

Chapter 1: Liberal Cynicism, the Dangers, and the Promise
Introduction
Liberal Cynicism is a cynical consciousness traceable to investments in justice,

freedom, and equality. It is distinct from Peter Sloterdijk’s notion of Enlightened False
Consciousness and a model following Slavoj Žižek which I call Cynical Liberalism. While

Sloterdijk’s cynic disavows ideals due to the legacy of critique and the Cynical Liberal
veils a commitment to capitalist excess beneath a phony liberalism, Liberal Cynicism

remains genuinely invested in liberal ideals and experiences pain because of the
cognitive dissonance between ideology critique, persistent investments, and the

perceived failures of liberalism. At its extremes, this painfulness can compel Liberal

Cynicism to repress its constitutive ideals, a process which can manifest as Extreme

Liberal Cynicism. Extreme Liberal Cynicism is inherently harmful because while

providing short term amelioration it results in a longer lasting and self-perpetuating
melancholy. It is instrumentally harmful due to enabling the conditions that compel it.
Despite these dangers, Liberal cynicism contains both the motivation and resources for
avoiding extremes and for contributing positively to progressive politics.
Enlightened False Consciousness:

The discontent in our culture has assumed a new quality: it appears as a
universal, diffuse cynicism […] defined by its ubiquity. 17

In the Critique of Cynical Reason Peter Sloterdijk defines cynicism as ‘Enlightened

False Consciousness’ a state ‘that follows after naïve ideologies.’ 18 Sloterdijk

understands ideology as a pernicious normativity functioning on and within the

17
18

Sloterdijk, 3
Ibid, 5

8

individual yet also constituted by the community and wider institutional context.
Ideology is pernicious because it compels a false understanding justifying both the
agents’ position within oppressive superstructure and the superstructures themselves.

To refer to this ideological self-deception Sloterdijk develops Engel’s notion of “false

consciousness.” 19 On this view, ideology critique exposes the deception, irrationality,
and injustice of the dominant ideology to destabilize its normative grip for the sake of

emancipation from oppressive, unreasonable, or unjust norms. In this register,
Enlightenment includes the process of figuring out the limits of ideology and the

possibility of a more truthful, just, and reasonable world in light of critique. Per
Sloterdijk, ideology critique paved the way for cynicism; a complex characterized by

melancholy and desperate self-preservation undermining its investments in truth and
justice, 20 that cynicism is the enlightenment turned on itself, and turned sour. 21

Sloterdijk loctes the origin of this degeneration in the response to aggressive

attacks by anti-enlightenment forces coalescing in violent opposition to rational

19 ‘Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker. Consciously, it is true, but with a false
consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown; otherwise it simply would not be
an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives.’ Friedrich Engels in: Marx, Karl,
Friedrich Engels, and Fritz J. Raddatz. "Engels' Letter to Mehring." The Marx-Engels Correspondence: The
Personal Letters, 1844-1877: A Selection. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981.
20 For Sloterdijk the enlightenment is essentially the pursuit of a more just world through reason:
‘Something different does exist; at the same time, it is better. What is reasonable can thus also become
real. That is all enlightenment is trying to say.’ Sloterdijk, 55.
21 For an explanation of how cynicism originates in the enlightenment prior to the opposing forces, see
Stanley, Sharon A. The French Enlightenment and the Emergence of Modern Cynicism. New York:
Cambridge UP, 2012. Stanley argues that Enlightenment criticism of religion, “system Building”, nature,
and morality, coupled with its preference materialism and empiricism paved the way for cynicism at its
inception, by reducing human motivations to self-interest, morality to utilitarianism, sociability to
pretense. For Stanley, complicity is a logical next step.

9

dialogue. 22 In this context of disensus ideology critique was compelled to adopt extra-

rational strategies. 23 For Sloterdijk, this propelled a (d)evolution of enlightened
consciousness which was further catalysed by ill-supported, absolutist, and hypocritical
features within the foetal ideologies of the early “enlighteners.” Which is to say, while

the original enlighteners of the 17th and 18th centuries exposed religious ideology, they
were not free of pernicious dogmatic commitments and remained unaware of how

certain material and institutional processes associated with the enlightenment, as well

as remaining vulnerable to further critique misled, misinformed, and mistreated. Per
Sloterdijk, the Marxists, the French moralists, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Freud,
and Heidegger unmasked aspects of this enlightenment naiveté and in so doing

extended the lineage of enlightening ideology critique in revealing motivational

mechanisms at or below the foundations of conscious life for the sake of certain

emancipatory goals. For Sloterdijk though, this group and their intellectual progeny also

suffered from false consciousness. This pattern was repeated with each generation of

“unmaskers” and while the unmaskings of previous false consciousness at each stage
remained persuasive the therapeutic, revolutionary, and ameliorative responses did

not. A consequence was that the ideological superstructures critique revealed were

increasingly deemed universal and inescapable. The final stage, “Enlightened False
Consciousness” is enlightened to the necessity of false consciousness. We will call this
negative dialectical process “Cynicalization.”

22 ‘Enlightenment wants to talk about things hegemonic powers and traditions prefer to keep quiet about:
reason, justice, equality, freedom, truth.’ Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota, 1987. P. 14.
23 Degenerating into ‘the polemic continuation of miscarried dialogue by other means’ Sloterdijk, 14.

10

Sloterdijk’s notion of “Reflexive buffering” 24

is the consequence of

cynicalization, a self-implicating pre-emptive affirmation of falseness standing between
the cynic and fidelity to ideals. Because cynicism presupposes its own ideological
fallibility it is uniquely impenetrable to critique. While this acceptance of folly buffers

against criticism, it allows for knowingly embodying a false consciousness and
therefore, when compelled by pragmatic concerns capitulates to the dominant ideology,

which given it is also the off shoot of the enlightenment, is late capitalism. 25 For

Sloterdijk, knowingly perpetuating the system he bemoans the resigned cynic becomes
schizoid, exhausted, and miserable, suffering from a dissonance stemming from a
disparity between how he lives - a rote capitulation to the tyranny of mammon, what he

pretends to believe – liberalism, and what he actually believes – transcendental
falseness:

Psychologically, the contemporary cynic is a functional melancholic, able
to abate the depressive symptoms to remain in a degree of comfort, to
work. This is perhaps the key aspect of contemporary cynicism, the fact
that it is actually an ideal comportment for professional success in a
system where suspension of the ethical is so often the requisite for
“progress.” 26
To be stupid and have a job, that’s happiness. Only the converse of the
sentence reveals its full content: to be intelligent and to perform one’s
work in spite of it, that is unhappy consciousness in its modern form, ill
with enlightenment. 27

For Sloterdijk, this unhappy enlightenment finds its surest footing in a

contemporary critique once invested in exposing injustice and pursuing truth is now

‘This consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already
reflexively buffered’. Sloterdijk, 331.
25 ‘Cynical egos […] obey the rules of the game in the capitalist world without resistance.’ Ibid. p. 479.
26 Ibid.
27 Sloterdijk, 153.
24

11

content to find ‘extra rational mechanisms of opinion: interests, passions, fixations,

[and] illusions’ 28 beneath the professed positions of its opponents, reducing opponents’

subjectivity to ‘necessarily deluded epiphenomena’ 29 and assuming superiority over

others in virtue of adopting ‘the correct false consciousness.’ 30 For Sloterdijk, by

reducing debate to the avoidance of folly and attacking the opponent, ideology critique

fails its guiding normative aspiration of contesting injustice and untruth, in effect
abandoning its constitutive hopes. 31

This is the point where enlightenment, as cynicism, turns on its self. Through

ideology critique enlightenment deconstructed the notions of a God made soul, rational
autonomy, creative self-constitution, as well as a free, true, “authentic,” or even

transparent self. 32 A consequence was that coupled with the exponential proliferation

of anti-enlightenment criticisms by the mid-20th century implementing political change

based on the moral dignity, autonomy, and integrity of the individual was no longer a

unifying aspiration. In this context, Sloterdijk argues, a fraught view of subjectivity as a

Ibid
Sloterdijk, 15
30 Sloterdijk, Peter. Eldred, Michael. and Adelson, Leslie A. “Cynicism: The Twilight of False
Consciousness” New German Critique, No. 33, Modernity and Postmodernity (Autumn, 1984), pp. 190 –
206, p. 206.
31 ‘In the Feuilleton of the Zeit, the culture critics argue about the right way to be pessimistic’ Sloterdijk,
98 – 99. While Sloterdijk was writing in response to the wave of disillusionment that followed the ‘68
revolts, we can speak about a lack of solidarity across the theoretical humanities, and the “left,” and also,
the status of polemic oppositional rhetorical currently dominating political discourse: ‘the religious
criticize the areligious and vice versa, whereby each side has in its repertoire a metacritique of the
ideology critique used by the opposing side: the moves in the dialogue between the Marxists and liberals
are to a large extent fixed, likewise those between Marxists and anarchists, as well as those between
anarchists and liberals [and] one knows pretty well what natural scientists and representatives of the
humanities will accuse each other of’. Sloterdijk, 20. ‘Any sociological system theory that treats "truth"
functionalistically - I say this in advance — carries an immense potential for cynicism. And since every
contemporary intellect is caught up in the process of such sociological theories, it inevitably is implicated
in the latent or overt master cynicism of these forms of thinking’ Ibid.
32 ‘Reason sits, so to speak, behind a grating through which it believes it gains metaphysical insights, but
what at first seems like knowledge (Erkentinis) proves to be self-deception under the light of critique.’
Ibid. p. 35
28
29

12

chaotic warzone of competing interests and arbitrary material forces mirroring a

cynical vision of social life propagated. This vision was fraught because the
consciousness that housed such a view wrestled with an unwillingness to reject the

possibility of a unified self yet felt increasingly compelled to do so. According to
Sloterdijk, these anxious effects of critique manifested in crude and destructive forms of

material and psychic self-preservation: ‘What is called a subject in modern times is, in

fact, that self-preservation ego that withdraws step by step […] to the summit of

paranoia.’33 This includes the view that the advancements of industrialised war
compounded the critique-induced existential angst with a sense of profound material

vulnerability that left a fearfully self-defensive bleeding into culture: sad, critical,

hostile, and haunted by a sense of existential and economic precariousness. 34 In short,

51‘The Bomb is not one bit more evil than reality and not one bit more destructive than we are’ ibid,
131. ‘The ego without metaphysics to be sure, presents itself as cognitively modest [but] slides into an
explosive self-expansion, because from this denial onwards, it stands absolutely alone vis-à-vis the
universe. Only with this does the modern self-preserving and knowing ego achieve world dimensions’
Ibid 355.
33 Ibid, 131.
34 In The French Enlightenment and the Emergence of Modern Cynicism. New York: Cambridge UP, 2012.
Sharon Stanley shows how advanced consumer capitalism has produced postmodern cynics independent
of initiation or familiarity with critique, explaining that ‘a postmodern sensibility is the perfect
complement of a stage of capitalism marked by a flexible technique of production and consumption,
whether it is carefully theorized by academics or naturally adopted by consumers” (174). ‘The cynicism
of postmodernity emerges in a self-aware surrender to the perceived total victory of the empty spectacle
of consumer society,’ (175) ‘in the contemporary era, there is a mutual reinforcement between the logics
of postmodern theory and advanced capitalism, which might account for the special virulence and
ubiquity of postmodern cynicism’. (177) The ‘encounter with the thoroughly commodified, mediated,
spectacular world of late capitalism may encourage the growth of a generally skeptical demeanor that
appears to manifest, in a less self-conscious manner, theoretical principles routinely attacked by critics of
academic postmodernism […] ‘A postmodern sensibility is the perfect complement of a stage of
capitalism marked by a flexible technique of production and consumption, whether it is carefully
theorized by academics or naturally adopted by consumers” (174). ‘Cynicism of postmodernity emerges –
in a self-aware surrender to the perceived total victory of the empty spectacle of consumer society’.
(175).
33
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while Socrates’ conscience led him to conclude that the unexamined life was not worth
living, the cynic concludes that neither is the examined. 35
Cynical liberalism

The formula of cynicism is no longer the classic Marxian ‘they do not
know it, but they are doing it’ it is: ‘They know very well what they are
doing, yet they are doing it anyway.’ 36

Describing

cynicism

as

‘contemporary

ideology’s

dominant

mode

of

functioning’ 37 Slavoj Žižek shifts the critique of cynical reason into a Marxist
psychoanalytic context. Žižek adopts Sloterdijk’s notion of Enlightened False

Consciousness and that it results from an exhaustion of ideology critique culminating in
the realization that removing the glasses of ideology is impossible. Žižek also shares

Sloterdijk’s view that this realization renders ‘impossible the classic critical-ideological
procedure.’ 38 But while for Sloterdijk the cynical consciousness pragmatically defaults

to the status quo, Žižek raises the possibility of a more complex relationship between

cynicism, late capitalism, and liberalism. Per Žižek, cynicism is not a relationship to
ideology, it is ideology, a false consciousness belying an unconscious ritually

internalized submission to the capitalist super-structure: ‘This very cynical denial is a
Cooper, John M., and D. S. Hutchinson (eds.). "The Apology" in Plato Complete Works. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Pub., 1997.
36 Žižek, Slavoj, “The Specter of Ideology” in The Žižek Reader, Eds. Wright, Elizabeth and Wright, Edmond
Blackwell, 1999. P. 61-62 Žižek here cites, Marx, Karl. "Chapter 1: The Commodity." Capital: A Critique of
Political Economy. The version I referred to: Trans. Ben Fowkes. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992 (1867),
pp. 125-56.
37 Žižek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology Verso 1989 p. 28.
38 Žižek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, 1989, pp. 29 – 30. Cynicism is invulnerable to
critique because it is ‘not subject to a symptomatic reading or to a confrontation with its blank spots.’
Ibid. ‘That is why we must avoid the simple metaphors of de-masking, of throwing away the veils which
are supposed to hide the naked reality’ - Žižek, p. 28-29.
38 Žižek, Slavoj, “The Specter of Ideology” in the Žižek Reader, Eds. Wright, Elizabeth and Wright, Edmond
Blackwell, 1999, p. 73.
35
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way we mask, we obfuscate, and conceal.’ 39 By reflecting on Žižek we can come up with
a persuasive account of a function of cynicism which explains better than Sloterdijk
how the cynic embraces capitalism even while “knowing” it to be flawed.

For Žižek, while professing disdain at the ills of capitalism the cynic behaves ‘‘as

if’’ it holds absolute authority, 40 an acquiescence sustained by a tripartite psychic
structure of concealing fantasies: 1) ideology critique of capitalism, 2) cynical distance,

and 3) “commodity fetishism.” 41 While the cynic criticizes capitalist injustices they

resign to the impossibility of alternatives through a combination of Enlightened False
Consciousness and a reification of capitalism as necessary. The third fantasy – money’s

promise of infinite commodities – ameliorates the cost of this denial. 42 These beliefs

function to conceal the guilt of willful complicity within a system the cynic “knows” is

both corrupt and contingent:

this logic of ‘putting the blame on the circumstances’ […] leads to the
unforgettable – and no less ideological – cynicism of Brecht’s famous lines
from his Threepenny Opera: ‘Wir Wären gut anstatt so roh, doch die

This cynical position is effectively an impossible one [….] What is repressed is not our non-belief, but
our belief. People publicly pretend, I'm cynical, I don't believe, and so on, but secretly you believe. […] So
why is this important? Because if it were as simple as that we live in a cynical age, then the critique of
ideology would be effectively impossible. […] In a totally cynical attitude, your answer would have been:
So what? I know this. It's not serious. Are you kidding? We all know this, and so on. I claim that real life
mechanisms are much more refined. This very cynical denial is a way we mask, we obfuscate, we conceal
from ourselves that we take our ideological premises much more seriously than we pretend to.’
40 ‘It may be that the ‘official’ ideology of our society is Christian spirituality, but its actual foundation is
none the less the idolatry of the Golden Calf, money.’ Žižek, Slavoj, “The Specter of Ideology” in The Žižek
Reader, Eds. Wright, Elizabeth and Wright, Edmond Blackwell, 1999. P. 73
41 Žižek argues people know that money has value only because of the embedded socio-economic
relations, but their actions betray their true unconscious beliefs; that money is value. Z� iž ek follows Marx’
view that this is an illusion perpetuated by advanced capitalism “the very process of production functions
as the fetish which conceals the crucial dimension of the form”. Marx, Karl Capital: A Critique of Political
Economy, Volume One – The Process of Capitalist Production. Moore, S., Aveling, E. (trans), New York: The
Modern Library. 1906 pp 81–82, 83.
42 For Žižek this enables the cynic ‘to accept the way things effectively are – since they have their fetish to
which they can cling in order to cancel the full impact of reality.’ Žižek, Slavoj. On Belief. New York:
Routledge. 2001 p 14.
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Verhältnisse, sie sind nicht so! (we would be good instead of being so
rude, if only the circumstances where not of this kind). 43

Through this triad of psychic operations the inadmissible guilt 44 of acting in

accordance with late capitalism’s ethos of brute self-interest is eclipsed. 45 Furthermore,
along with the internalized submission to capitalism, through ritualized practical

reinforcement and absolutizing narrative cynics performatively reify the illusion of its
necessity. 46 In this way, cynics aid and abet an unjust and destructive paradigm by

assuming themselves post-ideological jaded enlightened pragmatists, consciously

critical of, but unconsciously obedient to the demands of capitalism. 47 We will call this

“Cynical Liberalism.” While Sloterdijk’s cynic is genuinely ideologically exhausted, the

Cynical Liberal unconsciously pretends to be, and while Sloterdijk’s cynic is unhappy,
43 Žižek, Slavoj, “The Specter of Ideology” in The Žižek Reader, Eds. Wright, Elizabeth and Wright, Edmond
Blackwell, 1999. P. 58.
44 ‘Cynical distance and full reliance on fantasy are strictly co-dependent: the typical subject today is the
one who, while displaying cynical distrust of any public ideology, indulges without restraint in paranoiac
fantasies about conspiracies, threats, and excessive forms of enjoyment’ Žižek, Slavoj, “Re-visioning
‘Lacanian’ Social Criticism: The Law and its Obscene Double” in Slavoj Žižek: Interrogating the Real, Eds
Butler, Rex and Stephens, Scott, Continuum, London 2005. P. 305. This is also explained in Žižek, Slavoj,
The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso. 1989, p 18; Žižek, Slavoj. The Indivisible Remainder: An
Essay on Schelling and Related Matters. London: Verso. 1996, p 4; Žižek, Slavoj, The Plague of Fantasies.
London: Verso. 1997, p 105, 120; Žižek, Slavoj (2001b). The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski
between Theory and Post-Theory. London: The British Film Institute 2001, p 166.
45 As Adrian Johnston, the pre-eminent Žižek scholar explains on his behalf; capitalist liberal-democratic
ideology allows ‘for individuals to be as dismissive as they desire, precisely so that they find their
conformity bearable as something depersonalized, disowned, and thereby held at arm’s length.’ Johnston,
Adrian “The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Žižek and the Dynamics of Belief” in Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society
Vol 9 issue 3, 2004, p. 264.
46 On this picture, subjectivities within the “Big Other” of late capitalism’s Symbolic Order - the system of
morays, customs, laws, and norms that uphold the material and immaterial structures of social life - are
formed in response to that which they simultaneously performatively reinforce, compelled by the pursuit
of psychic homeostasis within an order erroneously deemed absolute. ‘The Institution exists only when
subjects believe in it, or, rather, act (in their social interactivity) AS IF they believe in it.’ Žižek, Slavoj “The
Art of the Ridiculous Sublime: On David Lynch’s Lost Highway.” Seattle: University of Washington Press.
2000, p. 26.
47 ‘‘the modern subject explicitly claims not to believe, while in his unconscious he does so.’’ Žižek, Slavoj.
For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor, second edition. London: Verso, 2002, p
ciii ‘we perform our symbolic mandates without assuming them and ‘‘taking them seriously’’ Žižek, Slavoj
On Belief. New York: Routledge. 2001 p 70.
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the Cynical Liberal, rather than submitting to the materialism and self-preservation of

advanced capitalism out of sadness, fear, and exhaustion, enjoys it, protected from guilt,

sadness, and critique by the fantasies of moral and intellectual superiority and limitless

potential consumption. 48 Furthermore, unlike Sloterdijk’s cynic uncomfortably and
knowingly pretending to be liberal, the Cynical Liberal believes himself liberal indeed,

he ‘insists upon the mask.’ 49

A literary-phenomenology
Through a literary-phenomenology of examples from Jess Row’s American

Cynicism and its Cure 50 we see that Enlightened False Consciousness and Cynical

Liberalism cannot account for solid examples of cynicism. An analysis of these

examples enables us to hypothesize an alternative cynicism more ideologically
fraught than Sloterdijk’s resigned consumer and which suffers more than the
Cynical Liberal, a cynicism painfully torn between liberal hopes and pessimism.

Like Sloterdijk, Row’s “mature” 51 cynicism germinates in exhaustive and

exhausted ideology critique which, assuming the necessity and falseness of value

48 Within this context we have a framework to understand Žižek’s description of cynicism as both
ideologically exhausted and ideological. Since it provides a framework for meaning, cynicism is an
ideology in the descriptive sense. Since it is self-deceptive - permitting a pragmatic rejection of liberalism
while still publicly “believing” it - it is an ideology in the pejorative sense familiar to critique. In this way,
the purpose of demythologizing the view of cynicism as value-barren is to show how it functions as
ideology: the idea that we live in a post-ideological society proceeds a little too quickly: cynical reason
[…] leaves untouched […] the level on which ideology structures the social reality itself’ Žižek, Slavoj. The
Sublime Object of Ideology Verso 1989 p. 30.
49 Žižek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology Verso 1989 pgs. 29 – 30.
50 Row, Jess. ““American Cynicism and its Cure”.” Home. Boston Review, 18 May 2015. Web. 10 Dec. 2015.
51 Row distinguishes between adolescent and mature cynicism. The signature example of the former is is
from Hal Ashby’s Harold and Maude (Harold and Maude. Dir. Hal Ashby. Perf. Bud Court and Ruth Golden.
Paramount Home Entertainment (UK), 1971. Film.) Where Harold’s petulant adolescent cynicism is
transformed into a life-affirming joy by the eccentric holocaust survivor. This movie is an example of the
romanticized opposition between Kynicism and cynicism and how the vitality of life can overcome many
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paradigms pollutes any ameliorative encounter with a self-fulfilling presupposition

of its inevitable failure. Row also adds a psychoanalytic layer to Sloterdijk’s
picture, but while the Cynical Liberal successfully eclipses suffering, Row’s

melancholy cynic fantasizes “solutions” which fail. This failed fantasizing
condemns the cynic to oscillate between false hopes and disillusion, all the while
slipping deeper into a perpetual traumatizing re-fortification.

Per Row, cynicism stems from guilty-privilege: ‘the cynicism of today is a

product of intense yet diffuse guilt.’ 52 Row’s notion of cynical guilt relates to
Sloterdijk’s “status cynicism,” the embarrassment through which heirs of the
enlightenment look back at its naivety. From this analysis Row adds a vague

consciousness of complicity with these failures as a valence of cynical guilt. Row
calls cynicism a ‘guilty, white sadness,’ 53 the “dominant value of white America”

definitive of contemporary “normative whiteness” 54 but this racializing is hugely

problematic. 55 Row draws examples exclusively from what he calls ‘“authentic”
liberal art,’ 56 which means independent cinema, indie-rock, and “leftist”

cynicisms. This is distinct to mature cynicism which, having gone through cycles of fortification is
invulnerable to Maude like solutions. This dissertation deals with a mature cynicism.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Row’s introduction of race is misleading because while he is right that Liberal Cynicism occupies the
consciousness of a predominantly white American demographic, he overlooks that this demographic is
dominated by a social/economic/intellectual middle class, and is absent in the kind of normativity behind
the rise of Donald Trump, the political (pseudo) Christian right, and the Tea Party, such that identifying
Liberal Cynicism with normative whiteness is partial and problematically simplistic. This is important for
more than just clarifying Row’s nuanced position, because the non-recognition or aggressive disavowal of
guilt in white American conservatism – both at the “top” and the “bottom’ (what we will shortly call
“Master” and “Mastered cynicism”) – is a disaster, the scope of which is amplified in the absence of robust
opposition, an inertia amplified by the encroachment of Liberal Cynicism.
56 “It is not difficult to imagine Harold reappearing as Andy Kaufman, Christopher Walken, Wes Anderson,
or a disembodied voice in the work of Don DeLillo, David Foster Wallace, or Sam Lipsyte. Which is
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literature. 57 Although takes this to be associated with being white, this condition is
representative of a portion of the liberally educated American middle-classes

which combine a higher-education-born and uncomfortable disavowal of ideals

and a sense of failed responsibility with the economic and existential precarity of

being nearer the very poor than the rich.

Row cites characters in Lorrie Moore’s Anagrams 58 and The Gate at the

Stairs as examples of this guilty white cynicism. 59 The protagonists are both poor

and well-educated and claim to reject the conservatism of their working-class
backgrounds for its ignorance and complicity in injustice, and the hyper-privilege,

superficiality, and hypocrisy of progressive alternatives. Both sustain their
alienation, choosing “exotic” lovers either through eyes they superimpose onto

others, or wrongly assume to be their own. Both drift ghost-like through the world
quietly enduring trauma, and responding with childlike fantasizing, barely
managing to stay afloat through detached ironic observations levelling the profane

and the profound in a trans-idealistic somnambular equanimity. Moore’s

characters are very modern and very cynical. The following quotes capture their
crudest extremes:

another way of saying that Harold’s disposition - the frozen, catatonic expression; the flat, measured
words; the unswerving bleakness of his voice; the feigned nonchalance or childlike mock-innocence - is
everywhere in contemporary American culture.”
57 Row cites The Lost Weekend (1945), One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962), The Feminine Mystique
(1963) Adding to the list doesn’t require much effort, Easy Rider (1969), Vanishing point (1971), A
Clockwork Orange (1971), American Psycho (2000), Dancer In The Dark (2000), House Of Sand And Fog
(2003), Revolutionary Road (2008), Whatever Works (2012), Leaving Las Vegas (1995), Happiness
(1998), Shame (2011) etc. etc. Sylvia Plath, Ally Sheedy, Ian Curtis. Row also cites eating disorders,
addiction, co-dependencies, self-abuse, depression, anxiety, attention deficit disorder, dysfunction, and
suicide in white America as evidence.
58 Moore, Lorrie. Anagrams: A Novel. New York: Knopf, 1986.
59 Moore, Lorrie. A Gate at the Stairs: Alfred A Knopf, New York, 2009.
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There was this to be said for sedatives: They help you adjust to death
better. 60

Love is the cultural exchange program of futility and eroticism.

Meaning, if it existed at all, was unstable and could not survive. 61
Life is unendurable, and yet everywhere it is endured. 62

Moore’s admittedly exaggerated characters nevertheless approximate

reality, and their cynicism is united by a traumatized, vulnerable, and detached
negativity, and perhaps uniquely, a degree of maturity in that its painfulness, and

on occasions even the cause of this painfulness is transparent. Row uses Lauren
Berlant’s notion of ‘cruel optimism’ 63 to argue that these examples reduce to a
state in which, although alleviation is sought, ‘the object/scene that ignites the

sense of possibility, actually makes it impossible to attain.’ 64 In making this

connection Row invokes Berlant’s diagnosis of our “neo-liberal” present as

structured through ‘crisis ordinariness:’ 65 an everydayness prefaced on a ‘sociality
traumatized’ 66 by a postmodern existential and material precarity which has
‘shattered’ the dreams of an ‘ongoing, uneventful ordinary life’ 67 and left behind a

battle-worn, trauma-born cynicism. Cruel optimism is the consequence, a

desperate panicked attachment to fantasies which inhibit flourishing but allow

‘There was this to be said for sedatives: They help you adjust to death better. […] Sedate as a mint, a
woman could place a happy hand on the shoulder of death and rasp out “Waddya say, buddy, wanna
dance?” Also, you could get chores done, you could get groceries bought. You could do laundry and fold.’
Ibid, 12.
61 Moore, Lorrie. Anagrams: A Novel. New York: Knopf, 1986. P. 130.
62 Ibid. P. 303.
63 Berlant, Lauren. Cruel Optimism. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2011. P. 2.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. pgs. 1-10.
60
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people to make it through the day through minimally motivating yet tragically
unattainable hopes. The cruelty is that this optimism sustains rather than
alleviates cynical melancholy.

We can distinguish two ways whereby cruel optimism curses cynicism

which suit the terms of our analysis hitherto. The first mirrors Sloterdijk’s

functional melancholic suffering in a ‘depressive stasis that could be called

“coping” faux-moral, selfish, and opportunistic, seeking material betterment as a shield
from the radical disengagement of full-blown pessimism, perpetuating an unhappy
getting-by, superficially optimistic about the next indulgence.’ 68 In Berlant’s parlance

such cynics have promised themselves to a barely sustaining hedonism so as to avoid
having to face up to what Sloterdijk defined as the ‘abyssal meaninglessness with which
the deeply intelligent contemporary cynic is familiar.’ 69 The second is more deeply

pained, seeing through superficial consumerism and restricting potential sources

of escape to that which its guilt-ridden critique permits, but tragically,

simultaneously prohibits. Row’s first example, the protagonist from Anagrams –
Benna Carpenter – rejects both the conservatism of her family and the liberal

progressivism of her adoptive community for incoherency, hypocrisy, and
insincerity. 70 Manic, ungrateful, aggressive, and plagued by an isolating intellectual
faux-depression, Benna is desperate for a reason to live. 71 Out of this desperation

Benna seeks a lover capable of providing a salvation compatible with her ideology

Sloterdijk, Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. 460.
Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
70 ‘Despite our various ways of resembling yuppies […] we hated yuppies.’ Ibid. 29.
71 I run downstairs and out into the street with my pajamas on, gasping, waiting for something – a car? An
Angel? – to come rescue or kill me, but there was nothing, only streetlights and a cat […] “There must be
things that can save us!” I wanted to shout. But they are just not here’ Ibid. 23 and 38 respectively.
68
69
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critique. Thus, she rejects her white wannabe opera singer boyfriend and pursues

a black Vietnam veteran upon whom she superimposes qualities that suit her
fantasy of an authentic post idealistic hero. 72 The fantasy frays and Benna leaves

the relationship thoroughly disappointed because Darrel “just” wants to be a
dentist. 73 As Row explains:

For her, Darrel is not just an emblem of psychological health and
sexual healing; he represents an entirely different order of
redemption as well. Darrel, on the other hand, can take a joke, but he
can’t ironize away his desire for a solid income, a professional career,
the terminally uncool, unexceptional, bourgeois life Benna has
mocked so relentlessly […] Darrel is this fiction’s fiction, or, more
precisely, this fiction’s fantasy, its object of cruel optimism. 74

Benna believes herself to be anti-bourgeois, post-naïve, and post-

ideological, and that thanks to the enlightenment she provides Darrell should
escape his “false consciousness” but her critique and attraction is self-deceptive

and distorting. The consequence is that while hoping to embrace alternative ideals
through the love of the other Benna fails to recognize the other at all. 75 The

conditions of her hope prohibit it. When Benna begins to wake up to her selfdeception, this trauma compels a deepened cynicism pushing hope further into

inaccessible regions of the psyche. Moore portrays this in truly tragic form with
Fantasizing that Darrell is capable of ‘such moral anger’, ‘astonishing gestures’ and ‘huge moments’
when actually he is an aspiring dentist and a bad poet. Moore, Lorrie. Anagrams. New York: Knopf, 1986.
P. 89.
73 Ibid. 191 – 194.
74 Row, Jess. “American Cynicism and its Cure”. Home. Boston Review, 18 May 2015. Web. 10 Dec. 2015.
75 Darrel, more of a realist than a fantasist, calls out Benna remarkably unreflective hypocrisy ‘You Benna,
are the most Bourgeois person I know’ p. 192 A tragic moment of potential and dashed intersectionality,
and surely one of the largest obstacles in overcoming the disaster of race relations in contemporary
America, where two systems of oppression – in this case, poverty, and racism – descend into comparison
and competition, root causes of segregation. This opportunity lost, is to oppose the primary means of
oppression: ignorance and the tyranny of mammon.
72
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Benna imagining herself the mother of a sweet 5-year-old girl, ending the book
with a heart-breaking descent into trauma-born delusion:

Life is sad. Here is someone […] a gift I have given myself, a lozenge of
pretend. 76

Row also cites Moore’s A Gate at the Stairs wherein Susan who, living under a

false name to hide from an accidentally infanticidal past, adopts a mix-raced girl and

outsources her upbringing, simultaneously facing up to, and hiding from, the past.

Susan organizes a weekly support group for multiracial families in a Midwestern college

town wherein resigned angry fatalism is thrown around with no solutions or hope

offered in response:

The Jews got reparations from the Nazis, but who actually got the
money? Well-to-do Jewish grandchildren who hardly need it at all. 77

School is white. And school is female. So it’s the boys of color who
have the hardest time, and if they’re not into sports the gangs will
lure them in. I guess we already knew that. 78

Row develops Moore’s implication that this hopeless indignation is prefaced

on a combination of insecurity and immovability concerning ideals and
investments and exposes the “colorful” range of characters as from the same
bubble of relative privilege. As Susan’s put-upon nanny remarks: ‘it had all begun

to sound like a spiritually gated community of liberal chat.’ 79 Susan’s cynicism is

similarly driven by guilt and in assuming liberalism’s inefficacy also results in a
Moore, Lorrie. Anagrams. New York: Knopf, 1986. P. 225. Benna cynicism is tragic for missing the
opportunities for joy right in front of her, in contrast to this lozenge of pretend Gerard loved her and
loved kids, ‘sometimes I think that without children we remain beasts or dust. That we are like something
lost at sea’ p. 6.
77 Ibid. P. 156.
78 Moore, Lorrie. Anagrams: A Novel. New York: Knopf, 1986. P. 155. my italics.
79 Ibid. P. 188.
76
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practical disavowal of liberal ideals. 80 While Benna’s optimism is cruel, Susan’s group
has abandoned it altogether. The cruelty here is the hopelessness. Row’s account

captures Sloterdijk’s description:

In the new cynicism, we see a detached negativity which scarcely
allows itself any hope, at most a little irony and self-pity. 81

This guilty cynicism plagues those who having floated above the bottom of

societies’ echelons and see themselves as among the scum on polluted waters,

insecure about complicity in injustice, educated in critique, invested in justice and
equality, and pained by their scarcity. Tragically, this pain is felt so deeply that it

compels denial and fails the ideals upon which it depends. While this guilty

cynicism may seek catharsis, immunized against hope by the universalization of
despair it nevertheless remains trapped, experiencing temporary alleviation through
indignant rage, ironic pseudo-levity, a neurotic hostility towards the world, and a

special hatred for the idealistic and “naively” liberal. This condemns Susan’s group to a
self-perpetuating cycle, leaving the cynics cynical and the world unchanged, as Row
concludes:

[This] can be summed up in Sloterdijk’s phrase: “reflexively
buffered.” Whether we call it cynicism, melancholy, depression, or
simply sadness, we are talking about a state that maintains itself. 82

On this picture, a reason cynicism sustains itself is that whenever it verges on

the self-awareness which would reveal its fantasy and reification, because it would also

Susan’s group characterizes Timothy Bewes’ notion of cynicism as postmodernity reified; a ‘disabled
critique that mistakes its own absence for a kind of universalized rigor’ Bewes, Timothy. Cynicism and
Postmodernity. London: Verso, 1997. P. 41.
81 Sloterdijk, Peter. Eldred, Michael. and Adelson, Leslie A. “Cynicism: The Twilight of False
Consciousness” New German Critique, No. 33, Modernity and Postmodernity (Autumn, 1984), pp. 190 –
206, p. 194
82 Row, Jess. “American Cynicism and its Cure”. Home. Boston Review, 18 May 2015. Web. 10 Dec. 2015.
80
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reveal its complicity in the forces its ideals oppose, it risks an inadmissible guilt. This

guilt and powerlessness is eclipsed by reifying hopelessness, replacing the trauma of

seeing what is wrong and knowing it could and should be different with the

insurmountability of illiberal forces. This is how, while it seems so unpleasant to the

outsider, extreme cynical hopelessness plays an ameliorative role. Crucially, this
process is never fully successful and the inevitable return of the repressed compels a

panicked, irrational, and hostile refusal to auto-critique, ideals, idealism, and hopes, as

well as calls for action. This picture fits Žižek’s notion of cynicism as ideology and
Sloterdijk’s account of cynicism’s predilection for fantasy, a condition where ‘a hard

sense for the facts slides over into the fictional, the histrionic, and bluff.’ 83 This cynical
hopelessness is maintained by a fantasized vision of the irredeemability of man, a

coping mechanism for avoiding pain which tragically only creates a deeper pain,
and adds self-deception, obstinacy, hostility, and irrationality, and worse still,

perpetuates the causes of the pain it seeks to alleviate, trapping itself in a cycle of

largely self-inflicted melancholy precluding imaginative sources of contestation. 84

While Susan’s group laments the ills of late-capitalism they nevertheless continue to
live within it, unable or unwilling to imagine a society that is not plagued with the same
problems. Susan’s group is overwhelmed by the worlds’ problems and assumes an

identity of hopelessness to eclipse the unbearable feeling of powerlessness. This also

enables Susan’s extremely cynical community to assume both moral and intellectual
Ibid. p. 473.
We see this predilection for fantasy both in Benna and Susan’s doomed and delusional relationships, in
Benna’s assumption of enlightened consciousness, and in Susan’s fraught commitment to the superiority
and inefficacy of liberal ideals.
83
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superiority. The moral superiority comes from assuming an association with the
“correct ideals,” and intellectual superiority from “knowing” their inefficacy. Benna is

overwhelmed by the falseness of ideology and fails to overcome it by fantasizing

impossible alternatives. Both strategies are adopted to defend against future

disappointment and by not having to doubt itself. By presuming the worst, the cynical

consciousness never feels let down, fooled, or deceived and takes solace in having its
suspicions validated. As Sloterdijk put it: ‘it is the universally widespread way in which

enlightened people see to it that they are not taken for suckers.’ 85 In this way, this

painful delusion tragically sustains itself. In a rare moment of clarity, when A Gate at the
Stairs’ protagonist breaks up with her Muslim boyfriend, she initiates an argument

about the problems with Islam and while she drifts off into a day dream where he is a
terrorist he pithily diagnoses her cynicism:

You feel you have a kind of wisdom, very mistaken, but a mistake of some
power to you, and you sadly treasure it and grow it. 86
While

characterizing

familiar

cynicisms,

neither

Enlightened

False

Consciousness or Cynical Liberalism adequately explain these examples. Both lack the
self-transparency of Sloterdijk’s cynic, neither disavows liberalism, and both suffer

more than the Cynical Liberal. In calling out the hypocrisy and sham of attempted
liberalisms, while critical of liberal ideals as ideology, Benna struggles with and

ultimately fails a naïve liberalism she nevertheless remains invested. Susan’s
righteous indignation also belies persistent liberal investments albethey immunized

against hope. Because neither is post-ideological they are not Enlightened False
85
86

Sloterdijk. p. 473.
Moore, Lorrie. Anagrams: A Novel. New York: Knopf, 1986. P. 206.
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Consciousness. Because both are genuinely invested in liberal ideals neither are they

Cynical Liberalism. Due to critique, Sloterdijkian cynicism suffers total ideological

exhaustion and knowingly capitulates to consumerism, and Cynical Liberalism is

comfortably numb to the failings of liberalism. By contrast, although suffering a

reflexively buffered universalization of liberalism’s inevitable failure, or merely failing

it, in both our examples the abandonment of liberalism is based on perceiving it as
a failure as well as doubting its truth, and crucially, perceiving this failure as a

tragedy. 87 While Benna and Susan suffer from guilt, powerlessness, fantasy, conflict,
denial, defeatism, rage, 88 despair, and cruel optimism, Sloterdijk’s cynic is merely
pragmatically resigned. The cynicism our examples signpost is hostile, pseudo-

realistic, worryingly self-reflexive, in a fraught relationship with ideals, and crucially,
painful.

Liberal cynicism: Cynical pain
On Sloterdijk’s account cynicism suffers from a persistent niggling melancholy

traced to an alienating discrepancy between its deeds and the values it once held but
has now rejected: between pragmatic ideological affiliation and enlightened falseness.

But can a disparity between practical reason and (un)belief account for cynical

obstinacy, insecurity, self-destructiveness, obliviousness, defensiveness, rage, and

Benna gives up on Darrel, and love, assuming the failure to be more the world’s than hers, and retreats
into delusions, and Susan, after the failure of her fantastical solution – Mary – embraces the hopelessness
of her support group, after the system has failed her.
88 Benna Carpenter is prone to self-pitying, sarcasm, and pathological neuroses, given to flashes of
mordant humor and manic, (self) righteous anger’ thinly veiling the trauma of losing her lover and best
friend beneath a hip intellectual ennui, and the tragic creation of an imaginary child. Benna is an ideal
candidate of the cynic as traumatized romantic, traumatized idealist, mourning for lost ideals. In a
moment of perhaps enlightened falseness, Benna describes her own cynicism: ‘the function of disguise is
to convince the world you’re not there, or that if you are, you should not be eaten. You camouflage
yourself as imperious […] simply to hang on and survive’ P. 194.
87
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despair? If cynicism merely feigns pragmatism and idealism, the tension between
practical reason and conscious belief wouldn’t compel the painful dissonance of a

schizoid and miserable cynic. If our analyses signpost real cynicisms, then there is
reason to seek an alternative model to an account for this phenomenological and

psychological complexity. My thesis is that these familiar varieties of cynicism are

better explained as originating in a tension between equally authoritative but
incompatible impulses, specifically between ideals, ideology critique, and deep

disappointments. 89 Given this view of cynical grief emanating from a dependence on

89 Characters in Christopher Nolan’s “Dark Knight Trilogy” (Dir. Christopher Nolan. Warner Bros.
Pictures) can serve as helpfully simplified and dramatic examples for explaining a liberally invested
cynicism. At first glance one might regard the Joker as prime example of a Master Cynic. He has the
familiar Hobbesian, Machiavellian view of human nature: “When the chips are down, these civilized
people, they’ll eat each other.” Indeed, the Joker’s cynicism is deeper, for while Hobbes supported
absolute sovereign power to avert the sufferings of a reversion to the state of nature, the Joker by
contrast professes to revel in the “truth” of metaphysical chaos and man’s essential barbarism and
opposes the imposition of civility, echoing the philosophy of his spiritual father the Marquise that says: if
man struggles to contain his savagery, then unleash the beast. The first key difference between the Joker’s
and Master Cynicism, and indeed, also the way in which the Joker is akin to Diogenes, is his complete
rejection of conventional value, symbolized so beautifully as he sits atop a burning pile of mobsters’
millions and in his disengagement with politics and power. The second key difference concerns cognitive
dissonance, for the Joker can be seen to exhibit something of that Lucian-like discomfort belying a
repressed trauma, a discomfort that may place him within the unhappier consciousness of the inhibited
schizoid cynic. That the Joker is dissatisfied with merely being ‘ahead of the curve’ (Their morals, their
code; it's a bad joke. Dropped at the first sign of trouble. They're only as good as the world allows them to
be. You'll see- I'll show you. When the chips are down these, uh, civilized people? They'll eat each other.
See I'm not a monster, I'm just ahead of the curve’) can be seen in his needs for others to submit to his
ideology. The Joker, rather than being an agent of chaos, is tied to a universalist morality of good and evil,
and that the good life is achieved by embracing our true nature. This resembles a virtue theory familiar to
romantic and Greek schools of thought. It is precisely this twisted hope for humanity that motivates the
Joker’s need to persuade and to convert and which belies a latent dissatisfaction with the status quo and
an unstable a belief in his ethics. The Joker struggles between rejecting and embracing values, as can be
seen in his need to expose the naiveté of others and to validate his extremely cynical views. The
motivation to convert emanates from a latent inability to disregard doubt. This is why the Joker wants to
subject Gotham to madness and anarchy; it’s why he targets Harvey dent, not to kill him, for his
martyrdom could not satiate his needs, but if he can expose the highest symbol of hope as a chaotic brutal
madman, he can thereby universalize his cynicism, eradicating the doubts sown by a latent idealism. This
is why he doesn’t try to kill Batman, but instead to get him to abandon his code of ethics: The Joker seeks
validation through proselytization because he is still an idealist, and inauthentically anti-ideological, both
in his failure to accept his idealism, and in his disability to embrace the chaos he proposes as the truth.
That is to say, when the Joker states that ‘the only sensible way to live in this world is without rules’ he
reveals his true ideology, indeed a universal rationalism and system of ethical virtue; beneath the mask of
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genuine commitments to liberal ideals is the pivot around which the arguments in this
dissertation move, we need to establish further why to suppose it.

Firstly, it better explains both Sloterdijk and Row’s analyses and our model of

Cynical Liberalism. This idea is inchoate in Sloterdijk who, although defining
cynicism as post-ideological, speaks to its liberal investments. This can be seen

where he describes the cynic as burdened by rather than insisting on the dominant

ideology, and that the cynic’s melancholy includes mourning a prohibited innocence

which results from seeing its idealistic hopes crushed under the weight of perceived
material, economic, and existential precariousness: ‘Within this unhappy consciousness,

there remain the echoes of ideals quite distinct.’ 90 Sloterdijk also describes cynicism as
the absurdist clown’s embrace of chaos, he champions violence and mayhem as the universal route to the
best, if not the good life. A truly morally chaotic agency would be as likely to commit profound acts of
kindness as it would murder. The Joker then, rather than being an agent of chaos, is tied to a universalist
morality of good and evil. This inchoate belief that human happiness is achieved by embracing its true
nature resembles a virtue theory familiar to Christian, romantic, and Greek schools of thought. The
“happiness” he has discovered and his “authentic alternative” to what he takes himself to be destroying:
the decaying fragments of once vivid ideals a hypocritical culture vainly clings onto, to reveal that people,
deep down inside, are nasty and cruel, but wear masks of civility to hide it. In seeing the “slave morality”
of the herd as a cosmic joke lies a hope for humanity that motivates the Joker’s need to persuade and to
convert, and which belies a latent dissatisfaction with the status quo, a belief in truth, as well as
repressed, unacknowledged ideals and the cognitive dissonance lamenting the failure of them. In this way
when the A Joker announces, ‘Kill you? I don't wanna kill you. What would I do without you? Go back to
ripping off mob dealers? No. No. No! No you – you complete me’ by personifying an alternative belief in
the good, the Batman offers the promise of completion in the sense of the romantic unification of self, if
he can successfully convince Batman that his is the superior ideology, which would enable him to
overcome his own doubts, and avoid cognitive dissonance. This condition of needing to destroy outward
manifestations of what has been internalized and foreclosed indicates both the fraught “schizoid”
constitution and the impossibility of such foreclosure.
90 ‘Within this unhappy consciousness, there remain the echoes of ideals quite distinct […] but the
tendency is to assume, if I don’t act, someone else will, and I will lose my place, the place into which I am
so unknowingly habitually ingrained that I cannot envisage an alternative. In this sense, the cynic feels
simultaneously as victim and as martyr – behind the façade of collaboration there is a vulnerable
unhappiness and the need to cry for lost innocence, for the haunting dreams of a radically improved
situation’. Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. Later,
Sloterdijk again gestures towards a notion of cynicism not ideologically exhausted, more tormented than
the bored hedon of chapter 1, describing cynicism as a ‘perversely complicated structure […] more
melancholy than false; it is a consciousness that, under the compulsions of self-preservation continues to
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knowingly going against its better knowledge: ‘To act against better knowledge is today

the global situation in the superstructure; it [cynicism] knows itself to be without

illusions and yet to have been dragged down by the "power of things."’ 91 A good way to
make sense of these “echoes,” “dreams,” “better knowledge” and subordination to the

“power of things” is to posit a cynicism composed of persistent ideals struggling in a
world which refuses to embrace them. Put simply, we are not nostalgic about what we

don’t value. Furthermore, when Sloterdijk claims that cynics “struggle to live with the

plurality of ideologies,” 92 and reduces debate and critique to hostile competition in
defence of the “correct falseness” we should ask why would Enlightened False

Consciousness have opponents? Let alone feel compelled to attack specific
ideals/ideologies? And if cynicism is “post-ideological” merely feigning investment why
feign liberalism? Sloterdijk claims that cynicism belies an equal distaste for all

ideologies but if this were true the cynic would have no intellectual motivation to “take
a side.” In the examples Sloterdijk provides of debates between cynical Marxists,

Liberals, and Anarchists 93 he claims that they reduce to ‘arguments about the right way

to be pessimistic’94 but why would a consciousness exhausted of commitments

run itself, though run down, in a permanent moral self-denial’. But this is inconsistent with Sloterdijk’s
definition of cynicism as both false and enlightened to that falseness.
91 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. Chapter 1.
92 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
93 ‘the religious criticize the areligious and vice versa, whereby each side has in its repertoire a
metacritique of the ideology critique used by the opposing side: the moves in the dialogue between the
Marxists and liberals are to a large extent fixed, likewise those between Marxists and anarchists, as well
as those between anarchists and liberals [and] one knows pretty well what natural scientists and
representatives of the humanities will accuse each other of’. Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason.
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. P. 20.
94 Sloterdijk, 98 – 99.
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recognize a right way? The notion of an invested cynicism better explains this
behaviour. 95

There are also reasons internal to Cynical Liberalism to prefer this model. For

Cynical Liberalism, Enlightened False Consciousness functions only at the level of
conscious

self-identification

and belies

an

unconscious

ritually

internalized

commitment to capitalism. A key element in this picture is the assumption of a

constitutive and inadmissible guilt or discomfort with the ills of capitalism, for it is the
repression of which that manifests in the tripartite psychic structure of professed
criticisms of capitalism, cynical resignation in response, and commodity fetishism.
Therefore, the guilt and/or discomfort must remain an energetic source. But if there

were not genuine commitments at its heart, this guilt would be incapable of fuelling
repression and fantasy. 96 The account of Cynical Liberalism has the cynic secretly

enjoying the failures of liberalism, feigning commitment to alleviate guilt but if not at

some level committed why would it insist on that mask? surely there are other sources

to alleviate capitalist guilt. Supposing idealistic cynicisms, torn between ideals, critique,
95 In Sloterdijk, the competition to expose and refute the “opponent” is prefaced on a latent valuation of
specific ideals, whereas for truly ideologically exhausted cynicism such desire would be absent. For
example, while the “Marxist cynic” is suspicious of its own claims to be beyond false consciousness it
nevertheless regards this false consciousness as superior to alternatives. The same would be true for any
cynic desperate to refute its opponents. So, not only does the cynic value intellectual superiority it values
a specific theoretical framework. The hostility then comes from combining this sustained commitment
with highly tuned critical faculties, a fraught combination of superiority and vulnerability. This is the kind
of dissonance likely to manifest in panic when its “affiliations” are challenged, prefaced on the fragile
hope of being the least naïve.
96 It could be objected here that the social pressure to identify with liberalism could provide the libidinal
energy through a super-egoic prohibition of illiberalism diverting its disavowal into an inadmissible guilt
capable of fueling this pattern of repression and fantasy. This could function however successfully the
population responsible for upholding this normative pressure acts in accordance with it. My reply is
twofold. Firstly, again, why pick liberalism? It is not the only possibility within normative culture.
Secondly, even conceding this possibility, among the guilty cynics there are surely some, and I would
wager most, whose guilt traces back to genuine “liberal” investments.
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and trauma in various degrees of transparency in relation to their commitments better
accounts for this condition. This account also benefits from explaining Lorrie Moore’s

characters, and since they speak to definitive features of cynicism we can surely
attest to – hopelessness, rage against idealism, a peculiar hostility towards liberal

idealism, proselytization, self-assertion, and a refusal to self-criticism – we can also
suggest that it better accounts for real cynicisms. 97

Our picture of a genuinely invested but torn cynicism involves a pain compelled

repression of hope. In repression the subject bars trauma from entering conscious
experience. But there are certain symptoms of repression, experiences or behaviors

resulting from the repressed investment exerting continued influence upon the agent.

Due to the censorship of repression the agent remains largely unaware of the return of
the repressed and is compelled to preemptively disavow it. Within Extreme Liberal
Cynicism this manifests in an inability to disregard and eradicate doubts sown by a

latent idealism. In Benna’s case the repression refers to her liberal commitments and
returns in a manic refusal of, and hostility towards, bourgeoise liberalism. In Susan’s
case, the repression refers to the efficacy of liberal ideals, and its returns is

preemptively disavowed by a reified and hostile hopelessness. In both cases repression
Perhaps we should pause to substantiate some of these claims, firstly, that invested cynicism reserved
a peculiar vitriol for its own ideology. As well as in our literary phenomenology - Benna’s startlingly
hypocritical mocking of bourgeois ideals, and Susan’s savvy ironicizing of liberal naïveté - examples are
easy to find in popular contemporary Western culture: From call out culture, the hip mocking of the
hipster, the dark critique of liberalism in popular visual media from Black Mirror to Get Out, and
4channers’ ironically endorsing Trump in protest of “Tumblr liberalism,” to the criticisms of traditional
ethical theory in philosophy classrooms and conferences, or the ostracization of philosophers who
remain committed to “traditional” ethical models (Singer, Nussbaum, Chomsky, Rawls, etc.), the twisted
delight in pointing out the gulf between societal values and practices, and the mocking and bringing down
of those who fail in their attempt to live up to liberal ideals. Concerning the obstinate refusal to selfcriticism again, the hostile defensiveness of cynical attitudes is often as apparent as is the bankruptcy of
its promise of intellectual superiority. This obstinacy is surely a common feature of cynicism.
97
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is enabled by universal and aggressive cynical critique, the assumption of intellectual
superiority, and the refusal to auto-critique, and has the consequence of failing the
investments that compel it.

This model better explains why, for the cynic, hopelessness may be preferable to

hope. The grief associated with the lack of justice, equality, and freedom in the world

and vulnerability of these ideals to critique compounded by the fact that their

achievement requires global cooperation, culminates in an unbearable grief.
Hopelessness is the manifestation of the repression of this trauma. When overwhelmed

by the inhumanity of man and the critical instability of ideals, left feeling unable or

incapable of intervening in a meaningful way, or helplessly dependent on the

unlikelihood of cooperation, liberal hopes are unbearable. The reification of
hopelessness validates and alleviates feelings of guilt, pain, and powerlessness. In this
contest extreme cynical hopelessness provides a preferable option, a fantasy achieved

by absolutizing the powers it opposes. Just as for the Cynical Liberal, this condition
fantasizes its courage-to-truth, its ability to see things “as they are” for the commitment

to truth demands the belief that its fatalism is realistic and therefore superior to hope.

At extremes, this results in a subjectivity void of responsibility and commitment to the
structural conditions of the world. In this way, the cynic feels victim to its vision of a

brutal world which Sloterdijk calls its ‘cancer-ridden consciousness of reality’ 98 and a

martyr for the optimism denied by it. In this way cynicism’s sense of victimhood and
(Sloterdijk, Peter. Eldred, Michael. and Adelson, Leslie A. “Cynicism: The Twilight of False
Consciousness” New German Critique, No. 33, Modernity and Postmodernity (Autumn, 1984), pp. 190 –
206).
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martyrdom are products of an unconscious wish-fulfilling reification of fantasies

through which the cynic is immunized against the painfulness of hope.

This model also allows us to make good sense of Extreme Liberal Cynicism’s

narcissism, hostile obstinacy, and arrogant dismissiveness. If part of the trauma that

compels cynical repression is the realization that the possibility of its own fulfilment is

in the hands of a global community over which it has little control, then the short-term

“solution” to this trauma works in part through disassociating itself from others. On our
model, the failure of Liberal Cynicism’s disempowerment is compounded by the

realization that solutions require cooperation it deems unlikely. Which is to say, liberal

hopes are radically dependent on, indeed vulnerable to, others. The reification of
hopelessness then, enables a refusal and disavowal of vulnerable inter-dependency. It is

unsurprising that this disavowal of dependency would manifest in the assumption of

intellectual superiority. This picture of a smug retreat into the comforts of fabricated

independence also makes better sense of Sloterdijk’s claim that in cynical ‘selfpreservation’ the ego ‘withdraws’ into a ‘worldless inwardness’ and that it ‘leaves
reality behind.’ 99

This picture also explains Extreme Cynicism’s lust for attacking ideologies,

ideals, and idealisms as emanating from a latent inability to fully disregard the

vulnerability and failures of its own commitments. Idealism is a threatening reminder
of the liberal cynic’s repression and this threat is met with a panicked hostility reflex

targeting that which is repressed. Concerning why cynicisms prevalent within liberal
(Sloterdijk, Peter. Eldred, Michael. and Adelson, Leslie A. “Cynicism: The Twilight of False
Consciousness” New German Critique, No. 33, Modernity and Postmodernity (Autumn, 1984), pp. 190 –
206).
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culture reserve such vitriol for liberal ideals, on this model, because it is the
consequence of an impossible repression of liberalism, liberal ideals pose a unique
threat to cynical denial. In this way, cynical vitriol stems from a panicked refusal of the
returning repressed. Concerning the need to proselytize, self-assert, and refuse

auto-critique, a cynicism suffering from fear and traumatized pessimism and
reifying the forces that compel it so as to eclipse pain needs to validate a
hopelessness in which it doesn’t full believe, it is not surprising that this manifests as a
panicked and desperate obstinacy. 100

This triad of symptoms speaks to another feature of cynicism’s ill-eclipsed pain,

the fear of that enlightenment will render, or has rendered even the limited human

agency of cynical refusal and resignation, in an unregulated or “free” sense, no longer
This complex mixture of fear of further enlightenment, refusal to auto-critique, and hostility for “its
own” ideals can be measured by cynicism’s association with irony which, from Benna’s and Susan’s
sarcasm to the sardonic irony of “left” satirical comedy, and the Tumblr vs. 4chan online culture wars etc.,
is an easy association to spot. (Sloterdijk notices cynicism’s penchant for irony: ‘if one is talking about
cynical "reason," then initially this formula completely takes cover behind […] cynical irony’. (Sloterdijk,
Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. P. 401) ‘In the new cynicism, a
detached negativity comes through that scarcely allows itself any hope, at most a little irony and pity’
(Ibid Pg7.) despite drawing out this connection Sloterdijk does not psychoanalyze the emotional purpose
cynical irony plays, and Žižek assumes it a tool whereby the unconsciously subservient cynic furthers the
ends of late capitalism.) Our model can explain irony as a mechanism though which cynicism may
attempt to alleviate cognitive dissonance. Irony suits a condition torn between avowal and disavowal and
exhibiting a panicked contempt for idealism. This association also suits a liberally invested cynicism as a
failed response to suffering. Just as irony offers an escape from the risks of commitment, cynicism offers
an escape from the pain of unrealizable hope. To ironicize hope, is to arm against the pain of its failure.
This is a negative freedom; from the grief, which belief in justice, non-violence, and equality etc. can
provoke in a world where such ideals struggle. But this is a false promise, a fantasy, an object of cruel
optimism, because of a crucial difference between irony and cynicism. Invested cynicism never breaks
free from their constitutive ideals. It may repress or deny them, but it cannot escape their pull. That
which Liberal Cynicism seeks to be free from, is necessarily constitutive of it, and so it finds itself in a
bind, attempting but failing to detach from itself. Because invested cynicism is a traumatized response to
failed hope, hope is therefore its necessary condition. Thus, cynicism, by attacking the very values on
which it depends, cannot provide the freedom it promises, from the pain of hope in a world it deems
corrupt. For a prolonged discussion on cynical irony see: Barnes, Will. “The Rise of Cynical Irony,” in
Distributing Worlds Through Aesthetic Encounters Eds. Josh Stoll and Brandon Underwood, Cambridge
Scholars Press, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 2017.
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viable. 101 While assuming itself enlightened Liberal Cynicism resists auto-critique out of

a fear which emanates from its reification of hopelessness, an intuition that even cynical

agency is a myth. For Sloterdijk, cynical indulgence averts a frightening encounter with

an abyssal meaninglessness. Extreme cynical obstinacy then, incorporates a libidinal
investment in avoiding this nihilism, sustaining itself through thinking: “I am right,
therefore I am.” This conviction though is panicked by the fear that auto-critique will

destroy the cynic’s sense of intellectual superiority, forcing a loss of that to which the

cynic desperately clings: itself. In addition to a depressed sigh exclaiming that critique

has gone too far, the cynic suffers a deeper angst, that it could go even further. Thus, a

self-loving need to preserve its ego is panicked by an inadmissible fear that this is

critically unstable. The response is that even with all its criticisms of naiveté, cynicism
is arrogant, requires validation, and furiously resists self-interrogation. Afraid of full

self-enlightenment, unknowingly holding on to its remaining naiveté, the cynic
manically and unknowingly preserves a confused sense of self-worth through

obstinacy, self-assertion, and proselytization. 102

Conclusion: A critique of liberal cynicism
For Sloterdijk and Žižek, cynicism is a temporally unfolded consequence of the

Enlightenment built into the contemporary liberal paradigm. 103 It is the result of the

See Bewes, 199.
It may be objected that this condition of egoistic self-defensiveness in the face of intuiting the
vulnerability of the ego is enough of a libidinal investment to account for the cynical hostility,
proselytization, and desperate self-assertion, the question would remain, why the specific relationship
with Liberal belief. My model allows for alternative cynicisms, I think that a liberal cynicism plagued by
this critique born fear, is not possible, but familiar.
103 ‘Enlightenment does not penetrate into social consciousness simply as an unproblematic bringer of
light. Where it has its effect, a twilight arises, a deep ambivalence. We will characterize this ambivalence
as the atmosphere in which, in the middle of a snarl of factual self-preservation with moral self-denial,
101
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legacy of critique yielding to the tides of capitalism beneath a façade of liberalism. For

both, the cynical consciousness discloses a universal dishonesty and remains in a

hypocritical relationship with liberal ideals, acting is if they are false, yet professing
belief therein. While for Sloterdijk the consequent complex is “schizoid and miserable,”
for the Cynical Liberal pain is avoided through critiquing illiberalism, feigning cynical

resignation, and commodity fetishism. On both accounts cynicism is both invested and

not invested in liberal ideals. Although in practice its ideals are that of brute capitalist

self-interest, Cynical Liberalism is compelled by a guilt that traces back to contrary
investments. And while Sloterdijk’s cynic is ideologically exhausted, it mourns for “lost”

liberal ideals crushed under the weight of a crude view of contemporary life. Reflection

on this tension helped us distinguish a cynicism torn between liberal ideals and their

perceived failures, beleaguered and in pain. This picture benefits from rendering
Sloterdijk’s picture and Liberal Cynicism consistent, fitting our examples, and better
accounting for cynicism’s hopelessness, rage against ideals, and peculiar hatred for
naïve liberalism, as well as its need for validation, its need to proselytize, and its refusal

to auto-critique. 104 The inverse of Cynical Liberalism, this cynicism acts as if liberalism
were false while believing it to be true, suffering from a painful cognitive dissonance as

cynicism crystallizes.’ Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987, p.
22. ‘Enlightenment is a process in time, a form of evolution. […] Analogous to a flame, its energy is most
intense at the center and dies down at the periphery. Starting from the pioneers and masters of reflective
intelligence in philosophy and the arts […] and is finally reflected back by pure misery that can no longer
be enlightened.’ Ibid 83. Sharon Stanley captures this historical claim: ‘Žižek contrasts today's form of
ideology with a "pre-cynical” ideology, implying a temporal dimension to the triumph of cynicism. Indeed,
as Sloterdijk tells the story, cynicism emerges wholesale after critique has performed its final unmasking’.
Stanley, Sharon. "Retreat from Politics: The Cynic in Modern Times." Polity 39.3 (2007): 384-407.
104 One quick example would be that paradigmatic example of liberal cynicism, Charlie Brooker’s Black
Mirror, viciously attacking the liberal value of artistic freedom in the admittedly hyperbolic, but
unforgettably crude and brilliant pilot. Brooker, Charlie. "National Anthem." Black Mirror. Dir. Otto
Bathurst. Channel 4. London, 4 Dec. 2011. Television.
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a consequence. While it hurts, the causes of this pain are repressed. As such they are

likely to manifest in superiority complexes, ennui, indignance, rage, despair, selfassertion, irrationality, reification, and aggressive anti-idealism. While professing to be

anti-idealistic and post-ideological, it is not; its painfulness and insecurity evince

persistent liberal investments manifest in self-deceptive forms. We call this Extreme

Liberal Cynicism. In our first example, torn between ideals and critique, Benna
Carpenter regards positive individual and political transformation in line with liberal
ideals as desirable but fails them due to insincerity, critique, and trauma. In this form,
Extreme Liberal Cynicism fantasizes a post-idealistic and post-ideological status. In the

second example, while assuming liberalism’s superiority, Susan absolutizes its
inefficacy, more explicitly abandoning it. Both cynicisms then, as well as invested in

ideals, are hypocritical and insufficiently self-critical. In the first case, in failing to
recognize dependency on ideals and failing to apply the same degree of criticism it
applies to others to its own. In the second, in its “secret commitment” – concealed by a

self-confident pseudo-realism – to the superiority of liberalism and its absolute

inefficacy. We will hereafter associate Extreme Liberal Cynicism with hypocritically

insufficient self-critique as well as the failed avowal and/or abandonment of its
constitutive idealism, labelling these forms of “Inauthentic Ideology Critique.” 105 This

inauthenticity is a manifestation of repression. In Benna’s case the repression refers to
her liberal commitments and returns in a manic refusal of, and hostility towards,

Taking “inauthentic” to refer to this combination of ideology critique and emotionally compelled
denial, this charged language is appropriate as it represses the fear of vulnerability to critique and the
appearance of naiveté, a vulnerability which compels hostility, a self-sustaining obstinacy, and a neurotic
delight in exposing the folly of idealists, particularly “naïve” liberals, and for normalizing their pariah
status.
105
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bourgeoise liberalism. In Susan’s case, the repression refers to the efficacy of liberal

ideals, and its returns is preemptively disavowed by a reified and hostile hopelessness.
In both cases repression is enabled by universal and aggressive cynical critique,
hopelessness, assumption of intellectual superiority and the refusal to auto-critique,
and has the consequence of failing to serve the investments that compel it.

Our analysis revealed pain as the inherent problem of extreme cynicism, and

evidence of a constellation of ideals persisting within it. This structure may have

positive consequences for mounting a response. Firstly, if Liberal Cynicism were as it
professes post-idealistic or indeed post-ideological, then immanent critique would be

effectively impossible, but it isn’t, therefore the possibility remains. If its constitutive

idealism and unsuccessfully pain-relieving fantasy were made apparent, so too may the
motivations for an overcoming which, coupled with cynicism’s critical will-to-truth,

could drive a transformative self-interrogation. Liberal Cynicism then, may contain both

the motivation and resources for avoiding its pernicious extremes.
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Chapter 2: Master Cynicism
the best lack all conviction,
while the worst are full of passionate intensity. 106

[at] the height of conscious statesmanship, serious thinking is invaded by
signals attesting to a radical ironicization of ethics and of social
convention. It is as if the general laws were only meant for the stupid,
while those in the know smile with fatal cleverness. More precisely: the
powerful smile this way […] no longer imbued with communal loyalty or
sympathetic to any recognizable code of conduct, we have exemplars
looking down at the ants from the glass palaces of the financial elite, in
the courtrooms, in parliament, even the palace […] The French moralists
called it self-love (amour-propre); Nietzsche called it the will to power. If
Marxism spoke in psychological terms […] it would call its original motive
the striving for profit. 107

“Master Cynicism” is uninhibited by guilt, fear, or pain, it is more successfully

post-idealistic than Liberal Cynicism, and takes advantage of ideals, naivety, ideology,

and cynicism in the pursuit of power. On the Sloterdijkian model, at the emergence of
cynicism at the enlightenment one group attempted to abandon dogma and perpetuate
reason and justice, and another used the truths and illusions revealed by the

enlightenment for retaining power. For us, the former is the forefather of Liberal

Cynicism and the latter, of Master Cynicism, which we take up from Sloterdijk’s mention

of a ‘modern, self-reflective master’s cynicism, […] the manipulative tendencies of those
in power.’ 108

Yeats, W. B. “The Second Coming”, in The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats. New York: Macmillan, 1956.
(my italics).
107 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. P. 20.
108 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. The term “Master
cynicism” was first used by Alan Keenan "The Twilight of the Political? A Contribution to the Democratic
Critique of Cynicism." Theory & Event. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. This was adopted by
William Chaloupka and David Mazella. The moves in this chapter benefit from Keenan’s tripartite
distinction between 1) the power wielding “master cynic” 2) the “cynical insider” who benefits from their
participation, and 3) the “outsider” whose cynicism stems from powerlessness. This roughly fits onto my
distinction of Master, Mastered, and Extreme Liberal Cynicism. Per Keenan, “Insider cynicism” mimics the
106
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A literary-genealogy: Lucian
By developing and adding to Sloterdijk’s literary genealogy we can distinguish

Master Cynicism as structurally distinct from Liberal Cynicism and begin to explain the

unique threat it poses. In The Passing of Peregrinus109 Lucian responds to the Kynic
martyr throwing himself on a pyre at the climax of the Olympic Games arguing that
Peregrinus uprooted Greek Kynicism’s parodic exposé of false idols and adherence to
bucolic ethics. The Passing marks the split from ascetic counter-cultural Kynicism into

forms prefiguring both Liberal and Master Cynicism. Concerning Liberal Cynicism, we

see here the internalized repression of guilt manifesting in vitriol, typical of its
extremes. 110 As Sloterdijk remarks ‘Lucian's laughter reveals more hate than
sovereignty. In it there is the sarcasm of someone who feels himself put on the spot.’111

That this cold diatribe was on behalf of a powerful elite also signposts Master Cynicism,

powerful due to a mixture of fear of economic precariousness and hopes to enjoy the riches the powerful
may bestow upon them, this is one variety of what we are calling “Mastered Cynicism.” The “cynical
outsiders” are victim to the whims of the powerful and succumb to an apathetic resignation upon
realizing their status. While Keenan, Chaloupka, and Mazella’s taxonomy favors a distinction between the
culpability of the rulers and the petit bourgeoisie in contrast to the victimhood of the proletariat, my
presentation of Mastered cynicism contains the possibility of comparable culpability across these divides.
109 Samosate, Lucien De. "The Passing Of Peregrinus." Trans. A. M. Harmon. Lucian. London: William
Heinemann, 1962. Sloterdijk’s analysis Critique of Cynical Reason pgs. – 169 – 174.
110 On this reading, the thirst for fame, status, and glory Lucian exposes and ridicules in Peregrinus, is
carried out with such ferocity because a similar pragmatism motivated Lucian’s career from selfproclaimed Barbarian to royal bureaucrat, and that this unacknowledged hypocrisy comes through in
Lucian’s vitriol. This potential for latent cognitive dissonance and the unhappy consciousness of
Sloterdijk’s cynic was a constant possibility in Lucian, who, later in life, became a public servant of the
Empire in Egypt, exhibiting the torn schizoid consciousness of living in accordance with what one
ethically opposes. In utilizing his talents to enforce his masters’ power, Lucian sold his “authenticity” for a
secure salary and domiciled stability then repressed the pain of this act, like Liberal Cynicism. As a career
rhetorician Lucian mastered the methods of manipulation, exploitation, and deception, as well as
materialism and social climbing, “qualities” he perhaps superimposed onto Peregrinus’ comparably
courageous asceticism. In this sense, this is a proto-Liberal Cynicism due its unsuccessfully veiled
dissonance.
111 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
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using ideals and ideology critique in the service of power, 112 and “Mastered Cynicism,”

the condition of being seduced by the promise of gain, bowing to the authority of the

masters, and reducing its own agency to objective causes, thereby excusing
disengagement with alternative ideals.
Mephistopheles

Sloterdijk’s ‘first model of modern master’s cynicism’ 113 is Goethe’s

Mephistopheles. 114 Therein, the Devil’s representative uses ideology critique to
manipulate his victim into surrendering power. Appealing to a relativism which

Sloterdijk calls ‘knowledge cynicism’ 115 Mephistopheles promises escape from

confusion, uncertainty, and despair by persuading Faust that his conscience is a
remnant of an archaic, irrational, and superstitious worldview and by selling hedonism

as the solution. Faust represents our Liberal Cynic, torn between the competing
impulses of enlightened ideals and ideology critique, while Mephistopheles is the
Master

Cynic,

concealing

sense-materialism

and

brutal

self-interest

behind

opportunistic intellectualism and other fashionable and socially acceptable masks. He is
exploitative, cultivated, and happy. Appearing at the peak of Faust’s suicidal despair,

112 It is a cold, joyless laughter, far from the Menippean lineage, with which Lucian exhorts an entire sect
to commit mass suicide, grotesquely pre-figuring the forthcoming holocaust whereby hundreds of
thousands of dissidents perished in the arenas and on the pyres of the Roman Empire. Lucian’s
disinhibition is astounding, using both the hypocritical affiliation with “true” Kynicism and the coldhearted cruelty and intelligence of the powerful, as well as mocking unsophisticated and hypocritical
attempts at exposing power as a “justification” for participation in power. ‘Is it truly not a charming sight
to view a fried-up old manikin and, in doing so, to breathe in the foul fat-vapors?’ Samosate, Lucian De.
The Passing of Peregrinus. Trans. A. M. Harmon. Lucian. London: William Heinemann, 1962.
113 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. P. 364. Sloterdijk does
not refer to master cynicism as a distinct variety, just an expression of the ubiquitous cynicism by the
powerful, hence master’s not master cynicism.
114 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang Von, and David Luke. Faust. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994.
115 ‘If his horns and claws are taken away, there remains of Mephistopheles nothing more than a
bourgeois philosopher.’ Sloterdijk, Peter Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
187, 175.
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Mephistopheles is the inversion of Clarence to George Bailey 116 - an “angel” offering a
perspective upon which life is made possible. Only here a hell’s angel who entices the

despairing enlightener by offering to pacify his tortured soul with the promise of
morally unrestricted experience. But, of course, like cynicism, the sacrifice is not worth
the rewards, and Faust’s tortured soul while freed from indecision, is condemned to
despair:

[Faust] would gladly banish the Devil back into the shape of the Kynical
dog, or still further, into that of the snake. But all paths back to naivety
are closed to him. 117

The Marquise De Sade

In The Marquise De Sade’s Philosophy in the Bedroom 118 the “cynic Domancé”

shamelessly veils a philosophy of sexually depraved brutal dehumanization and
despicable cruelty beneath a skillfully perverted liberalism. In his manifesto for a new

French revolution De Sade mounts a deconstruction of liberty as part of a deeply
disturbing brutalization of a child. By seducing and contorting Eugene’s vulnerable and

naïve lust for freedom into a grotesque cruelty, like Mephistopheles did Faust, Domancé
erodes the remaining humanity from his victim and replaces relativistic confusion and
uncertainty with sociopathic single-mindedness. 119 In a strategic exculpation of
It's a Wonderful Life. Dir. Frank Capra. Perf. James Stewart, Donna Reed, Lionel Barrymore. RKO, 1946.
Film.
117 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
118 Sade, Marquise De. Philosophy in the Boudoir, Or, The Immoral Mentors. Trans. Joachim Neugroschel.
New York: Penguin, 2006.
119 The argument is skillfully structured, beginning from acceptable premises to increasingly radical
conclusions in a gradual excitation and deconstruction of liberal ideals. By dismissing the possibility that
corrupt religious institutions could be reformed, arguing instead that liberty requires that religion be
violently extinguished. Since the refusal to admit the possibility of religion co – existing with freedom is a
very attractive position to many revolutionaries, this line of argument aims at seducing liberalism into
the glamor of violence, calling for “authenticity” and “sincerity” through the “completion” of the
enlightenment project, a completion amounting to the violent destruction of all which opposes it,
116
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unyielding and barbaric self-interest Domancé appeals to the morality of anti-egoism to

deconstruct the rule of law, liberty, and property. 120 Provoking a compassionate

sensibility in order to corrupt it, De Sade extends his critique of property in terms
familiar to feminism. The seduction begins with a persuasive premise that ownership of

people is immoral either in the form of slavery or marriage. 121 Then, in a cynical

rhetorical transfiguration De Sade argues that on the same logic rape is justifiable. The
“argument” is that once women have been freed from the bondage of marriage males
are freed from the bondage of restraining the drives for which marriage provided a
legitimized outlet. Instead of lauding the emancipation from institutionalized misogyny,

Domancé defends rape as the authentic form of a natural impulse which our institutions
and conventions crudely cover over. 122 The hyper-privileged hate criminal dons the

mask of Diderot, Voltaire, and Rousseau, deconstructing virtue, modesty, chastity,

specifically, to extend critique from libertory protest to iconoclasm, and ultimately, annihilation: ‘O you
who have axes ready to hand, deal the final blow to the tree of superstition; be not content to prune its
branches: uproot entirely a plant whose effects are so contagious […] Let the total extermination of cults
and denominations therefore enter into the principles we broadcast throughout all Europe. Let us not be
content with breaking scepters; we will pulverize the idols forever’ De Sade, Marquise. Philosophy in the
Boudoir, Or, The Immoral Mentors. Trans. Joachim Neugroschel. New York: Penguin, 2006.
120 For example, in bearing out the hypocrisy of a state where everyone is born equal, yet are rendered
unequal by the rules of commerce, nepotism, inheritance, and prohibiting theft, Domancé performs the
dangerous seduction whereby positive intentions and convictions, in a context of confusion of discomfort,
can be warped through deceptive intellectual bewitchment into dehumanizing fundamentalism. In this
vein, De Sade inverts his challenge that the state is essentially immoral, by smuggling in an argument for
embracing egoism as the best model for virtue within such a state, building an argument that survival
requires identification with the dominant value of self-preservation. This consciously concealed
inconsistency belies the shameless self-interest of a fundamentalist argumentative rhetoric, where any
ideal is utilized under the domination of an unopposed impulse, in this case the impulse for cruel power,
fueled by an inalienable self-righteousness invulnerable to experiential learning or logical elucidation.
121 ‘Never may an act of possession be exercised upon a free being; the possession of a woman is no less
unjust than the possession of slaves; […] all the ties which can bind a woman to a man are quite as unjust
as illusory’ Sade, Marquise De. Philosophy in the Boudoir, Or, The Immoral Mentors. Trans. Joachim
Neugroschel. New York: Penguin, 2006.
122 ‘What objections have you to the ravisher? What will you say, when he replies to you that, as a matter
of fact, the injury he has committed is trifling indeed, since he has done no more than place a little sooner
the object he has abused in the very state in which she would soon have been put by marriage and love’.
Ibid.
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beneficence, charity, and sensibility, and yet, while the Philosophes wore a will-to-truth

and egalitarianism beneath their masks, De Sade’s conceals only ugliness and brutality.

Unfettered by guilt, Domancé has no qualms about concealing his savage cynicism

behind the pretense of conformity to popular virtue and will appeal to any ideals,

argument, or rhetorical strategy to do so. For example, he persuades Eugene to indulge

in the basest betrayal of a sexually weaponized matricide while preserving the outward

appearance of virtue. In this harrowing example we see the crudest example of Master
Cynicism: the abandonment of all ideals except pure domination. This is not the
extremity of cynicisms which resign in despair, this is Goethe’s Devil among us,
exacerbating and delighting in the demise of the least fortunate and conducting

unimaginable dehumanizations. Domancé is a grotesque extreme of the comfortably

hypocritical cynic gleefully swapping disguises at the masquerade ball in celebration of
brute self-interest. As Louisa Shea’s generous description begins to explain, through

Domancé De Sade represents enlightened liberalism destroying itself and releasing a

deep potential for barbaric inhumanity as the result:

Cynicism emerges in Sade as a philosophy of moral nihilism and selfseeking gratification that strongly presages our modern use of the term.
[De Sade] has learnt the lessons of the enlightenment […] but rather than
seek to build a better society on the rubble of the old, he retreats into an
attitude of pragmatic opportunism. 123
The Grand Inquisitor

The state must know the truth, before it can sensor it. 124

123
124

Shea, Louisa. The Cynic Enlightenment: Diogenes in the Salon. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2010.
Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota p. 78.
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Sloterdijk cites Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor 125 as primary example of a ‘new

cynical political conservatism.’ 126 The story, as Karamazov tells it, the Cardinal of Seville
witnesses the return of Christ, but instead of paying homage to the returned Lord burns

him as a heretic. Unrepentant, he explains that Jesus’ ideological naiveté poses

unacceptable social dangers, arguing that civilization requires institutional domination
based in deception. For Sloterdijk, this provides a thought experiment through which

neo-conservatism can be investigated. 127 Therein, power figures push back against
freedom, tolerance, compassion, forgiveness, equality, and the institutions that serve
justice and the people from the perspective of anthropological arguments that

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, Charles B. Guignon, and Constance Garnett. The Grand Inquisitor: With Related
Chapters from the Brothers Karamazov. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1993.
126 Ibid. p. 182. 18. For quick contemporary examples, the Bill O’Reilly’s, Anne Coulter’s, Rush Limbaugh’s,
and Donald Trump’s preaching the neo-conservative virtues of crude selfishness, and practicing as if
economic slavery and warfare are required for a progressive civilization, all the while facilitating the
expansion of those monstrous dehumanizing fruits of industrial materialism, under a wafer-thin veil of
social conscience.
127 While there is no necessary link between Master Cynicism and conservatism, nevertheless,
conservative ideologies are more susceptible to it. This is because the sole ideal of Master Cynicism,
power, appeals to conservativism’s valorized notions of hierarchy and authority. Of course, Master
Cynicism merely wants power, but this pursuit is compatible with the humble conservative ideals of duty,
social immobility, obedience, and inequality. There are also crucial differences between conservativism
and liberal progressivism that render the former more vulnerable to Master Cynicism. Today, that one’s
ideology may be contingent and subjected to critique occupies a privileged position within the collective
imaginary. This is more threatening to conservative than progressive ideologies. Ideologies desirous of
change are less threatened by their contested status, and critique has “more to say” against conservative
traditions. We saw in our psychology of cynicism that Master Cynicism succeeds by placating anxiety,
confusion, and fear. Thus, while there is no necessary link between conservatism and Master Cynicism, it
is no surprise that Master Cynicism successfully targets, and exploits traumatized, impoverished, and
disenfranchised conservatives, specifically, their identity insecurity and economic precariousness. As
Mazella argues ‘The public impatience or disenchantment with the messiness of genuine discussion can
only lead to them to embrace the one political actor able to act unilaterally in this system, the master
cynic untroubled by others’ scruples. This may be the reason why popular discontent and cynicism often
do not lead in the direction of progressive reforms, as one might expect, but toward a still more
conservative embrace of those who already project power and authority.’ Mazella, David. The Making of
Modern Cynicism University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville: 2007, pg. 224.
125
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humanity is essentially weak and self-destructive and needs an ordered framework of
habit, certainty, and tradition to limit the natural tendency to barbarism: 128

Those invested with power can, in all ages, confidently assume that the
great majority have a horror of freedom and know no deeper urge than to
surrender their freedom, to erect prisons around themselves, and to
subjugate themselves to idols old and new. 129

The picture we are being drawn of Lucian’s concealed self-beratement, the force

compelling Faust’s capitulation, and Mephistopheles’s and Domancé’s desire for
domination are of the nature and appeal of a strategically conformist power

cynicism. 130 And while this Master Cynical consciousness is split, it is not torn. Neither

‘The Grand Inquisitor […] is a prototype of modern (political) cynics. His bitter anthropology prompts
him to believe that human beings must be and want to be deceived. Human beings require order, which
in turn requires domination, and domination requires lies. Those who want to rule must accordingly
make conscious use of religion, ideals, seduction, and (if necessary) violence. For them, everything, even
the sphere of ends, becomes a means; modern grand politicians are total "instrumentalists" and disposers
of values’ Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. ‘neoconservatism benefits from exploiting the naivety it knows too well, that its minions must internalize
certain fictions to carry genuine political influence, to mobilize the naïve will-to-work, just as in dogmatic
religious communities, don’t allow the danger of critical reflection to turn on yourself, double the efforts
to turn it onto others, concerning “us” stop reflecting, preserve your values! […] Its strength lies in the
fact that people have, in addition to a realistic fear of war and crisis, a fear of freedom, a fear of
themselves and their own possibilities’. Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Christopher Nolan’s Batman is also helpful for defining Master Cynicism and in highlighting the
spectrum of comportments between moderate and extreme Liberal and Master Cynicism. An example of a
Master Cynic from the Dark Knight Trilogy is Bane. Bane’s candidacy amounts to his conscious
exploitation of both naiveté and Liberal Cynicism for purely selfish aims. Bane’s comfortable disinhibited
duplicity and appeal to naïveté and cynicism is seen in the “undue” process of his public courts; a
strategic attempt to inoculate his tyrannical rule against protest under the guise of transparency,
accountability, and equal distribution of juridical power. The appeal can be seen in Bane’s speeches at a
football stadium and outside a prison, where he excites naïve cynical liberalism into the basest
revolutionary zeal to stir up the violence that would justify his damnation of humanity: ‘We come here
not as conquerors, but as liberators to return control of this city to the people. Tomorrow you claim what
is rightfully yours’. A Trump for Liberal Cynics, Bane feeds on the cynical consolation - the belief that all
humanity is corrupt - exciting indignation as a smokescreen for manipulation. Bane appeals to those who
refuse to recognize the subtlety of the contemporary situation, and hunger for a simple leader with a
simple narrative, which will cover over the many-sided truth and the existential discomfort the pluralism
on which cohabitation depends. Bane willfully and adroitly exploits many features of an essentially selfassertive “slave” morality; the non-self-implicating condemnation of privilege, a repressed egoistic desire
for dominance dangerously clothed in the (self) righteous indignation where egoistic vengeance and
retribution are transfigured as justified violence, aspects of the complex ideological blind sidedness
whereby individual so frustrated with a “system” overlook the atrocious deficiencies in the proposed
128
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Domancé, Mephistopheles, nor The Inquisitor recoil from cruelty, infamy, or deception.

When the old Cardinal confesses that the church in the time of Charlemagne took the

sword of worldly power into its own hands and sealed a pact with the Devil, the mood is

one of pride and defiance rather than the cathartic release of therapeutic beginnings.

This dangerous self-righteousness serves as solution to the schizoid painfulness of
cynical consciousness; the idea that the rulers’ exercising cynical domination is a
sacrifice for the greater good, ameliorating dissonance by masking cruelty under a

martyr’s hood. 131

For we who guard the mystery, we alone shall be unhappy. There will be
thousands of millions of happy infants and one hundred thousand
sufferers who have taken upon themselves the curse of knowledge of
good and evil. 132

alternatives: symbolizing the politics of negativity and hate that have so marred contemporary American
and European Politics. ‘Harvey Dent was held up to you as a shining example of justice. You have been
supplied with a false idol, a straw man, to placate, to stop you tearing down this corrupt city […] We take
Gotham from the corrupt, the rich. The oppressors of generations who’ve kept you down with the myth of
opportunity. And we give it back to you, the people. Gotham is yours, none shall interfere. Do as you
please. But start by storming Blackgate and freeing the oppressed! … Step forward, those who would
serve, for an army will be raised. The powerful will be ripped from their decadent nests and cast into the
cold world the rest of us have known and endured. Courts will be convened. Spoils will be enjoyed. Blood
will be shed. The police will survive, until they are ready to serve true justice. This great city will endure.
Gotham will survive’. What marks Bane’s attitude as definitive of Master Cynicism is that there is no
ideology beneath this appeal and no ideology to which he will not appeal. There is no desire to include
the people of Gotham in the elite he represents, indeed they are to be killed, and whatever ideology it
suits them to project in order to seduce the people into subservience, they will utilize, be it socialism,
communism, libertarianism, justice, etc. etc. Master Cynicism then, is the pure pursuit of power under the
auspices of an “enlightened” post-ideological consciousness.
131 Where Jesus’ supernatural compassion and love rose above the base destructive forces of tribalism
and retribution, the Master Cynics’ self-imposed martyrdom enables them to feel as if they have
transcended “basic” “unsophisticated” human compassion. With this analysis, Sloterdijk shows how the
rise of institutionalized righteous indignation sealed the split of the religion of Jesus from the religion of
ecclesia, and the danger a compassionate community poses to the masters: ‘It is the spirit of these
institutions that is abhorred by any recollection of the magnificent primitive Christian freedom […] It is
not religion as religion that has to burn the returned Christ, but religion as Church, as analogue of the
state, as institution; it is the state that fears the civil disobedience the religious are capable of; it is the
army that condemns the spirit of Christian pacifism; it is the masters of the world of work who have a
horror of people who place love, celebration of life, and creativity higher than slaving for the state, the
rich, the army, etc.’ Ibid.
132 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, and Constance Garnett. The Brothers Karamazov. New York: Modern Library,
1929. p. 304.
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For such a ruler, ideals can be made an instrument of politics, useful intellectual

apparatuses to be used in the pursuit of power. This leads to a vast ideological schism

between the ruled - the unenlightened false consciousness of the manipulated – and the

rulers – the reflecting elites who have overcome yet camouflage themselves under the

nation’s professed ideals. As the perfect spokesmen for Master Cynical power

Machiavelli puts it: ‘There is nothing more important than appearing religious.’ 133

Sloterdijk captures this well, defining this breed of cynicism as ‘without any illusions’
yet realizing ‘the functional necessity of illusions for the status quo. This is the way

enlightenment works in the minds of those who have discovered the origins of
power.’ 134

A Critique of Master Cynicism
knowledge is power; being virtuous is seeming virtuous; essence is
appearance; discovery is justification; peace is war; freedom is slavery;
ignorance is strength. 135

Master Cynicism is a strategic appeal to ideology critique and ideals in pursuit of

power. 136 While it may express allegiance to liberalism, Master Cynicism is cynical anyism, comfortably donning whatever mask is required to serve its desire for domination.
As we saw, the Liberal Cynic is miserable due to an unresolved and painful struggle

Machiavelli, Niccolò , and Peter E. Bondanella. The Prince. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005.
Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota p. 32.
135 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
136 Although brought to fruition in institutionalized religion, Sloterdijk locates contemporary Master
Cynicism’s apotheosis in the cleavage of church and state, the revolutionary years from French
republicanism to Soviet communism, in the hands of ideology parasites callously exploiting the ideals
behind those movements: ‘the more malicious aspects of the illusion of freedom are those beliefs the
rulers are happy to see in the people who commit to austerities out of ideological commitment, while
their leaders enjoy all they can – only those who lived before the revolution, or stay at its head, get the
taste of the sweetness of life’ Ibid.
133
134
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between ideals, ideology critique, and the world. Master Cynicism, by contrast, although

split and hypocritical, replaces cognitive dissonance and psychological pain with
disinhibited duplicity. Master Cynicism is rationalized and enjoyed without guilt.

Master Cynical shamelessness benefits from the history of ideology critique

championed by the French moralists and Nietzsche, after whom the life-affirming

liberative purport once accompanying the critique of a worn-out, hypocritical, and
imperialistic morality was disastrously purged. As Sloterdijk explains ‘the resonance
Nietzsche enjoyed among the imperialism had its moral foundation in the cynicism of

self-disinhibition’ 137 a willful duplicity that prefigures fascism and the totalitarianism of
the left, right, and center: ‘this cynicism makes a continuum between a subtle
philosophy and a brutal politics possible for the first time.’ 138 On this understanding,

once the hypocrisy of altruism and profound uncertainty were mainstream hypotheses
the elite no longer need to appear moral or pay attention to facts. The previously
inhibited duplicity has ‘shaken off existential ambiguities of all morality’ 139 and enjoys a

new nakedness. As a consequence, rather than struggle with the vulnerability of ideals

Master Cynicism exploits it, securing rule and support not by its truth-value but by the

promise of gain. While Liberal Cynicism retains a melancholic disappointment with

falseness, the failure of its ideals, and the atrocities of advanced capitalism Master
Cynicism embraces the status quo to which the Liberal Cynic begrudgingly defers,

counsels complicity, and relishes the disinhibition ideology critique permits,

capitalizing on moral, metaphysical, and epistemological decadence to seduce support.
Ibid.
Ibid.
139 Ibid. P. 45
137
138
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As Sloterdijk puts it ‘when confronted with illegal enrichment, with robbery, the
[master] cynical reaction consists in saying that legal enrichment is a lot more effective
and, moreover, protected by the law. As Brecht puts it in his Threepenny Opera: ‘what
is the robbery of a bank compared to the founding of a new one?’ 140
Cynicism & fascism: A totalitarian seduction

Extreme Liberal Cynicism enables Master Cynicism to reach such heights/depths

by failing to successfully oppose the unscrupulousness the masters have pioneered 141
and, as we saw in the cases of Faust and Eugene, lies in a precarious relation to its

distant, disinhibited, and happier cousin, its painfulness leaving it vulnerable to Master
Cynicism’s seductive power. There are several ways in which this can occur, the first

Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. pgs. 29-30 citing
Brecht, Bertolt, Desmond Ivo. Vesey, and Eric Bentley. The Three Penny Opera. New York: Grove
Weidenfeld, 1964.
141 This is a context we can all find ourselves in, where employees turn off the moral/ethical sociopolitical norms which govern their choices outside work, (relating to their families, to the common good,
to basic human compassion, decency, and mutual respect) and defer to the governing norm of the
profession, which in commerce, and increasingly health care, education, and politics, is to shift a product.
This workplace pragmatism sheds responsibility by accepting as permissible governing norms which
have been allowed to evolve independently of registers tethered to the necessities of interdependent
human community. Without intervention, and when collected together into corporations, this
“teleological suspension of the ethical” produces forces way beyond the sum of their parts, which more
often than not, in influential sections of society, develop into formidable destructive power. Within these
domains, parameters of acceptable behavior change considerably, yet remain bolstered by a sense of
corporate duty. As Rudy Baylor in The Rainmaker sways ‘Every lawyer, at least once in every case, feels
himself crossing a line that he doesn't really mean to cross... it just happens... And if you cross it enough
times it disappears forever. And then you're nothin but another lawyer joke. Just another shark in the
dirty water.’ The term “mob-mentality” is particularly fitting for the resemblances both to the mutually
exculpating powers of collective violence and organized crime. Where the governing norms in a
professional register serve to dictate behavior, the short cuts, minor discretions, and suspensions of the
ethical multiply through time, - blamed on the “system,” the next guy, or simply shirked - can produce a
cavalcade of evil completely unexpected even by the few genuinely callous American Psychos in the
conference rooms who happily benefit from systematic inhumanity. In short, extremer forms of Liberal
Cynicism are ill-equipped to deal with this disinhibited ruling cynicism which has perpetuated and
benefited from the current surge in “authenticity,” militarism, glory, the undisputable evil of a foreign
enemy, reclamation of national character, or empowerment of ethnic or national identity, conservatism,
nationalism, tribalism, anti-humanitarianism, provincialism, and isolationism. As for Rudy Baylor, seeing
this inherent vice, he drops out and resigns completely to preserve his innocence, giving up on the
genuine good a career as a civil rights lawyer could achieve, an example again of the abandonment of
liberal values through a trauma born reification of its absolute impracticality.
140
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relates to how subjects under Master Cynicism are seduced by its promise of assuaging

the painfulness of hope within totalizing narratives foreclosing the vulnerability of
commitment:

The fascist state, with its stifling confusion of capital and folk ideology,
idealism and brutalities deserves a unique philosophical predicate; the
cynicism of cynicisms. 142

As well as lauding his emancipatory commitments, theory of embodied vitality,

and the courage-to-truth, Sloterdijk also places a great deal of blame at the feet of
Nietzsche for paving the way from enlightenment to fascism. 143 A similar ambivalence

is found in Sloterdijk’s reading of Martin Heidegger. While Sloterdijk welcomes

Heidegger’s critique of technological distraction and the somnambular of cynical

conformism he warns that early Heidegger’s solution – authenticity – is extremely

dangerous. From Sloterdijk’s warning we can account for Liberal Cynicism’s unique

vulnerability to the seductive and disastrous power of Master Cynicism.

This danger is best laid out in Sloterdijk’s analysis of the Weimar Republic as an

example of a culture analogous to our own. 144 The most urgent feature of the analogy is
that cynicism rendered the traumatized German spirit susceptible to the lunacy of
National Socialism precisely because it offered a solution to its pain based on a denial of

vulnerability. For Sloterdijk, Heidegger’s notion of Das Man 145 represents the
contemporary cynic and was ‘inconceivable without the precondition of the Weimar

Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. P. 243.
‘With Diogenes, under the slogan Remint the Coins, there begins what will be called by the neokynic
Nietzsche "the revaluing of all values," the cultural revolution of the "naked truth." Nietzsche, of course,
ruins the point. His revaluation turns the Kynical rejection of power into a will to power; with this he
changes sides and provides the powerful with a philosophy of disinhibition.’ Ibid, P. 211 note 17.
144 More specifically, Germany in the 80s, but the analogy stands.
145 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. Macquarrie, John and Robinson, Edward. New York: Harper
& Row Pubs., 1962, 2008.
142
143
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Republic.’146 On this reading, Germany’s loss of World War I and the humiliation of

Versailles compelled a collective encounter with meaninglessness compounding the

effects of the critique of traditional ideology on traditional values and identity per se. In
response the call rose for the “authentic” self, a fantasy which laid the road to
totalitarianism. 147

Only in the cynical, demoralized, and demoralizing climate of a postwar
society […] can an impulse be diverted out of the "Zeitgeist" into
philosophy to observe existence "existentially" and to place everydayness
in opposition to "authentic," consciously decided existence. 148

This downtrodden and confused cynicism was uniquely vulnerable to the

seductively restorative narrative of authoritarianism because of its promise to
recrystallize a fractured identity, silence the voices of guilt, and close off the door to
nihilism. On Sloterdijk’s reading, the will-to-authenticity – the hallmark of Heidegger’s
romantic existentialism – captured a collective yearning and contained ‘the seeds of a

demonic fascism”: 149 ‘the politically naive Heidegger believed he had found in fascism a
"politics of authenticity"’ and, along with the German pubic, was ‘deluded by the active,

decisive, and heroic slogans of the Hitler movement.’ 150 With this analysis Sloterdijk

lays out how a genuinely invested cynicism, traumatized and torn, can reach a point of
despair and groundlessness rendering the need for salvation so great that it would

Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
Timothy Bewes locates a specific point to where Sloterdijk’s alarming comparison of the Weimar
Republic with our “cynical age.” Bewes compares Tony Blair’s New Labor movement’s opposition to
ideology and ideals to Himmler’s demands for a new birth for 1930s Germany – namely that
overemphasizing the futility of ideals, and calling for an individual moral rebirth results in a cynical
retreat, because it promises an impossible metaphysical retrieval of political objectivity.
148 “After the "disintegration of values," […] where "good" and "evil" dispatch each other into the
"beyond" such a critical "reflection" on "authentic being" become possible’. Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of
Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
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swap its values for subservience to the seductive powers of heinous masters. Given we

are seeing the reemergence of fascistic and totalitarian thinking and increasingly

disinhibited duplicity in mainstream conservative politics and in social media politics
across the spectrum, this analysis holds a timely warning. By turning to a cinematic

phenomenology, we can lay out one way this seduction occurs.
A cinematic phenomenology

Adam McKay’s ‘The Big Short’ can be seen to dramatize how moderate Liberal

Cynicisms in a world of Master Cynicism risks being subsumed by it. The movie tells the

story of Morgan Stanley trader Steve Eisman, (in the movie Mark Baum) capitalizing on

hedge fund manager Michael Burry and trader Greg Lippman’s unearthing of the

complex conditions that caused the 2008 financial crash. Eisman is an Extreme Liberal

Cynic par excellence, veiling trauma and guilt beneath the critique of a system in which
he fully participates, raging against Wall Street with all the hypocrisy, obliviousness,

and anger of self-righteous denial. 151 The subplot follows Eisman’s transformation from
a functional melancholic into a resigned fatalist bereft of the energy even for vitriol,

succumbing to a disinhibited duplicity and knowingly benefitting from the suffering of
others. At the beginning Eisman is angry at capitalistic parasitism and laments how the

crash will hit the most vulnerable the hardest - ‘people are going to be doing what they

always do when the economy tanks. They will be blaming immigrants and poor people’.
And I'm getting madder and madder and I ask this guy how he sleeps at night knowing he's ripping off
working people and he just leaves. He doesn't say a word. He just walks away from the lunch. So am I
fucked up or is he? […] The banks have given us 25% interest rates on credit cards. They have screwed us
on student loans that we can never get out from under. Then this guy walks into my office and says those
same banks got greedy, they lost track of the market, and I can profit off of their stupidity? Fuck, yeah, I
want him to be right! […] We're going to wait and we're going to wait and we're going to wait until they
feel the pain, until they start to bleed.
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But in his final capitulation, Eisman enacts descends from troubled liberal into
Mastered and maybe even Master Cynicism. Eisman’s realization is that the crash was
not just the consequence of ignorance and ineptitude but that many of the masters

knew what they were doing and gambled that the government would bail them out. 152

And they did. After which they paid themselves huge bonuses and lobbied successfully

against reforms. This cuts through Eisman’s hostility and reveals his anger as the
externalization of unprocessed trauma. But Eisman’s anger served the cathartic

purpose as it was facilitated by a belief in the possibility of justice and the possibility

that the financial system had not yet rendered it impossible. And when the catastrophe
he has hitherto fetishized happens, this angry cynicism is revealed as futile, and the
pained values out of which it was born return to the surface. For Eisman this is the love

for his lost brother, and his patient, caring, and loyal wife. Tragically, once Eismman’s
cynicism is revealed as a consoling carapace, rather than take responsibility Eisman
submits to a darker illusion; that his complicity was not reprehensible but an inevitable

reflection of unavoidable systematic corruption -- he reifies his powerlessness and
reduces his agency to the inevitable consequence of objective circumstances.

Consequently, Eisman sees no problem in benefitting from doomsday and, exculpated
by his own cancerous vision of the world takes the money and runs. One imagines
This descent is caused by the “realization” that things are worse than his phony critique could
imagine: ‘Wall Street took a good idea and made it into an atomic bomb of fraud and stupidity that’s on its
way to decimating the world’s economy. We live in an era of fraud in America […] What bothers me isn’t
that fraud is not nice. Or that fraud is mean. For fifteen thousand years, fraud and short-sighted thinking
have never, ever worked. Not once. Eventually you get caught, things go south. When the hell did we
forget all that? I thought we were better than this. I really did. And the fact that we’re not doesn’t make
me feel alright, it makes me feel sad, and as fun as it is to watch pompous dumb wall streeters be wildly
wrong, I just know at the end of the day that average people are going to be the ones who are going to
have to pay for all of this, because they always do.’
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Eisman reiterating this performance – benefitting from the suffering of others sustained
by an enlightenment to the irredeemability of humanity – until his cynicism is virtually

indistinguishable from the disinhibited duplicity of the masters. Giving speeches on the
ills of the financial system while benefitting from it.
Mastered cynicism

In a sense, Eisman’s cynicism is mastered, subsumed under the ideology of the

masters. To distinguish it from the preemptive knowing exploitation of those who
foresaw sand guiltlessly profited from the crash, we can call this “Mastered Cynicism.”

And there is another variety, similarly seduced by the promise of gain and bowing to

the authority of the masters, but here it feigns the reduction of its subjectivity to

objective causes to exculpate disengagement with positive ideals, and falsely thinks
itself free. We can investigate this Mastered Cynicism through Žižek’s analysis of the

Jet’s courting Officer Krupke’s sympathy in West Side Story. Žižek explains that in this

example a comfortably dishonest adherence to left liberalism is enjoyed by parasitic
beneficiaries: ‘Our mothers all are junkies, our fathers all are drunks, Golly Moses,
naturally we're punks.’ 153 Žižek’s analysis the UK Riots of 2011 is a helpful means to

reveal this condition. Therein Žižek argues that the liberal explanation for the

destructive and brutally self-interested behavior – as protesting injustice and inequality
– is not just a lie, but a lie concealing an important truth. For Žižek, the riots were a
crude expression of the consequences of interpellation with the dominant ideology –

the tyranny of mammon, self-assertion, and materialism.
153

West Side Story. Dir. Robert Wise and Jerome Robbins. United Artists, 1961.
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There was no ideological justification, they were totally caught in the
dominant ideology, with no ways to realize what this ideology demands,
it’s a wild acting out within this ideological space of consumerism. Even if
we are dealing with an apparently totally non-ideological brutality to
burn houses, to get objects, it is the result of a very specific social and
ideological constellation, where big ideology striving for justice equality
etc. disintegrates. 154

The “liberal” explanation which the Mastered Cynic happily affirms is a diversion

tactic serving to downplay liberal guilt at the radical subjectivating effects of neo-liberal

capitalism. By contrast, in the hopes of enjoying the riches the powerful may bestow,

Mastered Cynicism mimics the powerful as far as they can, excusing an abandonment of
social responsibility by reducing their subjectivity to objective causes. However, by

embracing the dominant ideology from a position of relative insignificance, Mastered

Cynics are ideal subjects for the masters: angry, poor, and disenfranchised, but
ultimately subservient to the dominant ideology which keeps them there. Paradoxically

this reinforces the claim that the Mastered Cynical agency is indeed reducible to

external forces, becoming what it pretends to be. While thinking itself free this cynicism
is mastered. 155

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=238&v=9TB52h6c2Ts Standard YouTube license.
That the rioters included those exculpating themselves via functionalistic reductions of their own
subjectivity can be laid out in two examples. Firstly, the infamous incident during the riots when two men
robbed a Malaysian student who had been attacked and had his jaw broken by other rioters. Feigning
sympathy they offered to help the bleeding victim to his feet. But this was not a moment of tenderness
amid the waves of violence, for as the dazed young man staggered to his feet, the apparent good
Samaritans leaned in, opened his rucksack, and took his belongings. The victim was 20-year-old
Malaysian student Ashraf Hazier Rossli, his first attacker, Beau Isagba, 17, broke his jaw in two places and
stole his bicycle. As he sat dazed and in a pool of blood Reece Donovan, 22, and John Kafunda, 22, took his
mobile phone, wallet, games console, and games. Although caught red-handed on CCTV, Donovan and
Kafunda denied wrongdoing; Kafunda told police he was "a million percent sure" he was not the man in
the film, and that "If that was me I would physically stop them but that isn't me there." The second
example, from my own experience was just a stones-throw from the police station where the “protests”
began. After the reckless shooting of gangster Mark Duggan, a crowd had gathered nearby with television
crews scanning for the loudest most angry individuals. A local I knew was standing proudly with his
manic drooling dogs, yanking their necks on crude link chains till their eye balls nearly popped out of the
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Conclusion
Master Cynicism is uninhibited by guilt, fear, or pain, it is more successfully post-

idealistic than Liberal Cynicism, and takes advantage of ideals, naivety, ideology, and
cynicism in the pursuit of power. This account suggests that it is beyond any form of

suffering and ideals and therefore, unlike Liberal cynicism, beyond critique, but this is
too hasty. Master Cynicism is brittle, hostile, insatiable in its pursuit of power,

narcissistic, megalomaniacal, and reduces to a morality trumping desire for domination

over others. Much like Liberal Cynicism this condition belies persistent investment, but

here the investment is autonomy. The Master Cynic, represses an inchoately skepticism

about the reality of autonomy, manifests in a manic and irrational pursuit of

domination, avoids that which threatens it, and aggressively disavows any reminder of

the repression. This includes the guiltless refusal of social responsibility, ethics, virtue,
skulls, shouting at assembled T.V. cameras searching for the loudest and most angry: “Remember Mark
Lawrenson.” Stephen Lawrence (13 September 1974 – 22 April 1993) was murdered in a racially
motivated attack in 1993. A public inquiry in 1998 concluded that the original MET investigation was
"institutionally racist." Mark Lawrenson is a white soccer television celebrity. Mark Duggan was in
possession of a handgun and thought to be on his was to assassinate a gang rival when unlawfully killed.
The individual in question represented the angry, ignorant, self-assertive, materialistic portion of the
rioters, using the liberal sympathy with institutional racism to justify violent materialism, from
conditions that do not cause it. Just as many who pretended to have informed grievance, with total
disregard for actual victims. This feigning of liberalism is different from the “Trump-est” of Tea-Partiers
only in that they don’t have membership to the clubhouse: Just as fascism united the rulers with those in
the proletariat claiming to be “the people,” Master Cynicism unites those whose ignorance is so
disastrous that it blurs the distinction between stupidity and malice, with those who revel in it. I am more
optimistic than Žižek, and believe that these rioters, are a minority who have succumbed to the
seductions of master cynicism, among a larger minority benefitting from and participating uncritically in
their perpetuation, and their “Slave Cynicism” is the result of the dominance of the master cynical late
capitalist ideology, which one of the ongoing obstacles to those who remain practically invested in
liberalism, who still occupy a large portion of society (In Europe at least). Kafunda and Donovan were
convicted of robbery and violent disorder and Isagba of grievous bodily harm and theft. Mr Rossli was
taken to the Royal London Hospital and after treatment for his injuries. The magnanimity of what he had
to say appeared a world away from the actions of his mean-spirited attackers. The shaken finance student
told reporters at a press conference: "I feel very sorry for the people who did this. It was really sad
because among them were children." The majority of family members of Duggan and community leaders
throughout the riots called for non-violence.
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morality, compassion, sympathy, empathy, duty etc. which we have seen in every

instantiation of Master Cynicism. This explains Master Cynicism’s megalomania, its
insatiable hunger for money and power, as well as the tendency towards patriarchy,

misogyny, sexual misconduct, and violence as a panicked refusal of the restrictions

unavoidably placed on an idealized vision of autonomy and how vast wealth, celebrity,

power, and other entitlements could allow such a pathological delusion to persist
without satisfying it.

Like Extreme Liberal Cynicism, this internal structure may too pose the

possibility of a transformative critique. If Master Cynicism can be exposed as prefaced
on denial, it may be contested. The more formidable task for Master Cynicism is

bringing about the motivation for a self-overcoming. For, unlike Extreme Liberal
Cynicism, if Master Cynicism can feed its addiction enough to avoid a reckoning, then its
suffering would be less than the mature liberal cynic, and therefore it would therefore

be less inclined to seek an escape. Possible means to encourage openness to critique

would be to highlight the insatiability, mania, and panic associated with this incessant
and impossible pursuit. For Mastered Cynicism there is more reason for optimism. The
“poor megalomaniacs” – exculpating themselves from the barriers to domination via

feigning the reduction of their own agency to action to objective causes – the inability to
satiate its needs may entail an experience of powerlessness which could urge a re-

conception of its unrealistic notion of freedom. Alternatively, the cavalcade of unhealthy

situations into which the injunction to dominate would entail would surely lead to
painful cycles of psychological and material violence leaving the mastered cynic

susceptible to critique revealing that its pursuit of autonomy and that its idolizing
59

mimicry of the powerful subordinates rather than frees itself. This is a project for

another time. For now, we are primarily interested in the relationship between Liberal
and Master Cynicism. Buying into enlightenment critique, super-structural theory, and

false consciousness, Master Cynicism manipulates this enlightenment in the pursuit of
power. Once Liberal Cynicism reaches extremes it is susceptible to Master Cynical

seductions offering to assuage confusion, guilt, and fear. Which is to say, Extreme
Liberal Cynicism which buys into the reduction of its own consciousness to deluded
epiphenomena within power, not only enables Master Cynicism, but risks becoming it.
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Part 1: Conclusion
When consciousness feels violence, its anxiety may well make it retreat
from the truth and strive to hold on to what it is in danger of losing. But it
can find no peace. If it wished to remain in a state of unthinking inertia
then thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and its own unrest disturbs its
inertia. […] its fear may lead consciousness to hide, from itself and others,
behind the pretension that it’s cleverer than any thoughts that one gets by
oneself or from others. This conceit which understands how to belittle
every truth, in order to turn back into itself and gloat over its own
understanding, […] and always find the same barren ego instead of any
content – this is a satisfaction which we must leave to itself, for it seeks
only itself. – Hegel 156
There is a shrewdness which, almost with pride, presumes to have special
elemental knowledge of the shabby side of existence, that everything
finally ends in wretchedness. - Kierkegaard 157

As Enlightened False Consciousness, cynicism concludes that ideology is

transcendental and false. The Cynical Liberal consciously resigns to the impossibly of

liberalism while unconsciously maintaining allegiance to capitalism. Enlightened False
Consciousness is rare, Cynical Liberalism is hardly ubiquitous, and neither does full

justice to our literary-phenomenology of familiar cynicisms. Jess Row misdiagnoses as
collective what is a provincial variety; the cynicism of arthouse Hollywood is not, as
Row claims ‘everywhere in American culture,’ 158 and even the Liberal Cynicism we

extracted from these analyses is more of a luxury than a pandemic. Nevertheless, it

finds footing in academia and liberal culture. This Liberal Cynicism shares

Enlightened False Consciousness’ familiarity with ideology critique which targeted

forces opposed to equality, justice, non-violence, and freedom. However, by contrast,
Hegel, G. W. F. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller and J. N. Findlay. Oxford: Oxford U, 2013.
§80 pgs. 51-52.
157 Kierkegaard, Sǿren Works of Love New York: Harper & Row, 1964 p.240.
158 Row, Jess. "American Cynicism." Home. Boston Review, 18 May 2015. Web. 10 Dec. 2015.
156
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Liberal Cynicism remains genuinely invested, pained by the perceived failures of

liberalism, and through resignation and inertia enables the problems that compel it.

This fraught relationship can result in an extreme variety which, while highly critical of
ideals and ideology, commits Inauthentic Ideology Critique, either as a refusal or

inability to acknowledge its dependency on ideals or through reifying their inefficacy. In

either form Liberal cynicism effectively abandons its constitutive ideals and suffers for

it. In an unsuccessful attempt to overcome this pain, Extreme Liberal Cynicism
represses its constitutive ideals by fantasizing the impossibility what it desires.
Extreme Liberal Cynicism is rationally unjustifiable when it fails to acknowledge its

own idealism, when it absolutizes, and reifies the inefficacy of, its constitutive idealism,

and when it refuses to engage in the same degree of critique it relishes applying
elsewhere. It is intrinsically harmful because it hurts. It is instrumentally harmful in

virtue of enabling the problems that compel it. This enablement can be seen in that

while criticizing injustice etc. within liberal capitalism, on the level of action, the
Extreme Cynic participates in the system it bemoans, and through ritualized practical
reinforcement and absolutizing narrative performatively reifies the illusion of its

necessity. Extreme Liberal Cynicism is also instrumentally harmful because it is both ill-

equipped to oppose, and vulnerable to succumbing to, Master Cynicism. Crucially, since
Liberal Cynicism’s exaggerated pessimism belies a persistent idealism, it remains open

to a more productive response. To begin developing this response and to contextualize
this problem in the context of contemporary philosophy, in part 2 we must indulge a
considerable digression into the works of contemporary philosopher Judith Butler.
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Part 2: Judith Butler & Extreme Liberal Cynicism
Judith Butler’s work is relatively representative of popular trends in the

theoretical humanities especially those indebted to both Continental Philosophy and
progressive liberal politics. This is the academic corner of the culture prone to Extreme
Liberal Cynicism. The purpose of focusing on Butler is that while taken as a whole her

work does not exemplify Liberal Cynicism, features of her “middle period” 159 mark a

“liberal-cynical” moment overcome in the later work. Part 3 argues that this later work

provides resources for theorizing a heuristic for overcoming Extreme Liberal Cynicism
more generally. The purpose of part 2 is to ground this later move. To this end, chapter

3 explains why we might consider Butler invested in liberal ideals at all, and chapter 4
argues that key texts in middle Butler bears resemblances to features of Extreme

Liberal Cynicism, specifically Inauthentic Ideology Critique; Cynicalization, and Cruel

Optimism.

For the purposes of this dissertation we are classifying Butler’s work in three phases based on their
thematic differences which map onto general preoccupations during works published in certain time
frames. Early Butler refers to the work focuses around the performativity of gender and materialization
spans from 1987 – 1990. The “middle phase” which focuses on the psychic machinations which prefigure
performativity and materialization runs from Butler, Judith “Imitation and Gender Insubordination” in
1991. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" 1993 and culminates with The Psychic Life of
Power in 1997. The “later phase” runs from 2001 onwards. I will also refer to the early and middle phase
collectively under the designation pre-9/11, and the later as post 9/11 as this period, and event, marks
the most significant change of focus in Butler’s career thus far.
159
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Chapter 3: Judith Butler & Liberalism
Introduction
The arguments hereon take Butler’s work as invested in ideals familiar to

liberalism in the intentionally broad conception of this dissertation specifically,

equality, tolerance, human rights, justice, democracy, freedom, and non-violence. It

is therefore crucial at the outset to address Butler’s own opposition to classic liberalism
and objections to her work from within that paradigm.
Butler’s anti-liberal humanism

As well as rejecting the classic liberal notion of property Butler is a consistent

and deep critic of individualism and autonomy describing the ‘classical liberal humanist

formulation of agency’ 160 as central to ‘naïve forms of political optimism.’ 161 Butler asks

us to resist ‘the hyper-agency (perhaps manic) of liberal individualism’ 162 and questions
the tradition of locating rights within the individual. 163 Butler also laments having to

function politically ‘within a legal framework ensconced in liberal versions of human

ontology,’ 164 and resists classic liberalism’s imperialistic imposition of “civilization” as
limited to ‘hegemonic forms of western rationality,’165 and that ‘liberal freedom’

functions as ‘the cultural bias for sanctioning forms of cultural and religious hatred and
Dumm, Thomas. "Giving Away, Giving Over: A Conversation with Judith Butler." The Massachusetts
Review 49.1/2 (2008): 95-105. JSTOR. Web.
161 Dumm, Thomas. "Giving Away, Giving Over: A Conversation with Judith Butler." The Massachusetts
Review 49.1/2 (2008): 95-105. JSTOR. Web.
162 Dumm, Thomas. "Giving Away, Giving Over: A Conversation with Judith Butler." The Massachusetts
Review 49.1/2 (2008): 95-105. JSTOR. Web.
163 ‘the "I" is bound up with the other and with temporality in a way that resists the language of individual
rights.’ Dumm, Thomas. "Giving Away, Giving Over: A Conversation with Judith Butler." The
Massachusetts Review 49.1/2 (2008): 95-105. JSTOR. Web.
164 Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. 25.
165 Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. 72.
160
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abjection.’166 Given this deep criticism we must explain why to consider Butler invested

in liberal ideals. My claim is not that Butler’s work is liberal in the classical sense; rather

that in her later works as well as maintaining the indispensability of autonomy,
integrity, human rights, and individual freedom, 167 Butler redefines, upholds, and

serves the ideals of justice, freedom, and equality. We can begin to ground this claim by
rebutting a classic criticism charging Butler with abandoning these paradigmatic liberal

enlightenment ideals. If we can show Butler’s work to withstand this objection we have
gone some way to justify our reading. After this we can outline further reasons to
identify Butler’s work as committed to justice, freedom, and equality.
Illiberalism in Butler: Nussbaum contra Butler

In The Professor of Parody 168 Martha Nussbaum famously charged Butler with

breaking from the liberal tradition. Nussbaum worried that Butler reduces freedom to

an illusion by deconstructing pre-cultural agency and a biologically/ontologically

robust notion of sex. For Nussbaum, these deconstructions amount to an ‘unwarranted

metaphysical speculation’ 169 which effectively disinherit the commitment to freedom,

non-violence, human rights, and equality, an abandonment that both stands Butler’s
feminism apart from its predecessors and renders it inert. Nussbaum argues that the
denial of autonomous agency and sex as a pre-discursive ontological corporeality are

Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London: Verso, 2009. P. 109 Butler even
famously extended Foucault’s criticism of liberation to challenge the emancipatory value of “coming out:”
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993.
introduction arguing that all gender identification is an unstable performance, incapable of providing full
emancipation from oppressive norms.
167 Individual rights, bodily integrity, property, autonomy, and self-determination, etc.
168 Nussbaum, Martha C. "The Professor of Parody." Reviews 1986-2011 Philosophical Interventions
(2012): 198-222. Web.
169 Ibid.
166

65

obstacles to feminism because critiquing the category of women problematizes the

emancipation of women, and critiquing autonomous agency leaves us powerless in

response to social and political problems both on the level of defining injustice and for
activism aimed at contesting it. For example, it might be argued that the fight against
female genital mutilation requires notions of biological integrity, individual autonomy,

and the right to sexual pleasure, and therefore an account of the ontological reality of

women as separable from cultural discursivity is required to ground an internationally
applicable justification for outlawing this cruel custom. Another case could be the fight

for women’s right to education. In line with Nussbaum’s worry we might argue that this
requires the notion of an inherent moral dignity realized through the achievement of
autonomy which requires education, thus providing an argumentative platform to settle

in international as well as domestic disputes, the right to education as resting on a

robust notion of human rights. We have already seen Butler antipathy to classic liberal

accounts of autonomy, and the idea of sex as inseparable from the constructed category

of gender is indeed a key Butlerian theme: ‘it is not possible to know sex as distinct

from gender.’ 170 That Nussbaum’s worry is a valid one is further evidenced by the

Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory." Theatre Journal 40.4 (1988): 519. Web. ‘The category sex is from the start normative, it is what
Foucault has called a regulatory ideal, in this sense then sex not only functions as a norm, but part of a
regulatory practice that produces the body it governs, that is whose regulatory forces make clear, as a
kind a kind of productive power, the power to produce, demarcate, circulate, and differentiate the bodies
it controls’ Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993.
‘if gender is the social construction of sex and there is no access to the sex accept by means of its
construction, then it appears not only that sex is absorbed by gender, but that sex becomes something
like a fiction perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed at a pre-linguistic site to which is there no direct
access’ Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993, pg.
5.
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following quote also from Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An essay in
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory:

feminist discourse has often relied upon the category of woman as a
universal presupposition of cultural experience which, in its universal
status, provides a false ontological promise of eventual political solidarity
[…] There is nothing about femaleness that is waiting to be expressed. 171

Nussbaum also claims that Butler’s deconstruction of sex is tethered to

narcissistic and anti-social individualism increasingly definitive of contemporary
America 172 reflecting an unthinking and narrow conformity to an epoch of cynicism
against liberalism defined by self-assertion and anti-solidarity: 173

The great tragedy in the new feminist theory in America is the loss of a
sense of public commitment. In this sense, Butler's self-involved feminism
is extremely American, and it is not surprising that it has caught on here,
where successful middle-class people prefer to focus on cultivating the

Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory." Theatre Journal 40.4 (1988): 519. Web.
172 Support for this objection comes if we consider Butler’s embryonic pre-Psychic life of Power theory of
the generation of sexual desire in Imitation and Gender Insubordination: ‘it is precisely pleasure produced
by the instability of those categories, namely gay and lesbian, which sustains the various erotic practices
that make me a candidate for the category to begin with.’ This psychoanalytic theory of her own desire
generation processes implicit here has them generated by virtue of the taboo of gayness, the very
desirability caused by the fact they fall outside of the dominant regulative normative categories. This is a
likely candidate for the kind of feature that Nussbaum implies evidence a narcissistic megalomania in
Butler which extrapolates her individual desires to serve as a general explanatory model for others. More
troubling is the suggested lack of moral concern for others, for when while prescribing a subversion she
is free to enjoy, there are many people for whom such subversion is dangerous, terrifying, or impossible.
The recognition that norms require repetition to gain credence and the recognition that pleasures that
come with being able to unfaithfully repeat are surely true, but there are “categories” of the subject for
whom that kind of discourse between subversion and pleasure seem highly indulgent and in some cases
simply offensive. It is a privileged subject that has various kinds of safety to be able to say that it gives a
kind of jubilation or pleasure to poke fun at these norms.
173 A point to charge Butler with anti-solidarity may be in her refusal to allow for the identifications
whereby any group my collectively identify as a “we”: ‘are there not discursive conditions for the
articulation of any we? Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA:
Stanford UP, 1997. P. 2 Every time that specificity is articulated, there is resistance and factionalization
within the very constituency that is supposed to be unified by the articulation of its common element’
Butler, Judith. "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of the “Postmodernism”." Ed. Seyla
Benhabib. Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. New York: Routledge, 1995. N.
171
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self rather than thinking in a way that helps the material condition of
others. 174

Nussbaum also argues that in the absence of any clearly defined theory of justice

or the good, the subversion of identity categories and binary value distinctions can be

extended to dissolve dichotomies such as just and unjust, cruel and kind, violent and
non-violent, etc. On this argument, since Butler offers nothing by way of argumentative
recourse to distinguish between beneficial and harmful subversion she promotes a line
of thought whereby atrocities become theoretically permissible:

Butler cannot explain in any purely structural or procedural way why the
subversion of gender norms is a social good while the subversion of
justice norms is a social bad […] In this way, her pessimistic erotic
anthropology offers support to an amoral anarchist politics [because] for
every friend of Butler, eager to engage in subversive performances that
proclaim the repressiveness of heterosexual gender norms, there are
dozens who would like to engage in subversive performances that flout
the norms […] of non-discrimination, of decent treatment of one's fellow
citizens. To such people we should say, you cannot simply resist as you
please, for there are norms of fairness, decency, and dignity that entail
that this is bad behavior. But then we have to articulate those norms - and
this Butler refuses to do. 175

Finally, Nussbaum worries that Butler ignores the empowering effects of sexual

identification and reduces the process of gender identification and sexual “liberation” to
a necessary re-imprisonment under delimiting categories. 176 For these reasons,
Nussbaum reduces Butler’s theories to an “ironic hopefulness” 177 a hopeless hope,
Nussbaum, Martha C. "The Professor of Parody." Reviews 1986-2011 Philosophical Interventions
(2012): 198-222. Web.
175 Ibid.
176 Support for such a reading is not too hard to find in Butler: ‘sex is] retroactively installed at a prelinguistic site to which is there no direct access […] a fiction […] within whose necessities we live, without
which life itself would be unlivable, [… it …] constitutes the very terrain of cultural intelligibility’ Butler,
Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993 introduction.
177 Nussbaum, Martha C. "The Professor of Parody." Reviews 1986-2011 Philosophical Interventions
(2012): 198-222. Web.
174
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defined not by actuality but by possibility, and one which has effectively disinherited
liberal values:

The big hope, the hope for a world of real justice, where laws and
institutions protect the equality and the dignity of all citizens, has been
banished. 178
A reply to Nussbaum 179

The criticisms that Butler’s feminism swaps equality, justice, human rights,

solidarity, and freedom for narcissistic individualism ignores the radical sociality
performativity entails, and the communal role of both its policing and the collective

commitment required for its overcoming. 180 Despite Nussbaum’s claims we see a

radical notion of solidarity in Butler, specifically in the co-constitution of identity: ‘my

Ibid.
A general response comes from the fact that Nussbaum veers close to a universalism which swims
against a current where the standards from which to prescribe ethics have been called into question both
by the extension of the enlightenment’s suspiciously critical eye to itself and the effects of opening up the
theoretical humanities to underrepresented perspectives. This opening up brought with it the dawning
realization that the liberal enlightenment’s vision of rational utopia universalized a provincial value
system complicit with colonial and imperial violence and oppression. Considering its sensitivity to this
legacy, Butler’s work and its popularity may reflect a timeliness absent in Nussbaum.
180 Concerning the alleged fetishization of taboo; one would be hard pressed to find accounts of sexual
pleasure that deny the erotic appeal of the prohibited, or against the rationale of a system that publicly
maintains privately permitted taboos. But the conviction that Butler’s personal sexuality prohibits her
from sincerely speaking out against normative injustice is straightforwardly ad homimem, and frankly
inadmissible in a genuinely argumentative context. Furthermore, and more importantly, Nussbaum’s
claim that for Butler the ‘act of subversion is so riveting, so sexy, that it is a bad dream to think that the
world will actually get better’ is problematized where Butler outlines political reasons to subvert gender,
and specifically warns against the political and ethical ills risked by certain forms of non-politically
guided subversion. Butler is aiming for a more inclusive les violent future, and explicitly warns against
the distraction erotic pleasure may form in pursuit of this political desideratum. Butler uses the example
of “butch” and “femme” role-playing in lesbianism, referring to the way in which the pleasure associated
with a lesbian identifying as a butch female, assuming the roles traditionally given to men as provider of
financial, psychical and emotional support, risks a condition ‘whereby that “providingness” turns into
self-sacrifice, which implicates her in the most ancient trap of self-abnegation’. (“Imitation and Gender
Insubordination” (1990) From Diana Fuss (ed.), Inside Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, pp. 12-31. New
York: Routledge, 1991. Butler warns that this erotic role playing risks reinforcing oppressive gender
ideals by valorizing female self-sacrifice. The danger is that that such performances resemble one of the
most pernicious features of patriarchal heteronormativity: the sacrifice of female civic-political agency,
self-constitutive agency etc. etc. Butler also warns against the adoption of “femme” example too: ‘[the
femme] may well eroticize a certain dependency only to learn that the very power to orchestrate that
dependency exposes her own incontrovertible power, at which point she inverts a butch or becomes
caught up in the specter of that inversion, or perhaps delights in it.’ ibid.
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pain or my silence or my anger or my perception is finally not mine alone.’ 181 Further

grounds to counter the anti-solidarity charge can be found in Against Proper Objects182

where Butler deconstructs the sex/gender categories at play in the certain

methodologies of race theory, feminism, and queer theory complicit in restricting sex to
the purview of queer theory and gender to feminism, categorizations that problematize
the production of a coherent account of their mutuality and shared goals and which

have fueled hostility and defensiveness between disciplines purportedly united in
support of civil rights and social justice:

There can be no viable feminism that fails to account for its complicity in
forms of oppression, whether they be colonial, class-based, racist, or
homophobic. And there can be no viable lesbian and gay studies
paradigm that does not examine its own complicitous investments in
misogyny and other forms of oppression […] I mean to open up another
possibility for feminist thought, one that would overcome its complicity
in heterosexist presuppositions, and mark an alliance with lesbian and
gay struggles. 183

To the alleged denial of pre-cultural ontological/biological sex and/or gender:

Firstly, Butler does not usher in some linguistic idealism, nor in any way deny the role

of a given corporality, and therefore remains theoretically sensitive to the significance
of ontological embodiment. Butler’s position is simply, and rightly, that our access to

the real is necessarily mediated by discourse. The following quote from Bodies that
Matter makes this clear:

Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory." Theatre Journal 40.4 (1988): 519. Web.
182 Butler, Judith. "Against Proper Objects." Ed. Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor. Feminism Meets Queer
Theory. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997. Butler also argues here against the condemnation
of pornography based on a ‘feminism in which the positions of gender are strictly correlated with
positions of domination or subordination within sexuality,’ Butler also criticizes defining all sexual
practice as inherently misogynistic, for assimilating ‘feminist politics to the discourse on victimization.
Nussbaum’s objections concerning this issue then, are unfounded.
183 Ibid. P. 2.
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To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates
causes or exhaustively composes that which it concedes, rather it is to
claim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same a
further formation of that body. 184

Concerning the refusal of identity labels such as “lesbian” or “woman,” far from

betraying women, Butler warns that without attesting to the socio-historical genealogy

of the category in question, heightens the risk that acts of intended emancipation might
reinforce a damaging illusion. Butler simply asks if we haven’t worked out how we are

“doing” gender, then how can we be sure that the idea of womanhood we are promoting
isn’t also delimiting the concept to the detriment of real women? This consideration of

under-represented embodiments represents a radically democratic compassionate and
anti-colonial aspiration both firmly in line with the tradition Nussbaum charges Butler
with abandoning and at the center of feminism in all its waves:

In this effort to combat the invisibility of women as a category, feminists
run the risk of rendering visible a category which may or may not be
representative of the concrete lives of women […] The cultural
construction of “women” constitutes the effacement of women, and those
who take the construction of women to be the “truth” of women close the
critical gap that it is feminism’s task to keep open. 185

Butler also explicitly endorses the strategic employment of these categories. At

the beginning of her career Butler claimed that the argument about using classic liberal
humanist terms and identity categories is ‘a quarrel that feminists must put to bed’ 186

and that lobbying demonstrations and legislative efforts are ‘virtually impossible

Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 10.
Both: Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and
Feminist Theory." Theatre Journal 40.4 (1988): 519.
186 Ibid.
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without recourse to identity politics.’187 When Butler warns that such strategic

applications should be carried out with the utmost care, the reason is that using even

provisional definitions risks assuming the emancipation of some “true” femininity
potentially perniciously exclusive of some “false” femininity, and that this can be an
obstacle to expanding the rights and freedoms of actual women. Therefore Butler

allows for “frontline feminism” to use identity categories while avoiding prescribing the
right thing to think of as “gender” “female,” “sex” etc. all firmly in the service of

individually and politically emancipatory ideals. 188 Indeed, Butler’s refusal to sanction

the unchecked strategic application of identity is to resist reinforcing regulative ideals

of gender, sexuality, and womanhood typical of oppressive regimes, a refusal which

belies a consistent commitment to further regulative ideals such as justice, equality, and
freedom:

Although it is quite clear that there are strict punishments for contesting
the script by performing out of turn or through unwarranted
improvisations, gender is not passively scripted on the body, and neither
is it determined by nature, language, the symbolic, or the overwhelming
history of patriarchy. Gender is what is put on, invariably, under
constraint, daily and incessantly, with anxiety and pleasure, but if this
continuous act is mistaken for a natural or linguistic given, power is
relinquished to expand the cultural field bodily through subversive
performances of various kinds. 189

Ibid.
Butler explains how damaging the attempts to define womanhood have been for the project of
feminism: ‘Every time that specificity is articulated, there is resistance and factionalization within the
very constituency that is supposed to be unified by the articulation of its common element. In the 1980s
the feminist “we” rightly came under attack by women of color who claimed that the “we” was invariably
white, and that the “we” that was meant to solidify the movement was the very source of a painful
factionalization. The effort to categorize the specificity of feminism through recourse to maternity,
whether biological or social produced a similar factionalization and even a disavowal of feminism
altogether,’ Butler, Judith. "Imitation and Gender Insubordination." Inside/out: Lesbian Theories, Gay
Theories. Ed. Diana Fuss. New York: Routledge, 1991.
189 Ibid.
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While defending the utility of rational autonomous agency, realizing and

exercising a notion of freedom within constraints is at the heart of Butler’s work up to

the present. While conceding that performativity shows us how gender ‘delimits me in a

shared cultural situation’ Butler theorizes how this ‘enables and empowers in certain

unanticipated ways.’ 190 Butler also explains that such deconstructions are conditions
for understanding the reality which the notion of a transparent autonomous subject and
agency cannot capture:

To recast the referent as the signified, and to authorize or safeguard the
category of women as a site of possible resignifications is to expand the
possibilities of what it means to be a woman and in this sense to
condition and enable an enhanced sense of agency. 191

Butler argues that far from eliminating the political being fought for in social

justice movements, the conception of freedom understood as necessarily within the

radical sociality of a poststructuralist frame contributes to mobilizing against
oppression and persecution more effectively than identity category discourse. 192

Indeed, Butler’s aim of expanding “the cultural field” in the name of freedom may be a

more realistic aspiration than many autonomy-based perspectives. This is because the
assumption of an unmediated origin of self-determination is untenable and removes the

responsibility and duty to consider the limiting effects certain socio-political and
psycho-physical conditions place on the will:

Ibid.
Butler, Judith. "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of the “Postmodernism”." Ed.
Seyla Benhabib. Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. New York: Routledge, 1995.
192 ‘If a deconstruction of materiality of bodies suspends and problematizes the traditional ontological
referent of the term, it does not freeze, banish, render useless, or deplete of meaning the usage of the
term. On the contrary it provides the conditions to mobilize the signifier in the service of an alternative.’
Ibid.
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The recourse to a position, hypothetical, counterfactual, or imaginary,
that places itself beyond the play of power, and which seeks to establish
the meta-political basis for a negotiation of power relations, is perhaps
the most insidious ruse of power. 193

Not only does Butler avoid problematically assuming the epistemic power to

capture identity from outside the context of social intelligibility, her theories also

explore the perimeters in which a viable and coherent notion of agency may be carved

out. Despite Nussbaum’s objection, the question for Butler is not whether we have

agency but how agency is constructed and where does political agency emerge within

an accurate picture of psychic, corporeal, and socio-cultural constraints. 194 A theory

capable of answering these questions is better equipped to deal with the insights of

Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Levi-Strauss, Saussure, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida as well
as Darwinism, physics, and neuroscience which have collectively and irreversibly
problematized the notion of a free autonomous agency interjecting from outside the

causal/material and social realms based on rational deliberation. To look beyond this
model is not to dismiss the tenets of liberalism nor is denying autonomous agency to

look for the determining forces that spell defeatism. To put it simply accepting our
vulnerability to determining forces is requisite for discovering what agency really is:
We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is
necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject, but to claim
that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined, on the

Ibid.
‘My purpose is neither to enumerate nor to resolve the contemporary instances of this debate. Rather,
I propose to take account of how a paradox recurrently structures the debate, leading it almost always to
culminate in displays of ambivalence. How can it be that the subject, taken to be the condition for and
instrument of agency, is at the same time the effect of subordination, understood as the deprivation of
agency? If subordination is the condition of possibility for agency, how might agency be thought in
opposition to the forces of subordination?’ Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection.
Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. p. 10.
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contrary the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition
of its agency. 195

Agency is to be found, paradoxically, in the possibilities opened up in and
by that constrained appropriation of the regulatory law, by the
materialization of that law, the compulsory appropriation and
identification with those normative demands. 196
Butler’s liberalism

Having addressed the major thrust of Nussbaum’s arguments and taking the

broad definition of liberal as invested in freedom, equality, justice, we can now turn to

Butler’s politicizations of her own work which, I argue, lends further credence to
describing butlers work as invested in liberal ideals. In Performative Acts Butler sought
to contest the pernicious effects of hetero-normativity on marginalized forms of gender

and sexual identification, proposing ‘a politics of performative gender acts […] to

expand the cultural field’. 197 Butler calls for the envisaging of a future social world
where the punitive consequences of gender insubordination are abated, and in which

socially sanctioned existential comportmental perimeters become wider and likelier to
permit conventionally attacked embodiments greater freedoms and security:

A critical genealogy needs to be supplemented by a politics of
performative gender acts, one which both redescribes existing gender
identities and offers a prescriptive view about the kind of gender reality
there ought to be. 198

Ibid. Butler continues, ‘For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconsideration of
cultural and political relations if not a relation that can be turned against itself, if we were to resist it, do
we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms
of the significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we
don’t offer in advance a theoretical guarantee of that agency are we doomed to give up transformation
and meaningful political practice?’
196 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993.
197 Butler, Judith. “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory”, Theatre Journal 40.4 (1988): 519.
198 Ibid. [My italics]
195
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In Imitation and Gender Insubordination Butler outlines performative subversion

as ‘a form of affirmative resistance to a certain regulatory operation of homophobia’ 199

and Butler has publicly associated with movements indebted to liberal humanism as
her speech at an Occupy Wall Street rally suggests:

We object to the monopolization of wealth. We object to making working
populations disposable. We object to the privatization of education. We
believe that education must be a public good and a public value. We
oppose the expanding numbers of the poor. We rage against the banks
that push people from their homes, and the lack of health care for
unfathomable numbers. We object to economic racism and call for its end.
[…] we are here, time and again, persisting, imagining the phrase, "we the
people."200

Liberal political ideals also animate Butler’s work on materialization: the means

through which discursive regimes render the material of the body intelligible. 201 The

normalizing and naturalization of a discursively realized figure has ethical, social, and
political consequences because in labeling “natural” sex it illegitimately attaches a prediscursive origin to post-discursive phenomena. In Bodies that Matter Butler describes

her work contesting this naturalization as ‘undertaken with the aim to expand and
enhance the field of possibilities for bodily life.’ 202

“Imitation and Gender Insubordination: (1990) From Diana Fuss (ed.), Inside Out: Lesbian Theories,
Gay Theories, pp. 12-31. New York: Routledge, 1991.
200 Transcript made and published in a comment on http://feministing.com/2011/10/24/judith-butlerjoins-occupy/ by username: William.
201 ‘What I would propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a return to the notion of matter,
not as a site or surface but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of
boundary, fixity, and surface that we call matter.’ Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive
Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 9.
202 “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler, Irene Costera Major, and Braujke Prins”
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press.
199
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The Psychic Life of Power serves a similar aspiration. For example, Butler

proposes a ‘psychic resistance to normalization’ 203 that marks the path toward a ‘more

ethical kind of being.’ 204 Crucially, Butler allows for a “remainder” within agency
beyond the scope of delimiting intelligibility or possible embodiment, something yet to

be, some vitality potentially revealed in the refusal to reify, considerable grounds for
freedom:

the purposes of power are not always the purposes of agency. To the
extent that the latter diverge from the former agency is the assumption of
a purpose unintended by power, one that cannot have been derived
logically or historically that operates in a relation of contingency and
reversal to the power that makes it possible to which it nevertheless
belongs, this is, as it were, the ambivalence in agency constrained by no
teleological necessity. 205

The Psychic Life of Power then, can be viewed as working from this theory of the

subject to mark out the psychic space for political freedom within constraints placed on

subjectivation at the co-constitutive social/psychic levels. While the work on

performativity included an analysis of the punishment dished out to those who deviate

from the norms, The Psychic Life of Power theorizes its origination in the discourse of
psychoanalysis,

explaining

how

the

heteronormative

script

is

necessarily

unsuccessfully realized and consequently perpetuates a panicked performativity which

compels the aggressive mistreatment of non-gender-sexual-conformity as the re-

emergence of repressed libidinal investments. Because of these commitments to nonviolence, justice, equality, freedom, human rights, and protecting marginalized

All from Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP,
1997. p. 131.
204 All from Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP,
1997. p. 131.
205 Ibid. p. 15.
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communities we can regard The Psychic Life of Power as collectable under the broad
umbrella of liberalism.
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Chapter 4: Judith Butler and Liberal Cynicism
Introduction
Because of commitments to non-violence, democracy, justice, equality, freedom,

and protecting marginalized communities we can regard Butler’s work as collectable

under the broad umbrella of liberalism. We can now turn to the claim that despite these
guiding ideals middle Butler can be seen to fail them. This includes the claim that
middle Butler bear hallmarks analogous to Inauthentic Ideology Critique both in the

sense of reifying their inefficacy of the liberal values on which it depends

exhibiting a reluctance to admit to these values, as well as Cynicalization; the

deepening of an inherited cynicism, and cruel optimism; raising and simultaneously
prohibiting hope.

Inauthentic Ideology Critique as abandonment
By elaborating on the problem of violence, specifically Butler’s structuralist view

of its constitutive depth, we can locate the Inauthentic Ideology Critique typical of

Liberal Cynicism in her work specifically that, while although allegiant to liberal ideals,
in absolutizing their inefficacy effectively abandons them. The worry revolves around
violence in the Butlerian framework. Although the idea of a normatively violent

“othering” required for conscious subjectivity is not new within the Continental lineage,
whether in Derrida, in the Levinasian frame, or in Kristeva’s psychoanalytic account of

abjection, normative violence is not political and ethical. 206 By contrast, Butler places
Derrida’s account of normative violence has it as ‘an original transcendental violence, previous to any
ethical choice’ […] a preethical violence.’ Writing and Difference, University of Chicago Press, 1978. P. 125.
For Levinas, the exclusory violence in the encounter with alterity is prior to norms of ethics and morality,
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epistemic, normative, symbolic, linguistic, concrete, and conscious hateful violence on a
spectrum.

In Bodies that Matter Butler claims that although “unreal,” sex and gender are

conditions for the possibility of conscious subjectivity, describing sex as ‘a fiction,
perhaps a fantasy […] without which life itself would be unlivable’ and that it

‘constitutes the very terrain of cultural intelligibility.’ 207 In Imitation and Gender

Insubordination Butler claims that even in the context of jubilant and liberating

identifications and political gains for traditionally legally marginalized sexualities,

identity categories are both necessary and necessarily perpetuate the oppressive
workings of hegemonic power, ‘whether as the normalizing category of oppressive
structures or as the rallying points of a liberatory contestation.’ 208 Crucially, Butler

claims that ‘this kind of categorization can be called a violent one, a forceful one’ 209 and
that the ‘discursive ordering and production of bodies in accordance with the category

of sex is itself a material violence.’ 210 This nominates material violence as a

transcendental figure in Butler’s middle work, the most troublesome aspect of which is
Butler’s politicization thereof:

The violence of the letter, the violence of the mark which signifies what
will and will not be included within the intelligible takes on a political

and for Kristeva normative “abjection” relates to a subjectivity enabled through repeated patterns of
expulsion, but it too, is not trafficking on the level of the political.
207 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “sex" New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 5.
208 Butler, Judith. "Imitation and Gender Insubordination." Inside/out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories. Ed.
Diana Fuss. New York: Routledge, 1991.
209 Butler, Judith. "Imitation and Gender Insubordination." Inside/out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories. Ed.
Diana Fuss. New York: Routledge, 1991.
210 Butler, Judith. "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of the “Postmodernism”." Ed.
Seyla Benhabib. Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. New York: Routledge, 1995. N. p. 51 – 52.
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significance when the letter is the law or the authoritative legislation for
what will be. 211

The worry is not just that Butler is making a category mistake or being

insufficiently sympathetic with victims of violence, it’s that she renders as necessary
what is itself a material violence, and which prefigures violence from the level of
intelligibility all the way to hate crime. 212

The Psychic Life of Power (1997) deepens this view. Therein, Butler develops

Foucauldian subjectivation by theorizing the psychic processes which prefigure

embodied performativity, appealing to a formal symmetry between Hegel’s dialectic up
to unhappy consciousness, 213 Nietzsche’s notion of sublimation, 214 Freud’s theories of

narcissism and melancholia, 215 and Althusserian interpellation. 216 This culminates in a

bleak picture of the psychic operations on which subjectivity depends; passionately
Ibid.
‘This delimitation which often is enacted as an untheorized presupposition in any act of description
marks a boundary that includes and excludes that decides as it were, what will and what will not be the
stuff of the object to which we then refer, this marking off will have some normative force and indeed
some violence for it can construct only through erasing, it can bound a thing only though enforcing a
certain criterion, a certain principle of selectivity’ Butler, Judith. "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and
the Question of the “Postmodernism”." Ed. Seyla Benhabib. Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical
Exchange. New York: Routledge, 1995. P. 11. If we must identify within existing gender possibilities and
these possibilities are necessarily tethered to violent politically relevant repressive norms, then we are
all unavoidably constrained by and constraining others through the performance of sexed and gendered
identity.
213 Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller and J. N. Findlay. Oxford: Oxford U, 2013.
214 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann “The Wanderer and his Shadow” §18, The
Portable Nietzsche. New York: Penguin, 1976. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of
the Idols, and Other Writings. Trans. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman. New York: Cambridge UP,
2005.Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic. Trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J.
Swensen. N.p.: Hackett, 1998. . Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of
Morality. Ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP,
1997.
215 Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Norton, 1962. .
Freud, Sigmund. "Mourning and Melancholia" and “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” Ed. Peter
Gay. The Freud Reader. New York: Norton, 1999. 584-89. Freud, Sigmund. Freud's On Narcissism: An
Introduction. Ed. Joseph Sandler, Ethel Person, and Peter Fonagy. New Haven: Yale UP, 1991.
216 Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (notes towards an Investigation)."
Trans. Ben Brewster. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review, 1971. 127-88.
211
212

81

attached to necessary forces of self-inflicted normative violence and subordination
often compelling identitarian violence in the sociopolitical realm:

the subject is passionately attached to his or her own subordination […]
the attachment to subjection is produced through the workings of
power. 217

The melancholic aggression and the desire to vanquish […] characterizes
the public response to the death of many of those considered "socially
dead," who die from AIDS […] Gay people, prostitutes, drug users, among
others. 218

We can extract from this a threefold violence of necessary, unavoidable, and pre-

conscious power to add to the violence of policed performativity and regulatory

materialization from the earlier work: 219 of identity formation, self against self, 220 and
self against other. Crucially, this threefold violence germinates prior to conscious
agency ‘always prior, outside of itself and operative from the start.’ 221 Butler concludes

that ‘the subject’s vulnerability to violence is unavoidable,’ 222 and that ‘the price of

existence is subordination.’ 223 While Butler’s early phase has the violence in discursive

materialization as transcendental, here Butler transcendentalizes the violence at play in
the psychic formation of the subject necessarily beyond the reach of conscious

Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. p.3.
Ibid. 27.
219 ‘The notion of power at work in subjection, thus appears in two incommensurable modalities, first as
what is for the subject is always prior outside of itself and operative from the start, [1] the second
modality carries at least two sets of meanings, as the willed effect of the subject subjection is a
subordination that the subject brings on itself, [2a] the other subjection produces the subject, and a
subject is the precondition of the agency, then subjection is the account by which a subject becomes the
guarantor of its resistance and opposition.[2b]’ Ibid. 14.
220 ‘The subject is initiated through a primary submission to power […] The form this power takes is
relentlessly marked by a figure of turning, of turning back upon oneself or even a turning on oneself’
Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. P. 3
‘production of the subject in the formation of that will is the consequence of a primary subordination’
Ibid. P. 20.
221 Ibid. P. 14.
222 Ibid. p. 20.
223 Ibid. p. 20.
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contestation. This reification of necessary pre-performative violence suits our definition

of extreme Liberal Cynicism’s rejecting the efficacy of liberal ideals – in this case nonviolence – while at the same time valuing them. For while Butler’s work is invested in

contesting violence, in theorizing its absolute necessity it leaves us incapable of doing
so.

violence founds the subject […] the subject who would oppose violence,
even violence to itself, is itself the effect of a prior violence without which
the subject could not have emerged. 224
Inauthentic Ideology Critique as failed avowal

We have seen how Butler can be reasonably described as invested in liberal

ideals/commitments broadly construed. We can suggest that Butler refuses to

avow these ideals by focusing on a tension in Bodies That Matter specifically, Butler’s
theory of materialization, the mechanisms through which discursive regimes render the
material of the body intelligible. The following quote lays out the problem:

the exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed requires the
simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not
yet subjects but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the
subject. The abject designates here precisely those unlivable and
uninhabitable zones of social life which are nevertheless densely
populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject. 225

The tension revolves around what we are we supposed to think of abjection and

abject beings who are “not yet subjects” but nevertheless inhabit social life, and what to

make of Butler’s politicization of this theory. Butler claims that ‘abjected or

delegitimated bodies fail to count as “bodies,”’226 and describes abjection as
Ibid. P. 63.
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. p. 3.
226 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 16.
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‘inadmissibility to codes of intelligibility’ 227 signaling ‘what is left outside binary
oppositions’228 and as the ‘the unthinkable, the unlivable, the unintelligible’ which ‘live

as the radically uninterrogated and as the shadowy contentless figure of something that

is not yet made real.’229 The problem can be put in the form of the question is Butler
talking of hypothetical beings beyond intelligibility, perhaps potential future

materialized embodiments, or as actual people struggling for recognition and
acceptance within dominant social norms? The attempt to answer this question can

compel three readings, the “transcendental,” “existential” and “Kynical.” My thesis is

that these heuristics are reasonable responses to independent and ultimately
inconsistent moves within a simultaneously phenomenological, metaphysical,
epistemological, ethical, political framework subordinate to a straightforward but

concealed principled commitment to justice, equality, freedom, and non-violence. This

is not to claim that Butler is wrong or misguided, far from it, it is rather to suggest that

there is a stronger normative position here than Butler’s theory can allow, and that this

concealment is due to a fraught relationship between ideals and critique which, as we
have seen, is a hallmark of Liberal Cynicism.

On the existential reading, 230 Butler is critiquing the discourses which

normatively erect and sustain the perimeters delimiting which humans are deemed
Costera Major, Irene. Prins, Braujke “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler”
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press p. 277.
228 Costera Major, Irene. Prins, Braujke “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler”
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press p. 284.
229 Costera Major, Irene. Prins, Braujke “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler”
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press p. 277.
230 What we mean here by an ‘existential’ relates specifically to Kierkegaard, for whom the “existentially
existing individual” is a subject who has self-actualized through passionate commitment to a chosen set
of “subjective truths,” principles by which to live and die. This idea we are adopting is that we are not
227
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worthy of dignity and respect. Abjection here refers to individuals denied the treatment

which participation in the category human should entail. The existential reading has
Butler aiming to contest the mechanisms through which the loss of human lives can

appear more or less grievable due to explicit and implicit cultural biases, normative and

concrete discrimination, prejudice, ignorance, unthinking conformity, explicit hatred
etc. There are many instances where Bodies That Matter seems to endorse this reading.
For example where Butler cites psychosis as one of the consequences of abjection,231
and when she refers to abject “beings,” “subjects,” and “bodies” as failing to qualify as

‘fully human’ 232 and ‘critical matters of concern.’ 233 More support for the existential
reading comes when Butler gives examples of the abject as women, lesbians,234

refugees, “the Arab,” aids victims, alleged terrorists, portions of the Muslamina, and
Guantanamo detainees. This connecting of abjection with mental conditions,

qualifications for moral concern, and Butler chosen examples combine to suggest that

we are talking about actual mistreated humans and the existential notion of humanity
as “enjoyed” in degrees:

discourse […] orchestrates, delimits, and sustains that which qualifies as
the human. We see this most clearly in those abjected beings who do not
appear ‘properly gendered.’ It is their very humanness that comes into

born human in the full sense of what that means, our humanness is bestowed on us by a community and
through discourse and relates to our perceived moral worth rather than our being alive.
231 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 15.
232 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 16.
233 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 4.
234 Grounds for the transcendental reading can be found where Butler talks of the “ontology of expulsion”
at play in the invisibility of lesbianism versus the despicability of male gayness, how male and female
homosexuality occupy different realms in cultural legibility as set by the symbolic imaginary. Butler
claims that while male homosexuality is hyper-visible and vulnerable to specific kinds of violence
precisely because it is despised, and while male gayness is ‘awarded’ a greater ontological reality, by
contrast ‘Lesbianism is not explicitly prohibited in part because it has not even made its way into the
thinkable, the imaginable, that grid of cultural intelligibility that regulates the real and namable, […] the
political is a context in which the lesbian doesn’t exist’. (p. 126.) This is of course absurd.
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question […] a differential operation that produces the more or less
“human.” 235

The existential reading allows us to make clear sense of how Butler politicizes

the processes of identity formation. On this view, the “humanness that comes into
question” is to be understood as within the purview of a conscious, exclusive, and

regulative normativity, and would therefore be exposable and revisable from within
this domain. Unfortunately, Butler distances herself from the existential reading:

you could say, oh yes, certain kinds of beings have more fully ontological
being than others, etcetera, etcetera. Then you would remain within a
certain kind of philosophical framework that could be conceptually
satisfying. 236

This apparently pejorative use of “conceptually satisfying” most likely stems

from the desire to avoid simplifying and superficializing the depth of discursive
construction, as well as avoiding the naivety of assumptions potentially guiding the

existential reading. Perhaps that it overlooks the inaccessibility to reflexive self-

consciousness of the internalization of norms though discourse and performative

reinforcement, deeply problematizing the assumption that the contestation of abjection
is a task of conscious re-classification. This reading is in line with Butler’s persistent

refusal of ‘classical liberal humanist formulations’ as ‘naïve forms of political

optimism.’237 The point crucially missed on that model is that the discursive realms of
intelligibility which dictates whose lives matter as well as the freedom to contest this
regulatory normativity operate within the perimeters dictated by normative violence

Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 8.
Butler, Judith. "Imitation and Gender Insubordination." The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader. Ed. Henry
Abelove, Michè le Aina. Barale, and David M. Halperin. New York: Routledge, 1993.
237 Dumm, Thomas. "Giving Away, Giving Over: A Conversation with Judith Butler." The Massachusetts
Review 49.1/2 (2008): 95-105. JSTOR. Web.
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and are therefore within that which Butler seeks to contest. On this view, the existential

reading assumes the impossible: a purview beyond discursivity.

The transcendental reading may avoid this problem. 238 Upon which, abjection

occurs where the discursively initiated psychic internalization of norms influences the
perceptual apparatuses which render humanity intelligible and restricts certain
possibilities to unintelligibility. On this reading Butler is critiquing the discourses which

normatively erect and sustain what counts as human; a pre-conscious discursively

realized psychic/cognitive function responsible for the possibility of experiencing
sensory input as human. 239 There is considerable support for reading Butler this way.

Bodies That Matter asks how subjects ‘count or qualify as real’ and answers that the
discursively realized ‘distribution of ontological effects’ functions ‘for producing

domains of unthinkability,’ 240 an ‘excluded and eligible domain.’ 241 Therein Butler
claims that ‘bodies only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints
of […] regulatory schema,’ describing the ‘domain of abjection’ as ‘a repudiation without
which the subject cannot emerge,’ ‘prior to the emergence of the “human.”’242

As the above quotations and analysis show, Butler invites both the existential

reading and the transcendental reading. If there were an explanation of how these two

different levels interact then this may be the end of the problem, but Butler’s

politicizations of normative violence do not restrict themselves to the existential realm.

Transcendental here refers to the Foucauldian “de-universalized” Kantian view that our experience
depends on historically contingent a priori “knowledge.”
239 In explaining materialization as ‘somewhat different form Foucault’ Butler ‘aligns with the Kantian
tradition.’ Costera Major, Irene. Prins, Braujke “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith
Butler” Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press p. 279.
240 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993.
241 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. x.
242 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 3.
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Butler describes the regulatory normativity which dictates the conditions of
intelligibility as an instrument of power instrumentalized for purposes of hierarchy,

subordination, and exclusion. This politicization of identity formation is much harder to

defend on the transcendental than on the existential reading because here the claim is

that certain persons occupy realms outside any current possible understanding of

personhood. But this could not be mobilized for defending subjugated groups because
their intelligibility is surely required for both their mistreatment and its contestation.
The problem can be made clearer by asking: if it is true that sex and gender are
transcendental conditions for intelligibility as human does this mean those whose

“humanness is called into question” are imperceptible? On the transcendental reading

the answer would be yes. This is hugely problematic, for even while there are those
who struggle to understand or empathize with certain sexed and gendered and/or not

sexed and gendered individuals, even to the extent of denying their moral status, such

dehumanizations still recognize a human. Put simply, only a human can be dehumanized. A potential way to address this issue is to read Butler’s work as aiming to

produce a future in which subjects come to occupy a less rigidly regulated normative

environment. On this view, inaugurating or opening the possibility of a new
intelligibility is a necessarily futural project and the humans we are saving from
abjection are those who could be subjectivated differently in the future. This would suit

Butler’s goal of ‘initiating new possibilities, new ways for bodies to matter.’243 The

problem is that nobody will benefit. No future being can be saved from abjection
because in the Butlerian frame ‘the subject is constituted through the forces of

243

Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 30.
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exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to the subject, an
abjected outside which is after all inside the subject as its own founding repudiation.’244

On this view, while the intelligible subject determines the abject state as the subject’s
"constitutive outside" it does so as a reflection of the perimeters of intelligibility, the

constitutive “inside.” Abjection operates internally to subjectivation, within the psyche

if not the ego. There is no further outside. The subject and the abject exert equal

exclusionary/creative power over one another within the psyche. Therefore, there is no

potential being which is barred from existence by subjectivation. Indeed, there are no
abject beings at all. Therefore, there is no way on the transcendental reading of Butler’s
theory to bring the abjected into the subjective, not now, not ever. 245

The “Kynical” reading may avoid the naiveté of the existential reading and the

problematic commitments of the transcendental and explain why Butler has not
distinguished between the two levels. On the Kynical reading, Butler adopts a disruptive

insubordination akin to Diogenes, deconstructing and de-legitimatizing the dominant

logic from within its symbolic paradigm, both implying and refusing the “tainted”
categories of transcendental or existential, as well as logical, rational, material,

discursive, metaphysical, or philosophical. On the Kynical reading Butler aims to

destabilize the power at play in laying claim to traditional categories, problematizing
these basic delimiting concepts as pernicious and unthought commitments in the

Ibid. P. 3.
Potentially some recourse to the radical sociality of the psyche could help here, but Butler doesn’t
offer one.
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dominant logic. 246 Here though, instead of defending a bucolic ethics, “Kynical Butler’s”

goal is realize freedom through resisting the dominant paradigm of intelligibility. There

is considerable reason to read Butler this way: ‘This whole domain of ontology that the
good, the conceptually pure, philosopher takes for granted is profoundly tainted from

the start.’ 247 Butler describes herself as ‘willing to commit a sort of rhetorical excess’ 248
and deconstructive writing as ‘one way of reconfiguring what will count as the

world’. 249 How Bodies Come to Matter questions ‘the necessity of the mechanisms
through which the ontological fields are constituted,’ 250 and intends ‘to confound the

conceptually proper philosopher,’ 251 so as to ‘resignify the ontological operators,’ and
‘produce ontology itself as a contested field,’ 252 ‘recirculating the “there is” in order to

Support for this reading can be found in Butler’s explanation of the purpose of the resignification of
terms; to capture the unavoidable embedded status of thought and language within historical cultural
socio-political limits which ‘makes the ontology of the body a social ontology’ and ‘normative production
of ontology’ necessarily implicated in discussions over what “life” is: ‘The domain of ontology is a
regulated domain: what gets produced inside of it, what gets excluded from it in order for the domain to
be constituted is itself an effect of power. And the performative can be one of the ways in which discourse
operationalizes power’ Ibid.
247 How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler, Irene Costera Major, and Braujke Prins,
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago press, P. 279-280 On this reading,
Butler intends to be impossible to pin down, to defy conventions, without supposing to fully extend
beyond their influence; to beguile, to confuse and even to inaugurate a new relationship to ontology:
‘Even if I say, "there are abject bodies that do not enjoy a certain kind of ontological status," I perform
that contradiction on purpose. And I am doing that precisely to confound the conceptually proper
philosopher and to pose a question about the secondary and derivative status of ontology. I am doing that
precisely to fly in the face of those who would say, "but aren't you presupposing ...?" No! My speech does
not necessarily have to presuppose. ... Or, if it does, fine! Perhaps it's producing the effect of a
presupposition through its performance, OK? And that's fine! Get used to it! But it is to roundly
inaugurate an ontology, it is not to presuppose an already given one. It is discursively to institute one’
Ibid.
248 Costera Major, Irene. Prins, Braujke “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler”
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275-286, University of Chicago Press p. 284.
249 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 19.
250 Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p.7.
251 “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler, Irene Costera Major, and Braujke Prins”
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press, P. 279-280.
252 Ibid.
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produce a counter imaginary to the dominant metaphysics.’ 253 On this register, Butler’s

use of overlapping and even inconsistent ethical, epistemological, ontological, and
metaphysical frames which compel our distinct readings, alongside pejorative

normative language is employed to target complex pre-conscious psychic and
discursive functions to encourage a self-reflective analysis of our visceral response to
provocation with the goal of shifting perspectives concerning the depth of normative
violence.

I could say "there are abject bodies," and that could be a performative in
which I endow ontology. I endow ontology to precisely that which has
been systematically deprived of the privilege of ontology […] I am
performing a performative contradiction, on purpose. And I am doing that
precisely to confound the conceptually proper philosopher and to pose a
question about the secondary and derivative status of ontology. Even if
say, “there are abject bodies that do not enjoy a certain kind of ontological
status,” I perform that contradiction on purpose. 254

Unfortunately, the Kynical reading is also deeply problematic. While Butler’s

theoretical commitments allow for the distance from norms requisite for critique, full
distance is rendered impossible by their constitutive depth. On Butler’s model we must
be within the functioning of norms to subvert them. A consequence of this view is that

imagining the power to step outside the grip of norms would contradict the very need
to subvert them. The following articulates this Butlerian refrain:

I see opposition working from within the very terms by which power is
elaborated. 255

Costera Major, Irene. Prins, Braujke “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler”
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press p. 279.
254 How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler, Irene Costera Major, and Braujke Prins,
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press, P. 279-280.
255 “How bodies come to matter: An interview with Judith Butler, Irene Costera Major, and Braujke Prins”
Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 275 -286, University of Chicago Press, P. 279-28.
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For this reason, one would expect Butler’s deconstructions to remain on

recognizable terms with that which they purport to subvert, but Butler refuses to

critique/engage traditional categories such as ontology on their own terms, and as such

the subversion loses its thrust. For example, in lamenting lesbianism’s “exclusion from

ontology,” 256 talking about changing “the distribution of ontological effects,”
“recirculating” and “re-signifying” ontological “operators,” and most of all when
“endowing with” or “inaugurating” ontology, Butler does not do enough justice to the

concept to claim to subvert it. Refusal is not subversion. Furthermore, claiming the

power to “inaugurate a new ontology” whilst simultaneously calling the very concept
“profoundly tainted from the start” is paradoxical to the point of meaninglessness.

This problematic also leaves unanswered how we are to judge the effects of

ontology discourse, upon what foundation we could justify subversion, and how we

could “change” ontology. If the pernicious biases functioning at the level where

discursive structures constitute experience are contingent and contestable, then surely

the commitments that motivate such contestation are equally vulnerable, and even if
we did have such power, what right have we to prefer these biases over others? While
Butler resists traditional concepts of sex and gender, discourse, logic, ontology, and

identity as such, she upholds subversive freedom, justice, non-violence, and equality.

Perhaps there is an explanation for why these ideals survive deconstruction while the
very structure of language, reasoning, and brute experiential reality do not, but Butler
does not offer one. This can leave the reader wondering why to apply Butler’s critique

Butler, Judith “Imitation and Gender Insubordination: (1990) From Diana Fuss (ed.), Inside Out:
Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, pp. 12-31. New York: Routledge, 1991. P. 20.

256

92

precisely where she does and not where she doesn’t, at which point the voice of Martha

Nussbaum is impossible to ignore: ‘you cannot simply resist as you please.’257

If we read Butler as critiquing the discourses which normatively erect and

sustain the perimeters delimiting which humans are deemed worthy of dignity and
respect the project intends to improve the situation for the currently marginalized. If

we read Butler’s project as deconstructing normalizing discourse at the deepest levels

of intelligibility it is intended to help render visible instances and varieties of violent
abjection we may otherwise be blind to and even recalibrate discriminatory

consciousness in response. And if we read Butler as utilizing paradox and performative
contradictions to deconstruct norms embedded in the very structures of inference

Butler’s aim is to break down the forces which discursively enclose the horizons of
embodied life, so as to carve out a future in which new “unimaginable” freedoms can

emerge. Whichever heuristic we adopt, Butler is encouraging us to interrogate how

prejudices and biases place limits we can potentially transcend. Butler describes this

‘“normative” dimension of her work’ 258 as expanding ‘the very meaning of what counts

as a valued and valuable body.’ 259 The rationale for supposing our heuristics then stems
not from if but how we are to ground such a project. Therefore, if these are legitimate
heuristics, we can claim an underlying aspiration to curtail violence, increase freedom,

Nussbaum, Martha C. "The Professor of Parody." Reviews 1986-2011 Philosophical Interventions
(2012): 198-222.
258 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 21.
259 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. P. 22.
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to contribute to realizing justice, and equality, all of which are, broadly speaking, liberal
ideals. 260

But, as Butler’s own placing of “normative” in scare-quotes suggests, this is

problematic. On the Kynical and transcendental readings the project fails its guiding

aspiration, and a straightforward articulation of existential reading – the only option

upon which it is realizable – is prohibited by Butler’s commitments. As we saw, this is
because for Butler, the discursive realms of intelligibility which dictates whose lives

matter as well as the freedom to contest this regulatory normativity operate within the
perimeters dictated by normative violence. This is why Butler cannot claim these ideals.

To do so would be to commit normative violence, the very power Butler aims to contest.

This marks the impasse many poststructuralisms interested in equality, justice,
freedom, non-violence, and human rights are prone to encounter. The will-to-

deconstruction is a consequence of ideology critique predicated on the observation of
implicit bias, the absence of canonical interpretations of experience, stability of

viewpoint of value, or overarching truths and the consequent commitment that value
systems risk potentially oppressive discrimination, a worry that Butler makes very

clear: ‘To assume a substantive notion of the universal is of necessity to impose a
culturally hegemonic notion.’261 For this reason, although the existential reading is the
It may be objected that there are other heuristics than these three, indeed, that I am superimposing
ideals onto Butler’s middle work, then criticizes the places where those ideals are not supported. I would
response in two ways. Firstly, I would point to the arguments in chapter 3. Secondly, I would add, that
even if we do not see progressive liberalism within Butler’s theory, the general uptake of her theories
have been from that diaspora of leanings, and therefore, that even if there is a case to be made that my
reading superimposes, (I strongly resist this), the exegetical tensions my reading highlights would
antagonize similar readers of which there are many.
261 Butler, Judith. "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of the “Postmodern”." Ed. Seyla
Benhabib. Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. New York: Routledge, 1995.
260
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most useful for those invested contesting normative violence, Butler nevertheless
resists it. The impasse is that the language popular in such projects, certainly in Butler,

of violence and abjection, discrimination, exclusion, expulsion, obliteration, subjection,
oppression, etc. invariably invoke categorical structures indebted to overarching

narratives and value systems. 262 When describing her ‘“performative contradictions”
flying in the face of those who would say ‘"but aren't you presupposing?" Butler replies

to her imagined interlocutors: ‘No! My speech does not necessarily have to presuppose.
... Or, if it does, fine! Deal with it.’ My thesis is that she presupposes liberal ideals and

that the reluctance to announce them stems from a tension within a normative
aspiration at pains to avoid normative violence or, put another way, from the tension
between ideals and ideology critique. This is roughly analogous, albeit in a highly

intellectualized form, to the liberal cynic – portrayed in our reading of Benna Carpenter
– compelled to self-designate as “post-ideological” while remaining in a fraught

relationship with liberal ideals and ideology critique. We called this “Inauthentic

Ideology Critique as failed avowal;” a condition combining the critical appreciation of
the vulnerability of ideals with concealed or unacknowledged commitments. It seems
then, that we a form of Inauthentic Ideology Critique in Butler.
Cynicalization and “Cruel Optimism”

The Psychic Life of Power evidences fidelity to, and/or a deepening of, the

pessimistic/problematic features of its critical inheritance and both raises and prohibits
Another classical form this impasse takes concerns the prospect of political solidarity: The
compassionate and open eyed postmodernism which yearns to purge ourselves of imperialistic
colonialist universalized notions of reason and man so as to develop a genuine non-violent pluralism,
struggles against the prospect of irreconcilable differences the same yearning implies.
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hope. This relates to the notion of “cynicalization” and “cruel optimism” in our literary

phenomenology. Cynicalization was our term for the process diagnosed in

Sloterdijk’s genealogy of enlightenment ideology critique into cynicism whereby
the legacy of revelatory critiques ruled out the emancipatory features in the

inherited theoretical linage. Cruel Optimism was the emotionally fraught

phenomenologically complex feature of Liberal Cynicism where the cynic seeks

cause for hope but limits potential candidates for amelioration or catharsis to that
which its constitutive and exhausted ideology-critique purports to, but cannot,

permit. We find analogs for both here. In addition to problematizing the

emancipatory within its intellectual inheritance, The Psychic Life of Power promises

and simultaneously prohibits hope. We can see this in Butler’s use of Nietzsche’s

notion of sublimation, Freud’s theories of narcissism and melancholia, and Althusser’s
theory of interpellation, and Foucault’s theories of subjectivation respectively.

Butler inherits and entrenches the negative elements in her Nietzscheanism,

specifically the mechanism by which morality creates bad conscience. 263 By locating a
passionate attachment to a self-beratement -- which Nietzsche locates within the

purview of the critical consciousness -- in the unconscious and rejecting that a preButler inherits Nietzsche’s diagnosis of a normatively violent morality which, through bad conscience
and existential guilt, carves out the psychic interiority constitutive of modern self-reflexive subjects and
compels a passionate attachment to self-subjection. (Specifically, from Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm.
Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. Ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter. Trans. R.J.
Hollingdale. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1997. Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality: A
Polemic. Trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen: Hackett, 1998.) ‘A prohibition on action or
expression is said to turn the “drive” back on itself, fabricating an internal sphere, the condition for selfinspection and reflexivity. The drive turning back on itself becomes the precipitating condition of subject
formation, a primary longing in recoil’ ‘Morality performs violence again and again in cultivating the
subject as a reflexive being’ ‘the subject engages in its own self-thwarting, accomplishes its own
subjection, desires and crafts its own shackles’ Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in
Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. P. 22, P. 64, P. 24 respectively.
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socialized vitality violently foreclosed in moral subjection can be liberated from this

pernicious normativity Butler immobilizes contesting normative violence. While
Nietzsche regarded guilt and bad conscience as conditions that can be consciously
appropriated for emancipatory ends for Butler, this masochistic requirement is

necessary, leaving the subject unavoidably vulnerable ‘to a power not of its own

making:’ 264

That morality is predicated on a certain kind of violence is already
familiar, but more surprising is that such violence founds the subject. 265

It might be argued that by portraying the depth with which our discriminative

capacities make us vulnerable to both suffering and committing violent abuse on the

social and political level that Butler’s psychic entrenching of normative violence may

function to mobilize sympathy with concrete situations of exploitation. To explain, that
while we are all vulnerable to normative violence, vulnerability “manifests” differently

concerning one’s relations to the norm in question. For example, a homosexual is likely
victim to harsher concrete consequences of functions associated with normative

violence than the heterosexual, even though on this psychic level the violence is similar

(the exclusion of the otherwise sexed). The unique vulnerability then is that the
normative violence produces beings intelligible as more or less worthy of

hate/violence/persecution than others. The unique sympathy could emanate from
realizing that both this corporeal vulnerability of sexual non-conformism, and the

likelihood of persecution is a consequence of deep psychic functions: ‘that subjects are

Ibid. p. 20
‘the subject engages in its own self-thwarting, accomplishes its own subjection, desires, and crafts its
own shackles’ Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP,
1997. P. 64, P. 24.
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constituted in primary vulnerability does not exonerate the abuses they suffer, on the

contrary it makes all the more clear how fundamental the vulnerability can be’. Indeed,

Butler’s normative language then of “abuse”, “exploitation”, “subjection”, “abjection,”

“obliteration,” may function to excite their contestation. However, it remains impossible
to mobilize any kind of social or political action based on a theory of a priori
vulnerability which ‘qualifies the subject as an exploitable kind of being.’ 266 Therefore,

while going some way to make finer distinctions among cases of violence, as well as
linking “inaugural” violence to actual states of abuse and exploitation and by theorizing

the mechanisms of normative subject formation as they relate to subjugation and

exploitation, Butler nevertheless fails to ground contesting abuse and exploitation, the
unequal distribution of vulnerability at the societal/political and biological level, and
the mechanisms of normative subject formation as they relate to subjugation and
exploitation.

Following On Narcissism: An Introduction, 267 Mourning and Melancholia,268

Civilization and its Discontents, 269 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,

270

and The

Ego and the Id 271 Butler uses Freud’s theories to describe the psychic working of

heteronormative power claiming that a self-destructive psychic circuitry prefiguring
266

64.

Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. P.

Freud, Sigmund. Freud's On Narcissism: An Introduction. Ed. Joseph Sandler, Ethel Person, and Peter
Fonagy. New Haven: Yale UP, 1991.
268 Freud, Sigmund. "Mourning and Melancholia," and “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” from; Ed.
Peter Gay. The Freud Reader. New York: Norton, 1999. 584-89.
269 Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Norton, 1962.
270 Freud, Sigmund. " Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality." Ed. Peter Gay. The Freud Reader. New
York: Norton, 1999. 239-293.
271 Freud, Sigmund. "The Ego and the Id." Ed. Peter Gay. The Freud Reader. New York: Norton, 1999. 239293.
267
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normative masochism is a universal socially instantiated condition. 272 On Freud’s
account of the processes of melancholy foreclosure a love object once known to the

analyzant is later repressed. 273 For Butler, the narcissistic internalization typical of
melancholia is a feature of subject formation and thus the love object was disavowed

prior to the formation of the ego. Because Butler designates the narcissistic self-

beratement typical of melancholia as a creator of subjectivity, and not as does Freud a

contingent affliction, it is no longer a psychopathology which therapy can ameliorate. 274
Therefore, Freud’s ameliorative purport is compromised in Butler. 275

The cruel optimism here also begins with a feature that distinguishes Butler’s

account of melancholia from Freud’s. While in Mourning and Melancholia Freud argued
that melancholia begins with the loss of a loved person, for Butler, melancholia involves

the internalization of a prohibited desire and the disavowed grief concerning its
unavailability. On the back of this innovation Butler promises a new focus for contesting
the disastrous effects of heterosexual melancholia: ‘in the social foreclosure of grief we

‘I come into social being, and because I have a certain inevitable attachment to my existence […]
because a certain narcissism takes hold of any term that confers existence, I am led to embrace the terms
that injure me because they constitute me socially’ Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in
Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. p. 104 Compare with Freud’s description of patients suffering
‘during the course of melancholia’ and the condition as essentially a regression caused by conscious failed
love. Freud, Sigmund. "Mourning and Melancholia," and “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” from;
Ed. Peter Gay. The Freud Reader. New York: Norton, 1999. 584-89.
273 It may be relatively plausibly objected that The Ego and the Id supports Butler’s reading. This is not
straightforward and would simply shift the consequent problematic onto Freud as well as Butler.
274 For Butler ‘the foreclosure of homosexuality appears to be foundational to a certain heterosexual
formation of the subject’ (23). The result is that whereas for Freud the loss which compels melancholia
was once known, on this image, it was never known, instead forming the very boundary of the
heterosexual subject such that ‘that loss inaugurates the subject and threatens it with dissolution’. Butler,
Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. P. 23.
275 While the Freudian picture admits to action-determining forces of which we are unaware many of
these forces relate to neuroses which are contingent and traceable to local personal experiences which, if
analytically revealed, can be ameliorated. Here, although not causally deterministic, the forces which
form subjects are necessarily beyond the reach of those subjects and the effect of therapy (assuming the
maintenance of subjectivity is a basic therapeutic demand).
272
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might find what fuels the internal violence of conscience.’276 The problem is that this is
impossible given the role Butler gives the repudiation of desire in the coming into being
of a self-conscious subject. Nevertheless, after laboriously laying out the necessity of

foreclosure for consciousness, Butler states at the very end of the argument, that ‘there

is no necessary reason for identification to oppose desire.’ 277 Butler even proposes
‘developing a typology of "refusal" and "exclusion" that might help us distinguish

between what is rigorously repudiated and foreclosed, and what happens to be less
rigidly or permanently declined,’ 278 suggesting that after locating the points whereby
punitive norms compel the internalization of prohibited desire in the emergence of

psychic interiority we could imagine processes to retroactively destabilize the
formative grip of foreclosures poised to manifest in identitarian hatred. This excites the

hope that we can contest how subject formation internalizes necessarily delimiting
social norms through the foreclosure of desire. But Butler’s account of subject

formation entails the foreclosure of grief and the repudiation of desire. If the claim is
that a volatization of social norms at the level of critique enables us to loosen ourselves

from their normative grip at the level of the preconscious then why not just say that and

explain how? If the processes prefiguring subject formation could be constructively
directed to correct certain pernicious downstream effects, or to bring about the
possibility of new future inaugurations then this account would pose a potentially
revolutionary possibility, but without prolonged elaboration on both how her theory
Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. P. 183.
Ibid. p. 149.
278 Ibid. p. 163.
276
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allows for this and what actions in the conscious arena could direct these processes this
hope remains a fantasy.

Butler inherits a restricted version of interpellation – Althusser’s model of

subject formation via submission to ideological categories initiated through language 279
– arguing that subjects motivated by a “guilty” recognition of the necessity of the laws

under which identity categories within a specific ideological paradigm are sustained
through an unconscious ‘submission to the rules of the dominant ideology’ 280

‘constituted within sociality by virtue of this submission.’281 The idea is that the cost of
subject formation – the foreclosure of certain psychic possibilities – is “chosen” by the
subject in its inauguration. Again, while for Althusser subject formation functions
within existing subjects for Butler, it is a priori and unconscious:

The possibility of a critical view of the law is limited by what might be
understood as a prior desire for the law, a passionate complicity with law,
without which no subject can exist. 282

Concerning cruel optimism, Butler’s Althusserian account of psychic resistance

cites that because the act of hailing in interpellation can miss, its demands are therefore

not absolute. In other words, that interpellation is ‘neither unilaterally or

exhaustively’ 283 determined. From this indeterminacy Butler promises an alternative
Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (notes towards an Investigation)."
Trans. Ben Brewster. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review, 1971. 127-88.
280 Ibid. 116. ‘the law is broken prior to any possibility of having access to the law, and so "guilt" is prior
to knowledge of the law’ ‘In "Ideology," guilt and conscience operate implicitly in relation to an
ideological demand, an animating reprimand, in the account of subject formation’ Ibid. 108.
281 Ibid. 116. Also - ‘the law is broken prior to any possibility of having access to the law, and so "guilt" is
prior to knowledge of the law’ ‘In "Ideology," guilt and conscience operate implicitly in relation to an
ideological demand, an animating reprimand, in the account of subject formation’ Ibid. 108.
282 Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997.
283 Ibid. p. 107.
279
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variety of “being” 284 potentially inaugurated contra the guilty complicity with

oppressive norms going as far as offering a new ‘direction for rethinking ethics’ 285 on
the back of this promise:

we might reread "being" as precisely the potentiality that remains
unexhausted by any particular interpellation. Such a failure of
interpellation may well undermine the capacity of the subject to "be" in a
self-identical sense, but it may also mark the path toward a more open,
even more ethical kind of being, one of, or for, the future’ 286

If answering the call is a condition for the possibility of being a subject then

utilizing this resource would require the improbable ability to hover between realms of
unrealized and realized unconscious identification. Furthermore, because missing “the

call” of interpellation remains an event necessarily outside of the subjective domain,

even if it were possible, it is surely impossible to bring such volatization into
consciousness, let alone the socio-political realm. 287 The cruel optimism here then
stems from the fact that refusing to submit to the law of interpellation must operate in a
space necessarily post-interpellation, but it cannot. Thus, when Butler promises some
preconscious ontological resource that exceeds interpellation coexisting alongside but

Is there a possibility of being elsewhere or otherwise, without denying our complicity in the law that
we oppose? Such possibility would require a different kind of turn, one that, enabled by the law, turns
away from the law, resisting its lure of identity, an agency that outruns and counters the conditions of its
emergence’ Ibid. p. 130.
285 Ibid.pg 131.
286 Ibid. ‘Such a turn demands a willingness not to be - a critical desubjectivation - in order to expose the
law as less powerful than it seems. What forms might linguistic survival take in this desubjectivized
domain? How would one know one's existence? Through what terms would it be recognized and
recognizable?’ Ibid.p. 130.
287 Furthermore, it is hard to imagine in a psychoanalytically internalized account of interpellation what
“forms of linguistic survival” taking place in a “de-subjectivized domain” would amount to.
284
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independent of the formed subject to be utilized in producing a more expansive
“ethical” subjectivity, this beautiful idea is hoisted by its own petard. 288

The Psychic Life of Power also adopts and deepens the problems of mobilizing

Michel Foucault’s theories for ethical and political ends. 289 For Foucault, the critique of

power might be politically mobilized 290 because critique reveals that there is no
necessity for power to express itself291 in specific oppressive social and political norms.

As elaborated in The History of Sexuality, 292 The Subject and Power, 293 and Discipline and
Punish294 this realization can be utilized for political ends. 295 An issue with Foucault’s

Perhaps Butler is committed to our capacity to “be” without a self, to “be” beyond the realm of
subjective being if there is any “path” marked out at all here it is not a path towards any recognizable
application in service of allowing for the creation of a more ethical kind of human than one constituted by
grief, guilt, fear, denial, repression, and disavowal.
289 Foucault revealed ruptures in the evolution of power as fundamentally unpredictable, contrary to
traditions which highlight shifts in power as logical, consciously directed, or direct-able including the
enlightenment’s juridical model, Hegelian dialectics, the existentialist’s notion of power possessed by
certain constellations of committed subjectivity, or the Marxist idea of economic power as unfairly
distributed. Opposed to these, Foucault’s disruptive “strategical” model of power sees “it” as immanent,
omnipresent, and relational, ‘not acquired seized or shared,’ ‘not what one holds onto or allows to slip
away,’ ‘exercised from innumerable points’ ‘from below not above’, ‘non-subjective’, from which ‘there is
no escaping.’ Butler also shares Foucault’s theory of subjectivation as a contingent and incomplete
working of power: ‘subjectivation is a kind of power that not only unilaterally acts on a given individual
as a form of domination, but also activates or forms the subject. Hence subjectivation is neither simply
the domination of a subject nor its production, but designates a certain kind of restriction in production, a
restriction without which the production of the subject cannot take place’. Foucault quotes from Foucault,
Michel, and Robert J. Hurley. The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage, 1990. vol. 1.
290 ‘I would like to suggest another way to go further toward a new economy of power relations, a way
which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations
between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power
as a starting point. To use another metaphor, it consists of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so
as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, and find out their point of application and the
methods used’ The Subject and Power Author(s): Michel Foucault Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4,
(Summer, 1982), pp. 777-795 Published by: The University of Chicago Press p. 780
291 ‘even though consensus and violence are the instruments or the results, they do not constitute the
principle or the basic nature of power.’ Ibid. 789.
292 A Foucault, Michel, and Robert J. Hurley. The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage, 1990. vol. 1.
293 The Subject and Power Author(s): Michel Foucault Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4, (Summer,
1982), pp. 777-795 Published by: The University of Chicago Press.
294 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage, 1995.
295 Coupled with over-determining the particular forms it takes, for Foucault power has a tendency to
self-subvert, and therefore carries with it the resources and potential for contesting its current
instantiations relevant to those pursuing freedoms from certain machinations of power: At the very heart
288
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view is that given we cannot escape its dominion resistance amounts to refusing to
operate under the current conditions of power’s more pernicious machinations.296
Because socio-political efforts based on theories, anticipations, or desires which

necessarily operate within the scripts of various regulatory and disciplinary regimes
offered up in the current constellation of power, its ateleological ruptures and
discontinuities are essentially random and chaotic in relation to human ends whose

very intelligibility remains tethered to this context. As such we have no right to think of

radical shifts in power relations as possibly directed by our efforts. Consequently, there

is no justification for thinking that a rupture will, can, or should happen in a certain

direction. 297 Nor could we have any epistemic foundation for thinking so, for we could

only ever attest to a ‘new’ paradigm from within the scripts allowable by the current
one. 298 We can merely refuse the full governance of the norm at the empirical level.

of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the
intransigence of freedom […] The relationship between power and freedom's refusal to submit cannot,
therefore, be separated Ibid. 790.
296 This refusal could stall, or short circuit the unnecessarily and undesirably delimiting, yet contingent
manner in which subjects are currently formed. As Foucault explained: ‘the target nowadays is not to
discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to
get rid of this kind of political "double bind," which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization
of modern power structure. The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical
problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state and from the state's institutions
but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state.
We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has
been imposed on us for several centuries. The Subject and Power Author(s): Michel Foucault Source:
Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4, (Summer, 1982), pp. 777-795 Published by: The University of Chicago Press
pg 785.
297 There is no single locus of great refusal, no soul of revolt, no source of all rebellions, or pure law of the
revolutionary, instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case. They are possible
necessary and probable, others are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant or violent; some of
those are quick to compromise, interested or sacrificial. By definition they can only exist in the strategic
field of power relations Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York:
Vintage, 1995. (My italics)
298 Although there may be room in Foucault for activism designed to contest the conditions under which
certain nefarious forms of subject formation occur, because it places agency entirely within the purview
of contingent disinterested power, Foucault’s theory is tricky for mobilizing significant socio-political
resistance. Because the realm of hitherto unrealized psychic possibilities for subjectivity and
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In Butler’s innovative project of supplementing Foucauldianism with

Psychoanalysis, these already scant grounds for optimism are further problematized.

This

problem

stems

from

a

moment

of

infidelity.

While

for

Foucault

subjection/subjectivation functions on the body 299 subjectivation in Butler occurs at the

point of intersection between the conscious and the unconscious. 300 When Butler
promises that ‘what is enacted by the subject is enabled but not finally constrained by
the prior working of power’ and that agency ‘is constrained by no teleological
necessity’ 301 the freedom this promises is dashed: ‘whatever resists the normative

demand by which subjects are instituted remains unconscious.’302 When Butler raises

the hope of a “psychic resistance” to power’s more pernicious machinations303 in

relation to a psyche which ‘exceeds the imprisoning effects of the discursive demand to
inhabit a coherent identity’ and which resists ‘regularization’ and ‘normalizing

embodiment, are “re-materializable” only in relation to power’s unpredictable and undirectable tendency
to self-subvert.
299 Butler even quotes Foucault saying as such for the epigraphy of Psychic Life ‘We should try to grasp
subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects.’ In Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power:
Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997. p. 1.
300 Recall Foucault’s project of resisting what we are, speaks of ‘a new economy of power relations,’
‘which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation,’ and ‘implies more relations
between theory and practice’. The Subject and Power Author(s): Michel Foucault Source: Critical Inquiry,
Vol. 8, No. 4, (Summer, 1982), pp. 777-795 Published by: The University of Chicago Press p. 780.
301 Both from Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP,
1997. P. 15.
302 Ibid pgs. 86-87.
303 Furthermore, when Butler offers a potential route out of this mess, introduces the notion of a
“remainder” in the psyche beyond the constructed subjectivity, some space within which we may contest
the cookie cutter effect of norms on the psychic “reservoir” the Lacanian real, “imagination” and “fantasy”
at various stages in the book, (pg 86-87, 94 – 98, 122) these are insufficient categories to carry out such a
function. (Although claiming in footnote 6 chapter 3 p. 206 of Psychic Life, that ‘in this analysis’
‘psychoanalysis is only to be represented by these two figures’ Freud and Lacan, there are no direct
refences to Lacan in the book. And in the footnotes there are only two: Lacan, Jacques. The Four
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W.
Norton, 1978. . And Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Sylvana
Tomaselli. New York: W.W. Norton, 1991).
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discourses’ 304 since she fails to account for the reciprocity whereby conscious activity
could somehow retroactively influence these pre-conscious functions this is a cruel
optimism. 305 The claim appears to be that the norm-governed perimeters which delimit

the enactment of performative actions do not map onto the perimeters of human

agency. On this understanding, agency is the psychic potential which is materialized
through performative acts in the accomplishment of identity, a theory which leaves

“wiggle” room for contesting harmfully normalizing discourse. 306 Tragically though, this

is a freedom at the cost of subjectivity - ‘the subject pursues subordination as the
promise of existence.’307
Conclusion

Despite its guiding “liberal” ideals middle Butler fails them. A representative

selection of Butler’s work on Materialization and the psychic mechanisms which
prefigure it bear hallmarks analogous to Liberal Cynicism. In the work on
materialization we find Inauthentic Ideology Critique as failed avowal; a reluctance

to admit to the liberal values on which it depends. We also find in this work, and in

The Psychic Life of Power “Inauthentic Ideology Critique as abandonment”; reifying

the inefficacy of the liberal values on which it depends. Because Butler entrenches
Ibid p. 86.
If we compare the possible applications of Foucault’s to Butler’s account – for example how the
barbaric punitive practices which produce radically dehumanized subjects such as the docility of
panoptical prisoners or the somnambular of those confined to solitude as locations for contestation by
removing this cruel punishment once we have located the machinations of subjectivation within the
unconscious, without an account of how such concrete practices relate to the unconscious preconditions
for experience – the possibility of coming up with similarly applicable solutions seems painfully remote.
306 What is enacted by the subject is enabled but not finally constrained by the prior working of power,
agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled, one might say that the purposes of power are not
always the purposes of agency Ibid. p. 15.
307 Ibid.
304
305
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and deepens the ideology critique of her lineage without upholding or replacing its

emancipatory purport, we find features resembling cynicalization in The Psychic Life of

Power. Butler’s efforts to imagine against the comportmental imperialism of social

norms can leave sympathetic readers further bereft of hope about the prospect of
mobilizing the ideals of non-violence, justice, and equality. Because of this, a “cruel

optimism” plagues a broadly liberal socio-political invested reading of middle Butler

where we find the possibility of resisting oppressive power thwarted by the conditions
of its own emergence, thereby perpetuating cynicism in relation to the ideals that
attract the liberal reader to her work.
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Part 2: Conclusion
While invested in liberal ideals Judith Butler’s middle work inherits a legacy of

ideology critique which problematizes their explicit adoption and through reifying

oppressive power structures precludes their efficacy. It is for these reasons that we can

read middle Butler as sharing Liberal Cynicism’s Inauthentic Ideology Critique both as
failed avowal and abandonment. The Psychic Life of Power observes a cynical fidelity to

and a deepening of negative features of its inheritance, raising hopes prohibited by, or
by prohibiting hopes raised by this inheritance, and therefore can be said to resemble
Cynicalization. Finally, while exciting hopes its own theoretical frame prohibits Butler
also exhibits signs of Cruel Optimism. For these reasons Butler’s “middle phase”

resembles Liberal Cynicism. Later Butler offers a resource for overcoming both the
cynicism we diagnosed in her work and along with more positive contributions from

Butler’s theoretical framework, for overcoming Liberal Cynicism. We turn now in part 3
to grounding and theorizing this overcoming.
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Part 3: The Promise
If the cynic is a figure of disenchantment, he or she is not a figure of
terminal disenchantment, and the possibility of reenchantment always
lurks on the horizon. 308
Why not continue the attempt to clean up our game? Why not think the
Enlightenment through once again? Why not make a garden out of all that
dirt? 309

Part 1 explained how for Extreme Liberal Cynicism the repression of its

constitutive and fraught hopes manifests in the reduction of critique to criticism, a lack
of self-transparency, an anger at idealism and idealists, and even taking delight in

exposing folly. it also explained how Liberal Cynicism is susceptible to the radicalization

of “fantastical” fascistic master narratives due to their offer of assuaging painfulness. A

goal of Part 1 was to show that Extreme Liberal Cynicism contains the motivational
impulses for overcoming its repressive extremes and the resources for doing so. The
primary goal of part 3 is to theorize this overcoming; to provide an inoculation for

cynicism’s self-imposed hopelessness taking its constitutive hope as its starting

point. To this end, chapter 5 returns to Sloterdijk, specifically to the successes and

failures of his proposed solution to cynicism. This analysis will enable us to outline
conditions which a response to Liberal Cynicism must meet. This will provide the

foundation for our study in Chapter 6 of how “later” Butler can be seen to exemplify and
be used to theorize a model for Extreme Liberal Cynicism overcoming its pernicious

(Stanley, 195).
Punching out the Enlightenment: A Discussion of Peter Sloterdijk's Kritik der zynischen Vernunft Neil
Wilson, New German Critique, No. 41, Special Issue on the Critiques of the Enlightenment (Spring Summer, 1987), pp. 53-70, Duke University Press.
308
309
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extremes grounding the heuristic for addressing Liberal Cynicism via a synthesis of
Sloterdijk and Butler with which this dissertation concludes.
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Chapter 5: Cheekiness

Introduction

Whatever cannot stand satire is false. 310

For Sloterdijk, cynicism is what survives from within the enlightenment after its

abandonment of ideals under the weight of critique. Given the scarcity of Enlightened

False Consciousness we need not over-emphasize Sloterdijk’s diagnosis but because
Sloterdijkian cynicism shares crucial features with Liberal Cynicism and because he
proposes a solution, a continued analysis may furnish solutions here too.
Cheekiness

Arguing that cynicism is genealogically entrenched in modern western

consciousness and ‘because consciousness raising is irreversible’311 Sloterdijk contends

that cynicism cannot simply be abandoned, instead for any response to cynicism to
persuade it must remain faithful to cynicism. The proposed solution is to overcome

cynicism from within. For Sloterdijk, features of Kynicism – the critique of naivety, the

pursuit of truth, irony as a form of critique, and a degree of autarky – have remained
within the enlightenment lineage and its descent into cynicism. However, since

cynicism does not share these features to the same degree, reinvigorating cynicism’s

waning Kynical virtues could mount an immanent critique targeting that which it does

not share with its ancestor; a panicked egoism, neediness, insufficient self-criticism, and
joylessness. In this way, Kynicism represents ‘a source of enlightenment in which
‘Truth is a matter that can stand mockery, that is freshened by ironic gesture directed at it. Whatever
cannot stand satire is false’ Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota,
1987. P. 288.
311 ‘Always a bit unsettled and irritable, collaborating consciousness looks around for its lost naïveté, to
which there is no way back, because consciousness raising is irreversible.’ Ibid. P. 6.
310
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[cynicism’s] secret vitality is hidden’ 312 promising a ‘Kynical re-enlightenment’313 of

Enlightened False Consciousness. For Sloterdijk, this critique must use the spirit lifting
and joyfully disruptive power of satirical insubordination, or ‘cheekiness.’314
Importantly, on Sloterdijk’s reading, cynicism’s problems are reducible to egoism. In

pursuit of this primary target Sloterdijk proposes that satirical critique be employed for
‘liquefying’ 315 the “hardened” cynical ego.’ 316

Sloterdijk also cites early Heidegger and invokes a ‘crypto-Buddhist’ 317 model to

mount this critique. For Sloterdijk, the Heideggerian critique of Dasman which
deconstructed the psychic and sociocultural forces that compel blind conformity is

simultaneously a critique of contemporary cynicism. Sloterdijk’s reappropriation rests
on his critique of Being and Time, that a desperate unwillingness to let go of the ego left

Heidegger vulnerable on the spiritual side to the panicked, fearful, and anxious pursuit
of self-creation, and on the political to the seductive restorative narrative of national
socialism. However, for Sloterdijk, Heideggerian angst and guilt also provide the

opportunity to deconstruct the ego. While Sloterdijk describes Heidegger’s

Kierkegaardian notion of throwing oneself into a particular existential possibility –
being-unto-death – as ‘the philosophical key word in the age of imperialist and fascist

Ibid. 99.
Ibid. 99.
314 Ibid. 99.
315 ‘Verflüssigung’ - Ibid. 379.
316 This is as extreme as it sounds, for Sloterdijk’s dramatic Nietzschean pursuit of ‘overhumanism’ (Ibid.)
calls for a dissolution of the human as we know it: ‘Humanity cannot be enlightened because it itself was
the false premise of enlightenment. Humanity does not come up to scratch […] where its ego appears
there cannot shine what was promised by all enlightenments’ Ibid. 355.
317 Ibid.
312
313
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world wars’ 318 he nevertheless prescribes using angst to deconstruct the ego and

develop conscience from ontological guilt into an awareness of the precariousness of all
life. Heideggerian anxiety – which Sloterdijk calls the ‘experience of the

meaninglessness of life,’ and ‘the crystallization point around which a philosophy of
Kynicism can develop,’ 319 is the means to overcome cynicism. Per Sloterdijk, existential
guilt can initiate a reverse dialectic to that from enlightenment to enlightened-false-

consciousness. On this suggestion, instead of preemptively mourning what I might have

been, anxiety could instead turn us to who we all might be. 320 Rather than the rugged

individualism of self-constitution this "call to be guilty" leads to ‘the realization of an

exuberant life’ 321 'taking off from the ‘melancholy nimbus’ 322 of Heidegger’s ‘self-

obsessed, narcissistic, and megalomaniacal authenticity by reclaiming an ecstatic otherlove.’ 323 With this deconstruction Neo-Kynicism counters cynical melancholy by

discouraging its material neediness through pushing towards a radical autarky inchoate

in contemporary cynicism, freeing it from the illusion of perpetual precariousness

which advanced capitalist consumerism breeds, and which compels the cynic’s
318 Ibid. P. 202. Sloterdijk also described a proto form of cynicism in the Weimar Republic as “matter-offactness unto death” Ibid p. 521.
319 Ibid.
320 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. Chapter 7 The cabinet
of cynics chapter entitled Anyone, or: The Most Real Subject of Modern Diffuse Cynicism.
321 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
323 ‘”Authenticity,” if the expression is to have any meaning at all, is experienced in love and sexual
intoxication, in irony and laughter, creativity and responsibility, meditation and ecstasy. In this release,
that existential individual (Einzige) who believes its most intimately genuine (eigenst) possession is its
own death disappears. At the summit of potentiality we experience not only the end of the world in lonely
death, but even more the demise of the ego in its surrender to the most communal world’ Ibid. Chapter 7
The Cabinet of Cynics chapter entitled Anyone, or: The Most Real Subject of Modern Diffuse Cynicism.
‘Ecstasy, the dissolution of the ego, is recognized as the precondition for cosmic communication. At the
same time, it provides a presentiment of the reconciliation of human beings with one another”. Ibid. p.
467.
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‘suspension of the ethical’ which it deems ‘requisite for “progress.”’ 324 Neo-Kynical

critique also attacks and therefore frees cynicism from the emotional/intellectual
neediness and fraught sense of self-worth which compel cynical pain. Through Socratic

humility the Kynic evades the need for intellectual superiority: ‘the Kynical sublation of
theory stems from a conscious not-knowing, not from a knowing better.’ 325 The Kynic

embraces its own ignorance as the yard stick for all human knowledge, refusing the

false consolation of seeing things as they are instead favouring a relentless ironicization
of all claims to knowledge: A Socrates gone mad. 326 This greater fidelity to truth and
critique broken free from limiting restraints enables a greater degree of self-awareness
and a critique of cynical-egoism. Finally, through non-cooperation with the discursive

forces of materialization, objectification, and identification, Kynical agency frees itself

from the constraints of a panicked need to uptake constructed identity categories
which, in a cynical age, is to be freed from cynicism. By saying ‘no to weakness and

neediness’ 327 the Kynical revitalization releases dormant libidinal energies from within

cynicism sustained inchoate from Diogenes,’ ‘a “secret” and vital agency’ 328

the

alternative to cynical egoism, a self-generating agentless agency which Sloterdijk calls a
"yesbody”:

original Nobodiness remains in this world buried under taboo and panic.
The self-conscious nobody in us - who acquires names and identities only
through its “social birth” - remains the living source of freedom. The
living Nobody, in spite of the horror of socialisation, remembers the

Ibid. Chapter 1.
Ibid. 293.
326 Plato’s alleged description of Diogenes in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Book 6,
Chapter 54. Trans. Robert Drew Hicks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950.
327 Ibid p. 468.
328 Ibid p. 468.
324
325
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energetic paradises beneath the personalities […] which we should not
call nobody but yesbody. 329

Concerning the will-to-truth, the Kynical revitalization embraces cynicism’s

fatalism concerning the enlightenment’s hopes for a universally applicable reason
taking this to be an implicit and hidden truth of cynical reason, what Sloterdijk calls

‘knowledge cynicism’. 330 However, adopting a ‘satirical resistance, an uncivil
enlightenment, [a] non-Platonic dialogue […] against the rigged game of “discourse”’ 331

Kynicism no longer pretends to conform to this universalized picture of rational

dialogue, a move which could make cynicism honest and counter the inertia of
argumentative stalemate. Also related to the pursuit of truth, Sloterdijk combines

mindfulness ‘that which restricts itself to alertly seeing what is the case,’ 332 compassion,

and a more Socratic than Kynical irony as the means to realize genuinely universal

truths from within the cynical constitution:

Only through forbearance and tranquillity would subjective reason be
capable of hearing an objective reason within itself […] rooted in the

Ibid. 73–7. To explain this empty neo-Kynical agency Sloterdijk rewrites Adorno’s famous analysis of
Odysseus and the Cyclops (Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor Adorno W. Dialectic of Enlightenment:
Philosophical Fragments. Trans. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002. First published
1944) In Homer's epic, Odysseus lands on an island and, together with his men, enters a cave filled with
provisions. After six of his men are eaten, Odysseus offers wine to the culprit, the Cyclops Polyphemus,
who responds by asking his name to which Odysseus replies: nobody. (οὔτις and Οὖτις, as translated in
Autenrieth, Georg, and Robert Keep P. An Homeric Dictionary: For Use in Schools and Colleges. London:
MacMillan, 1902.) After the monster falls into a drunken sleep, Odysseus drives a wooden stake into the
monster’s eye and when he cries out for help against "nobody," his fellow giants think him possessed and
recommend prayer. Odysseus and his men escape. Adorno uses the story to allegorize the failure of the
enlightenment, reading Odysseus as denying his identity under threat of death, and through his cruelty to
the monster, descending into comparable depths of inhumanity, symbolizing the enlightenment’s
capitulation into what it opposed. By contrast, Sloterdijk’s Odysseus transcends the weakness of egoperseveration, escaping the violence of raw power and selfishness symbolized by the cyclops - who can
only see things one way - by elevating himself beyond the need to identify.
330 ‘the secularization, naturalization, and objectification of our understanding of the world,’ Ibid. ‘The
story of Doctor Faustus can be understood as a document for the unsettling of the older metaphysical
dualism through the new empiricism’ Ibid. p. 362.
331 Ibid.
332 Ibid.
329
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experience of enthusiastic tranquillity when, on the summit of havingthought, the thinker steps aside and let himself be permeated by the “selfrevelation” of truth. 333

For Sloterdijk then, the choice cynicism faces is ‘between the false self-

experience in collective suicide’ of functional melancholia or to give up on the cynical
ego, a ‘suicide of false subjectivity in real life experience,’ warning that if ‘the heirs of

the enlightenment’ choose the first they will remain ‘on the way to a global cynicism.’ 334

On this view, western intellectual history compels a choice choose between cynicism or
Kynicism, between the self-imposed curse of modernity and the emancipated spirit of
its ancestor. Through cheeky insubordination of the status quo, as custodian of vital
embodied energies that have not been appropriated by material and immaterial forces

governing the psyche, Kynical satire 335 overcomes cynicism’s hardened egoism and

releases an oceanic reserve of emancipatory libidinal energy disrupting the cynical

world order to create a more joyful and free society, carrying on the ‘struggle for the

Ibid. p. 541.
all ibid.
335 Exemplified in the Menippean tradition of Kynicism. Menippean satire is characterized by attacking
mental attitudes rather than specific individuals or entities. Other features found in Menippean satire are
different forms of parody and mythological burlesque, a critique of the myths inherited from traditional
culture, a rhapsodic nature, a fragmented narrative, the combination of many different targets, and the
rapid moving between styles and points of view. The form is named after the Greek Kynic parodist and
polemicist Menippus (third century BC). His works, now lost, influenced the works of Lucian, Seneca the
Younger and was revived during the Renaissance by Erasmus, by Voltaire and Diderot in the
enlightenment, and significantly influenced Rabelais, Swift, Voltaire, Blake, Carroll, Huxley, Joyce,
Vonnegut. Indeed, ever since Mikhail Bakhtin's defined Menippean satire as one of the classical "seriocomic" genres, alongside Socratic dialogue, philosophers of the Carnivalesque have elevated it above the
more misanthropic methodologies of the other Kynics. For Bakhtin, Dostoevsky represents the highest
point in the genre. In a series of articles, Edward Milowicki and Robert Rawdon Wilson, have argued that
Menippean is a term for discursive analysis characterized by a mixed, discontinuous way of writing that
draws upon distinct, multiple traditions. It is normally highly intellectual and typically embodies an idea,
or an ideology, or a mind-set in the figure of a grotesque, even disgusting, comic character. Critic
Northrop Frye observed; ‘the novelist sees evil and folly as social diseases, but the Menippean satirist
sees them as diseases of the intellect’ Frye, Northrop, and Robert Dayton Denham. Anatomy of Criticism:
Four Essays. Toronto: U of Toronto, 2006. See footnote 292 on this legacy of selective reappropriating
Kynicism.
333
334
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greatest ideals […] justice, reason, heroic courage, the legitimacy of power, love, the
medical sciences’ to continue ‘to dare to know.’ 336
Objections

The Critique of Cynical Reason remains a good account of the apathy and

disillusionment that can thwart critique and offers to instill a new vitality and energy in

a tradition that can stagnate. But while in the rare and rarefied context of ideology
critique’s ossified dialectic a biting honesty and disinhibited forthrightness is surely

welcome, Sloterdijk’s solution is not only limited in its possible application it is also

beset by difficulties. It hypostasizes a Kynicism perfectly suited to oppose Enlightened
False Consciousness, and yet is unfaithful to both. It maintains a fraught relationship

with truth and rests on a wildly speculative theory of human agency. Rather than a
solution Sloterdijk’s Critique is in an intellectual example of Liberal Cynicism. And

worst of all, it advertises a dangerously amoral and apolitical agency while failing to

police against its harmfulness.

Concerning hypostatization, in Punching out the Enlightenment, 337 Neil Wilson

charges Sloterdijk with warping cynicism into a ‘spiritual totalitarianism’ 338 expressed

in his description of our age as characterized by the subjection of every action, emotion,
or thought to instrumental rationality. This is both argumentatively ill-supported and

conveniently constructed such that Sloterdijk’s model of Kynicism is perfectly equipped

“Sapere aude.” P. 306 citing Kant, Immanuel, and H.B Nisbett. An Answer to the Question:
'”What Is Enlightenment"? London: Penguin, 2009. Print.
337 Punching out the Enlightenment: A Discussion of Peter Sloterdijk's Kritik der zynischen Vernunft Neil
Wilson, New German Critique, No. 41, Special Issue on the Critiques of the Enlightenment (Spring Summer, 1987), pp. 53-70 Duke University Press.
338 Ibid.
336
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to counter it. 339 This hypostatization can also be seen in Sloterdijk’s infidelity to both
cynicism and Kynicism. The suggestion that cheekiness is a deconstructive process
which reveals the objective truth of the ‘highest ideals’ 340 would have Kynics from

Diogenes and Menippus turning in their graves. On the classic Kynical view, the

evidence for the value of following animal impulse is indulgence not intellectual
analysis, and the evidence for the value of self-discipline is the limits of this indulgence.

Furthermore, the primary vehicle of Sloterdijk’s neo-Kynical insubordination is

irony which seems far closer to an achievement of culture than a natural impulse. This

infidelity continues, as the “truths” which Sloterdijk claims this neo-Kynical
enlightenment would embrace are so questionable to both traditions that to assume

self-discipline, critique, mediation, and irony would somehow render them plausible is
a stretch. The cynic has given up on, and the Kynic never embraced, such ideals. The

hypostatization can also be measured by improper historicizing, for although framed

within an historical analysis Sloterdijk constructs cynicism and Kynicism as ‘constants
in our history’ 341 and eschews the task of locating the duo within a network of power

relations. Sloterdijk’s praise of gestural insubordination also neglects the extent to

which bodies are inscribed within dominant discourses by relying on an essentializing
discourse of the body separable from intellect magically interjecting from outside and

Timothy Bewes regards the call for neo-Kynicism ‘nothing more radical or challenging than yet
another flank in a pervasive rearguard action against postmodern ‘inauthenticity,’ which is to say, it is
both dangerously apolitical, and deeply cynical in its false reification of postmodernity’ (Bewes, 29).
340 Ibid. 545.
341 Ibid: ‘Kynicism and cynicism are constants in our history, typical forms of a polemical consciousness
“from below” and “from above” Ibid. Cynicism ‘forms a basic figure of the revocation of values in the
historical process. In “it” ideologies awaken to themselves. Ostentatiously, they scintillate in malevolent
ineluctability.’ P. 384.
339
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into the field of discursive subjectivation. 342 This depends on a crude dualism between

mind and body and a magical interaction between the two, with Neo-Kynical satire
functioning at the level of embodiment as opposed to the purely intellectual cynicism.

As well as contradicting his professed non-dualism Sloterdijk unargumentatively

asserts the persistence of this miraculous accessible pre-cultural agency capable of
enacting a new Enlightenment revealed by a bodily irony.

Most potently, Sloterdijk argues that cynical egoism conceals objective reason

from itself and that it can be reclaimed by applying meditation and Kynical critique but
Sloterdijk has simply not done enough to explain how a tradition which questioned

objective truth could reveal objective truth to a condition which rejects objective truth.

Without establishing this post-dialectic non-universalist conception of truth,

Sloterdijk’s belief that adopting a ‘satirical resistance, an uncivil enlightenment, [a] non-

Platonic dialogue […] against the rigged game of “discourse”’ 343 could counter
argumentative stalemate remains fanciful.

Concerning Sloterdijk’s Liberal Cynicism, his analysis assumes that relentless

and suspicious unmasking of an increasingly un-invested reason, ethics, equality, and

justice is an inevitable consequence of enlightenment critique. In laying out the futility
of liberal politics and its alternatives and the complete exhaustion of critical theory

Andreas Huyssen asks the pointed question in his forward to Sloterdijk’s seminal work: ‘How would
Sloterdijk counter a Foucaultian claim that the resistance of the self-conscious body is produced by the
culture of cynicism itself as a regenerating and legitimating device?’ Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical
Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. Forward. In fairness the same question may be legitimately
asked of Foucault who in his lectures on Kynicism makes the body the privileged site for contesting
existing relations of power. And the great (eventual) enlightenment defender answers by taking the body
as the site of practices of self-fashioning that concretely redefine the subject’s position within the social
games that fashion our “souls”.
343 Ibid.
342
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Sloterdijk concludes from frustrations at the pace of liberal progress that it has no

efficacy, in effect announcing the total victory of an ‘explosive and unassailable’
cynicism. 344 Therefore, Sloterdijk succumbs to Liberal Cynicism’s Inauthentic Ideology

Critique

as

abandonment

of

its

constitutive

idealism.

Sloterdijk

dismisses

communicative rationality, the possibility that law and morality can be rationally
justified, that rational self-governance and virtue are possible and relate to the
achievement of happiness, and that knowledge requires an intellectual struggle that can

be worth it. But these ideals are the enlightenment. In denying any truth to

enlightenment claims and neglecting enlightenment ideals’ positive legacy and
persistent emancipatory potential Sloterdijk’s attempt to embrace a surviving notion of

the enlightenment ends up reinforcing what it sought to oppose. 345 Sloterdijk’s is not

the correct diagnose of corruption at the heart of enlightenment liberalism it is the
logical conclusion of his cynicism. As Neil Wilson concludes, ‘the work is selfcancelling’: 346

the author locates himself in the Kynic's corner to fight off his own
cynicism. He relieves his frustrations with activism and reveals his hopes
[…] but he ends up in the same cynical place where he began. The work is
parasitic upon the very strategies and tactics the author appears to be
trying to defeat.

344Ibid.

P. 3. ‘Does not everything speak for the view that the Grand Inquisitor's logic has triumphed,
according to which a returned Jesus would be burned on the pyre of the Holy Inquisition, a returned
Nietzsche perish in the gas chambers, a returned Marx rot alive in a Siberian labor camp? Is there a law
that regulates as such?’ Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987.
345 Sloterdijk even intimates a such ‘We wanted to learn something about cynicism and discovered in
doing so that it long since brought us under its domination’. Ibid. p. 217.
346 Punching out the Enlightenment: A Discussion of Peter Sloterdijk's Kritik der zynischen Vernunft Neil
Wilson, New German Critique, No. 41, Special Issue on the Critiques of the Enlightenment (Spring Summer, 1987), pp. 53-70 Duke University Press.
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Much like the Liberal Cynic, Sloterdijk seems torn between the impulse to reject

the enlightenment due to its failings and to maintain fidelity to its ideals, between the
self-confident snigger of the ruthlessly critical satirist and the romantic dreamer,

between extreme pessimism and naïve optimism. Sloterdijk also suffers from Cruel

Optimism. Which is to say, as well as recapitulating the legacy of German romantic anti-

intellectualism in abandoning the enlightenment by offering up a naïve alternative

Sloterdijk also reproduces its utopian anachronism. Calling the enlightenment an
unrealized ‘utopian archaic scene’ and persuasive argument ‘an epistemological idyll’

and ‘a beautiful and academic vision’ upholding ‘the healing fiction of a free dialogue’ 347

Sloterdijk prohibits his enlightenment aspirations and in fantasizing an idealized
alternative to the insufficiencies of his tradition and heritage both raises and prohibits
hope:

I have a dream to see the dying tree of philosophy bloom again, to
flourish, without disappointment, saturated with bizarre flowers of
thought red, blue and white, in original unfaded colors from which
sprouts a fantastic, ironic magic tree with thoughts, treasures, singing
nightingales and swinging monkeys. 348

There are also huge problems concerning the practice and methodology of Neo-

Kynical cheekiness. While the Kynic scoffs at cynical hypocrisy and dishonesty, it

replaces fidelity to rational dialectic with a laughter unpolluted by ideals. But Sloterdijk
charged the extra-rationality of an enlightenment forced to branch out from dialectic

and detach from its noble goals to satire as both symptomatic of and perpetuating
contemporary cynicism. His solution proposes the same. Furthermore, Sloterdijk values
347
348

Ibid. P. 14.
Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. (p. 28-29).
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sarcasm precisely because it is just and truth-revealing but again, justice and truth are

enlightenment ideals. It appears we are in a bind: if Kynical satire is beyond ideals then

it cannot continue the enlightenment, but if it remains invested, then it isn’t Kynicism.

More worryingly, in freeing cynicism from ideals Neo-Kynicism veers

dangerously close to Master Cynicism. Sloterdijk appears as did Mephistopheles to
Faust, promising escape from the “needs” of morality, law, or duty. Stripped of guilt,
doubt, and conscience, Kynicism risks a wanton immoralism. Sloterdijk acknowledges

this risk describing Kynicism as ‘the profound idea of world extermination on which a
gay science is based’ 349and although insisting on compassion in his Buddhistic model of

ego-transcendence and emphasizing the Kynic’s harmony of act, nature, and cosmos as

it grounds, Sloterdijk fails to provide a convincing theory of Kynical benevolence. 350
Even if we accept the picture of Kynical kindness, while Sloterdijk warns that

cheekiness is likely to be ‘answered from the side of the attacked’ by ‘outrage’ that

could ‘go as far as extermination’ 351 he never develops a defense strategy against the
backlash on those who practice Kynicism nor does he ask how such a backlash would

Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. Pgs. 28-29.
Andreas Huyssen notes: ‘[Kynicism] depends on a logic of hostility that the new reality principle of a
softened, flexible subjectivity is supposed to overcome. It is difficult to imagine a nonhostile,
nonobjectifying satirical laughter, and Sloterdijk never really addresses the question of what kynics
actually do to the persons they laugh at.’ Ibid. Introduction. Sloterdijk’s attempt to legislate the border
between an ideal Kynicism and its corrupt counterpart and neutralize Kynical misanthropy relies on the
harmony of life doctrine, and the mental peace of a disinhibited “non-schizoid” consciousness. But these
criteria, even if liveable, do not guarantee nonviolence or civility. This is an attempt which belongs to a
longstanding tradition from Julian, Epictetus, St. Augustine, all the way to D’Alembert and Diderot. that
attempts to rid Kynicism of its potential for destructive social violence and to make it into a universal
philosophy. All of these methods of disambiguating Kynicism are unable to deal successfully with the
tensions and ambiguities that mark its concrete expression. For example, the famous anecdote where
Diogenes saw three women hanging from a tree and remarked “I wish every tree bore similar fruit”
exemplifies an often vitriolic and brutal misanthropy bleached out in the renaissance and the
enlightenment’s selective reappropriation. Louisa Shea details this legacy of partial infidelity to cynicism
as the chief cause of the emergence of the category in its contemporary form in Shea, Louisa. The Cynic
Enlightenment: Diogenes in the Salon. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2010.
351 Ibid. P. 103.
349
350
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limit its success. However attractive this romantic vision of egoless authenticity, when it

is presented as a substitute to political theory and praxis based on a defensible
normative aspiration, it must account for the chaos it is likely to unleash. 352 In

disinhibiting cynicism from ideals, it advertises and releases a dangerously amoral and

apolitical agency and fails to police against its harmfulness. In sum, Neo-Kynicism is an
unacceptable solution to Liberal Cynicism. 353
Return to Row

By turning to Jess Row, we can explain how despite these critical errors Kynical

satire may aid the project of addressing Extreme Liberal Cynicism. Row argues that

Sloterdijkian Kynicism has a role to play in countering the painful fatalism around
the issue of race relations in America. As we saw in our literary phenomenology

the reification of inequality is both a condition and symptom of Liberal Cynicism’s

self-perpetuation and political inertia, 354 a fatalism which Row thinks Kynical

satire can overcome. Cynical fatalism is a libidinally motivated psychic move
adopted unconsciously to ameliorate the feeling of powerlessness and/or guilt

concerning the failures of liberalism. On this view, by reifying forces which render

these failures insurmountable this powerlessness and guilty complicity is eclipsed
by hopelessness which while unpleasant is nevertheless preferable. Therefore, if

This section paraphrases an argument made by Leslie A. Adelson and Michael Bernstein from: “The
Bomb and I: Peter Sloterdijk, Botho Strauß, and Christa Wolf,” Monatshefte, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Winter, 1986),
pp. 500-513, University of Wisconsin Press. And "The Poetics of Ressentiment." In Ed. Gary Saul Morson
and Caryl, Emerson. Rethinking Bakhtin: Extensions and Challenges. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1989.
353As Luis Navia explains in response to the misanthropy of Greek-Kynicism, which better understood its
role as serving Athenian ideology than Sloterdijk’s does liberalism, ‘a remarkable passion for virtue and
moral freedom’ is required to police the violent risks of disinhibited post-ideological cheerfulness. Navia,
Luis E. Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996.
354 Specifically, in the sense of segregation and fantasy concerning Benna doomed attraction to Darrell,
and in Susan’s groups cynical take on the irredeemability of institutional racism.
352
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Row’s application of Neo-Kynical Cheekiness can subvert extremely cynical

fatalism, it may also thwart the mechanisms of Extreme Cynical repression.

In the context of race relations in America a psychic cause for fatalism is

that acknowledging the scarcity of realizable justice is more painful than the

presupposition of its impossibility. Thus, Extreme Liberal Cynical hopelessness
may incorporate a reification of inequality. In this way anger and inertia are

preferred to working towards equality. This delusional absolutism allows the

Liberal

Cynic

to

maintain

moral

self-respect

without

taking

individual

responsibility or engaging in self-critique and for letting a situation they abhor
persist. For Row, the ‘taboo-breaking, cringe-inducing, uneasy laughter of […]
radical racial satire produced by comedians of color stretching back to blackface

and minstrelsy’ 355 is uniquely equipped for overcoming this disastrous and painful
delusion. This stems firstly from a feature satire shares with all comedy; that its

inability to age well is the flipside of an ability to engage a unique socio-historic

context. In addition, satire has a special capacity for “double entendre;” an ability
to simultaneously engage various evaluative stances under a mutually welcoming
and challenging critical gaze. Through this capacity, racial satire addresses trauma,

realism, joy, catharsis, difference, guilt, insecurity, denial, anger, optimism,

despair, and hope simultaneously. Crucially, this coalescence is not intended to

harmonize or rank differences, rather this disorienting, self-implicating, and equal-

opportunity mockery “disarms” lazy identifications and juxtaposes realism, guilt,

humor, and hope in discombobulating simultaneity, achieving an ‘intimacy and

355

Row, Jess. “American Cynicism and its Cure”. Home. Boston Review, 18 May 2015. Web. 10 Dec. 2015.
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plasticity’ and a ‘refusal to remain within one tradition or sensibility, or to stay
within bunkers.’ 356 Row argues that this carves open a space for remembrance,

acknowledgement, and therapeutic release, allowing for a calmer appreciation of
terrible truths which may in turn ground the pursuit of a united response:

does comedy affirm what we already think we know, and who we
already think we are, or can it enlarge what we know, and who we
think we are? […] The joke, and the violence it describes, are
inseparable, but somehow still worth laughing about because we are
all implicated in it. How much misery have we experienced
maintaining this way of life? How can we be reconciled to it? The
alternative - which we all practice, every day, sometimes passively,
sometimes as principle - is to go on pretending […] that we speak private
languages that never overlap […] that there is no way of describing […]
how we suffer together.’ 357

But how does this relate to Extreme Liberal Cynicism? Kynical satire can

mobilize liberal goals in a manner uniquely equipped to appeal to liberalisms

vulnerable to cynicism by embracing cynical critique without refusing hope. This
mutually implicating critique disarming egotistic identifications could condition a more

a realistic view on the failing of our ideals, and our failings of them. Buffered by the

carapace of ironic distance this universally critical and inclusive comic exposure while

validating cynicism’s mockery of naiveté and its willingness to face up to man’s folly

could allow for the cynic’s pain and vulnerability to reach consciousness, and thereby
contest repression. In relation to our taxonomy, satire could be utilized to address
Cynicalization by ironicizing the canon’s authority thereby challenging its negative

legacy. Concerning Inauthentic Critique as failed avowal, through a minimally
Row, Jess. "American Cynicism." Home. Boston Review, 18 May 2015. Web. 10 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.bostonreview.net/books-ideas/jess-row-american-cynicism>.
357 Ibid.
356
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antagonist ridicule of the failure and contingency of all ideals self-implicating
cheekiness has a chance of rendering the Liberal Cynic’s values transparent,

fallible, and valuable. Concerning Inauthentic Critique as abandonment, a minimally
antagonistic disarming self-implicating satire could compel an owning up to

vulnerability born of the painful re-witnessing of the challenges to liberalism. This
could make possible a realization of its own assumptions, fantasies, delusions,

insecurities, ideals, guilt, privilege, anger, and despair thereby therapeutically
weakening their grip. Ideally this would expose Liberal Cynicism’s absolutizing of
hopelessness as adopted to ameliorate the inadmissible powerlessness and guilt,
exposing extreme cynicism’s absolute pessimism as emotionally driven rather than the

intellectual martyrdom of a rigorous realism, and thereby thwart this delusional

fatalism.

Before endorsing this ambitious appropriation, we must draw again from Row to

clarify how to overcome the risks we outlined in our objections to Sloterdijk. Row is

well aware of the risks, giving as examples of applied Neo-Kynical cheekiness ‘a
cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed published in the face of death threats that are

[…] likely to be carried out’ and ‘a movie about the assassination of a North Korean

dictator that names the actual dictator in question,’ and describes it as a ‘thoroughly
serious artistic rage’ and as a ‘weaponized comedy.’ 358 Crucially though, Row’s

application of Sloterdijkian Kynicism remains subordinate to a normative

Ibid. Arguments about freedom of expression, necessary as they are, tend to obscure another aspect of
these works: by taking comedy to its furthest extreme, to the point where the work provokes not only
adversarial violence but state violence in response - what we might call weaponized comedy - these
artists engender a kind of solidarity, the catharsis, cohesion, and elation of a mass audience, that they
could find no other way. As Morrissey put it: if it’s not love, then it’s the bomb that will bring us together.
Ibid.
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aspiration based on non-violence, human rights, justice, democracy, and equality.

With such policing in place, satire could be used to deconstruct the cynical ego and

productively release repressed cynical libidinal energies, and in directing its selfimplicating attacks at the liberal insecurity, both mourns our failures and allows
for some hope in response. In this sense, satire could play a positive role in the
general project of overcoming extreme cynicism, the call to remain between

Extreme Liberal Cynicism and naivety, to sustain competing impulses of traumaborn despair and hope.

Conclusion: Lessons from cheekiness
Our look at cheekiness allows us to produce some conditions which a successful

response to Extreme Liberal Cynicism would have to meet. We can take from the failure

of Sloterdijk’s romantic utopian reappropriation of Kynicism that solutions to cynicism

must remain faithful only to what is within it, that a persuasive critique of Extreme

Liberal Cynicism cannot invoke some secret agency to remain immanent. Such a
critique must draw from resources within cynicism which could be used in resisting

its own pernicious extremes. From Sloterdijk we can take this to include the
mockery of naivety, consolation, and irrationalism belying a respect for truth. In

addition to chapter 2 warning about assuaging cynical pain our look at Row and
Sloterdijk helped us clarify this worry and claim that any response must remain
subordinate to a normative aspiration. Of course, this too must draw from within or

at least remain plausible to cynicism to be persuasive. Within our qualified
appropriation of satire, we took that a response to Liberal Cynicism would benefit

from employing a self-implicating critique designed to disarm egoistic identifications
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such that its ideals and emotional relationship to those ideals are acknowledged and
acknowledged as vulnerable. A chief component is the radical Socratic humility of the
Kynic who embraces its own ignorance as the yard stick for all human knowledge,

maintaining its right to a radical ironicization of knowledge without assuming
intellectual superiority.

From Row’s appropriation, we saw that by targeting all as potentially complicit

in the problems it seeks to overcome and by acquiring an openness to diverse solutions,
policed cheekiness could disrupt the inertia of argumentative stalemate by avoiding the

reduction of opposing views to “false consciousness.” 359 We should also retain the
insight that the critique of cynicism would be wise to target its’s deepest attachment;
the ego. Sloterdijk located cynicism’s self-defensive and self-aggrandizing behaviour as

emanating from a desperate clinging to a confused sense of self-worth. We developed
this as including the fear of enlightenment persisting within a cynicism resisting self-

critique due to an inchoate feeling that it would lead to a loss of self: to death-in-life. But

while Sloterdijk’s alternative demand is that cynicism push through this obstacle and
deconstruct its hardened ego to release a new source of extra-ideological vitality, this is

dangerous. Nevertheless, as in Row, this neo-Kynical immanent ego-critique can be
mobilized under the policing of a clearly articulated normative aspiration. Thankfully,

we know that Liberal Cynicism, unlike Enlightened False Consciousness, is not

beyond ideals. This raised the possibility of a critique furnishing us with policing

ideals from within Liberal Cynicism. Furthermore, the goal of Neo-Kynical ego
359 and anti-solidarity both in the “left” and between the “left” and those it’s supposed to serve and once
incorporated, the working class.
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critique would be different for Liberal Cynicism than Enlightened False Consciousness,

because its traumatized self-preservation and fear has not “clouded from view” the

inchoate energies of a magical neo-Kynical yesbody, but the value, efficacy, and

responsibilities entailed by its constitutive idealism. A critique which reveals that

hopelessness impedes escape as well as belying fear, guilt, and its ideals, may provoke a

reassessment of these ideals. At our most ambitious we could hypothesize that Kynical
satire could encourage the genuine autarky of accepting uncertainty and taking
responsibility for the success of it values.

To remain immanent and therefore persuasive this reassessment has to be made

compatible with the cynical conscience, 360 with its will-to-truth, and its historical

geopolitical consciousness. 361 What we are proposing is an immanent critique of Liberal
Cynicism that revitalizes liberal ideals while retaining something of the rationale

behind their disavowal. As Neil Wilson asks: ‘Why is it necessary to find a natural
starting point that is independent of our enlightenment traditions? […] Why not
continue the attempt to clean up our game? Why not think the Enlightenment through

once again? Why not make a garden out of all that dirt?’ 362 To make this garden, instead
of Sloterdijk’s plot to replace the ‘dying tree of philosophy’ with an ‘ironic magic tree’363

Cleaned here means purged of its emotionally driven irrational, absolutizing, and fantasizing
tendencies.
361 This is a point where Sloterdijk’s instance on the linear direction of cynicalization is legitimate.
Sloterdijk’s conviction that certain values are forever lost to ideology critique was let down by his
romantic resurrection of an antediluvian ethic, but his attempt to utilize the cynical critical impulse
against its remaining naiveté - egoism - was more faithful to this insight. This insight reduces to the claim
that romanticizing post-ideological solutions to cynicism are unlikely to succeed.
362 Punching out the Enlightenment: A Discussion of Peter Sloterdijk's Kritik der zynischen Vernunft Neil
Wilson, New German Critique, No. 41, Special Issue on the Critiques of the Enlightenment (Spring Summer, 1987), pp. 53-70 Duke University Press. “Making a garden out of all of that dirt” will by the
guiding aspiration of the later sections of this dissertation.
363 Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. Pgs. 28-29
360
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we should cultivate liberal ideals by subjecting them to rigorous critique. While it may

be too ambitious to assume this would follow merely from a Neo-Kynical critique of

Liberal Cynicism, a deeper reflection on the resources within Liberal Cynicism and

reflection on Judith Butler can help us explain both why and how Liberal Cynicism
might swap the easiness of painful fatalism for the deep challenges of upholding an

ambivalent and critical commitment to reinvigorating and working for the success of its
constitutive ideals.
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Chapter 6: “Later” Butler and Overcoming Liberal Cynicism
Introduction
We saw in chapter 3 that “middle Butler” struggled to engage with its guiding

broadly liberal normative aspirations. Butler’s post-9/11 works mobilize a theory
which explicates and grounds the optimism previously posed in self-defeating forms.
This new theoretical frame also retains fidelity to the insights from the previous work
and fortifies their guiding ideals. As such Butler’s “later” work provides an example of
overcoming Liberal Cynicism’s extremes by utilizing its saving power.

In the post-9/11 works Butler’s career-long project of lessening the punitive

restrictions and expanding the perimeters of life imposed by social norms de-

emphasizes the discursive and psychic pre-conditions for subjectivation in a

Psychoanalytic Foucauldian frame and re-emphasizes the contestability in a more
experiential frame. Therein Butler overcomes the failed avowal in the work on
materialization and realizes the hopes excited and unfulfilled there and in The Psychic
Life of Power by following a clear ethical imperative to show where, how, and why

harmful norms may be disrupted at the level of action.
Overcoming the cynical “impasse”

1. Overcoming Inauthentic Ideology Critique as abandonment
As we have seen, while invested in contesting it Butler’s view of the constitutive

depth of normative violence problematized this aspiration. The problem stemmed from

a failure to successfully distinguish between necessary normative violence and political
and ethical violence. Contrary to the transcendental reading which failed to theorize the

contestation of necessary normative violence at the pre-experiential level of perceptual
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categorization, the existential reading had Butler critiquing the conscious domain in
which the practices and discourse responsible for erecting and sustaining the

normative perimeters delimiting what solicits grief. In the later material Butler

continues the move begun in Psychic Life from “liveability” to “grievability” and

endorses the existential reading. In Frames of War Butler explicitly refuses the

‘transcendental thesis’: 364 ‘I would caution against a generalization of the thesis that all

normativity is founded in violence’ ‘this kind of claim can function as a transcendental
argument [which would] make violence essential to any and all subject formation.’365
Supporting the existential reading, also from Frames of War, Butler addresses how

discursive regimes withhold the designation of humanity to those accused of terrorism:

‘The lives of those at Guantánamo do not count as the kind of “human lives” protected

by human-rights discourse.’ 366 While Butler previously seems to reject the notion of
humanity in degrees here she describes discursively mobilized dehumanization as

when ‘specific lives’ although ‘apprehended as “living,”’ are not ‘apprehended as living

Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 169.
‘I would caution against a generalization of the thesis that all normativity is founded in violence. This
kind of claim can function as a transcendental argument and so fail to distinguish those social instances
when norms operate for other reasons, or when the term “violence” does not quite describe the power or
force by which they operate. There are, to be sure, regimes of power that produce and constrain certain
ways of being, but I am not at all sure about affirming or denying a transcendental thesis that would
dismiss power from the equation and make violence essential to any and all subject formation.’ Butler,
Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 169.
366 That “later” Butler “owns-up” generally to the existential reading requires us to clarify some
classifications Butler uses, albeit inconsistently, in Frames of War: Butler uses a range of terms Such as
“subjects” “life worlds” “life-forms” “lives” “living beings” “specific lives” “persons,” “figure” albeit
inconstantly to refer to “that” which can be dehumanized by contingent socio-politically regimented
normativity operating at the level of discourse: ‘The forms the subject takes as well as the life worlds that
do not conform to available categories of the subject emerge in light of historical and geopolitical
movements.’ Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 58. This language settles the debate as to
whether we are referring to actual of hypothetical beings, and avoids the cavalcade of problems that
flowed form the latter possibility in the previous work. ‘there at least two sense of life, the one, which
refers to the minimum biological form of living, and another which intervenes at the start, which
establishes minimum conditions for a liveable life’. Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor &
Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 226.
364
365
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[…] in the full sense.’367 Finally, Butler also seems to separate the existential and

transcendental registers by distinguishing between apprehension and recognition. 368
While all subjects are apprehended, recognition is the discursively mediated faculty
responsible for ‘crafting a living being’ into ‘shape’ suitable for normative judgments: 369
What we are able to apprehend is surely facilitated by norms of
recognition, but it would be a mistake to say that we are utterly limited by
existing norms when we apprehend a life. 370
2. Overcoming Inauthentic Ideology Critique as failed avowal

In the later work then, Butler avoids the absurd consequence of the

transcendental reading that we do not apprehend the dehumanized. 371 This move goes

someway to overcoming Inauthentic Ideology Critique as failed avowal, the condition
whereby the extent of critique prohibits avowing a nevertheless guiding normative

position. In critiquing the violence of norms which dictate the basest of moral status –
grievability – Butler not only maintains the critical project but clarifies who she is

fighting for: ‘Norms operate to produce certain subjects as “recognizable” persons and
to make others decidedly more difficult to recognize.’ 372 We have an answer to the

perplexing question from Bodies That Matter whether or not there are actual victims of
Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 1. My italics.
Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p.5.
369 The notion of grievability clarifies the notions referred to interchangeably by, intelligibility, livability,
and recognizbility: ‘Grievability makes possible the apprehension of the living being.’ All Butler, Judith
Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p.5.
370 Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 5.
371 ‘We have ongoing debates about whether the fetus is a human life […] about what constitutes death
[…] The fact that these debates exist, and continue to exist, does not imply that life and death are direct
consequences of discourse (an absurd conclusion if taken literally.)’ Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso,
UK, 2009, p.6. And with this subtle distinction, Butler enables us make sense of the following familiar
claim: ‘The very terms that confer “humanness” on some individuals are those that deprive certain other
individuals of the possibility of achieving that status.’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor &
Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p.2.
372 Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 15.
367
368
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the violence Butler would have us contest. While this concept of recognition still
functions at the depth of experientially constitutive intelligibility, because of this
distinction between apprehendability and grievability, its role at conscious and sociopolitical levels is clearer: ‘The question is not whether a given being is living or not, […]

it is, rather, whether the social conditions of persistence and flourishing are or are not
possible:’ 373

Undoing Gender also overcomes a critical problem from within The Psychic Life of

Power and the earlier work which problematized the avowal of the guiding normative

aspiration, specifically the refusal to explain the partial applications of radical

deconstruction. Performativity implied a politics where subjects formed on the basis of
norms could resist the disciplining effects of these prescriptions by emphasizing the

norms' contingent and performative nature. The reliance of norms on repeated
performances over time grants subjects an opportunity to redraft disciplinary
prescriptions and open new pathways for political and cultural life. However, there was

an issue concerning the standard from which we should adjudicate between helpful and
harmful subversion. This problem persisted in Bodies That Matter and Psychic Life with

its radical subversion of language, logic, and intelligibility which, as well as relegating

subversion to a pre-conscious realm, again called the justification of subversion into

question. Undoing Gender puts this concern to bed by clarifying the role of critique as

employed at the socio-political level to allow for marginalized forms of life the

opportunity to flourish. Therein Butler advertises subversion ‘not to celebrate
difference as such but to establish more inclusive conditions for sheltering and
373

Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 20.
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maintaining life.’374 Here, Butler both asks ‘which innovation has value, and which does

not?’ 375 and appreciates that the standpoint from which to answer this question must
be from within the existing context of norms: ‘The norms that we would consult to

answer this question cannot themselves be derived from resignification,’ 376 and Butler
is very clear about which norms we must commit to:

One must make substantive decisions about what will be a less violent
future, what will be a more inclusive population, what will help to fulfill,
in substantive terms, the claims of universality and justice that we seek to
understand in their cultural specificity and social meaning. [ultimately] A
call to extend the norms that sustain life. 377
Cynicalization and “Cruel Optimism”

As well as clarifying varieties of violence and articulating a clear normative

aspiration Butler theorizes the space and power for critiquing and contesting harmful
formative norms, thereby realizing optimisms hitherto posed in self-defeating forms.
Previously, where Butler argued that the processes pre-figuring the performative

sedimentation of pernicious social norms in the unconscious formation of the ego the

explanation for how to contest them was insufficient. By contrast, Undoing Gender lays
out plans for contestation which work on the newly developed account of the

relationship between the concrete realm of political life, the intelligible realm of social
norms, and the unintelligible realm where subjects are formed in relation to them. The

problem was three-fold; what opens the space within subjectivation to mobilize it for

alternative inaugurations? what could power such contestation? and what could justify
Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 4.
Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 225.
376 Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 225.
377 Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 225.
374
375
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it? While such a critical space was presupposed in Butler’s work on performativity and

in Psychic life where the processes of gendered subject consolidation/formation
entailed that subjectivating norms are within the purview of critical consciousness,
Butler provided insufficient grounds for locating this space and for explaining why and
how to use it for contestation. Here, we have a theory of where, why, and how to

subvert norms. Firstly, the where; Undoing Gender theorizes how the ‘critical relation’

always occupies a ‘distance from norms’ and this space not wholly scripted by
dominant norms might be subjected to immanent critique:

the “I” that I am finds itself at once constituted by norms and dependent
on them but also […] maintains a critical and transformative relation to
them […] This is the juncture from where critique emerges, […] as an
interrogation of the terms by which life is constrained in order to open up
the possibility of different modes of living. 378

In this way, we can make better sense of the cryptic disclaimer at the end of

Chapter 5 of The Psychic life of Power: ‘The logic of repudiation that I've charted here is

in some ways a hyperbolic theory, a logic in drag, as it were, which overstates the case,
but overstates it for a reason.’ 379 This include the idea that firstly, critical analysis of

restrictive normativity affords a psychoanalytically therapeutic bringing into
consciousness of that which binds us if left uninterrogated and secondly, that
exaggerating the severity of libidinally invested normative violence through hyperbolic

critique is particularly effective in loosening the bonds of pernicious norms. This

reading is also supported in Frames of War where Butler claims not only that critique
378 Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 3 – 4 my
italics.
379 Butler, Judith, The Psychic Life of Power p. 148,9,50.
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‘focuses on the violence affected by the normative framework itself’ but that critique
itself promises ‘an alternative normativity’. 380

Undoing Gender also provides the why – “sheltering and maintaining life” – and

in referring to a collective capacity ‘to articulate an alternative minority version of

sustaining norms’ begins to lay out how. Butler argues that ‘If my doing is dependent on
what is done to me, rather the ways in which I am done by norms, the possibility of my

persistence as an “I” depends upon my being able to do something with what is done to
me.’ 381 Heretofore, by locating the space for contestation within pre-conscious psychic

machinations over which we have no conscious control Butler deeply problematized

resistance. Here the power to offer an alternative account of normativity to sustain

alternative norms or ideals and the electrifying Sartrean 382 capacity to do something

with what is done to us, Butler goes further in explaining how ‘improvisation within a
scene of constraint’ 383 is actionable for socio-political ends.

For a fuller account of the how we can actively contest pernicious norms and to

see how Butler fulfilled hitherto unfulfilled hopes we have to turn to Precarious Life and
firstly, the problem as we had it in The Psychic Life of Power. The diagnosis of cruel

optimism in The Psychic Life of Power – that it simultaneously promises and
prohibits the means to realize its hopes – rested on the cryptic upturn at the end of

Chapter 5 where Butler claimed that ‘there is no necessary reason for identification to
Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 150.
Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 3.
382 This sounds very Sartrean: ‘I have never ceased to believe that one is and one makes oneself of
whatever is made of one’ Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism Is a Humanism (L'Existentialisme Est Un
Humanisme); Including, a Commentary on The Stranger (Explication De L'Étranger). Trans. John Kulka,
Arlette Elkaı̈m-Sartre, Annie Cohen-Solal, and Carol Macomber. N.p.: n.p., n.d.
383 Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004 P. 1.
380
381
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oppose desire, or for desire to be fueled by repudiation.’ 384 The problem was that Butler

did not provide an account. Precarious Life does. Therein, Butler asks how the

experience of grief motivates destructive political action and how it can be redirected to

target pernicious narcissistic mechanisms and ground a generally applicable political

ethics.

The theory of melancholy and mourning in Precarious Life works from that

which compels the panicked performative reinforcement of pernicious norms, the

causes of normative material violence, and the psychic cause of identitarian violence the loss of prohibited desire. The new theory marks loss as a universal human

experience: ‘loss has made a tenuous we of us all’ 385 one that exposes our vulnerability
to, and dependence on, others, be they the loved ones, those who took them away or,

other attachments reducible to primary desire. On this understanding, loss always

involves more than just the relationship with the “love object” for this trauma is
compounded by a loss of desire for self-identity, security, autonomy, invulnerability,
and independence. In Butler’s analysis the mechanisms of mourning are surprising,

unpredictable, and partially inaccessible and since loss is always traceable to an

unsatisfied desire it follows that desire itself is at least partially inaccessible. In this
way, the opacity of grief and loss reflect the opacity of desire. Loss also involves then,
the thwarting of the desire for a coherent and transparent identity.

In Butler, just as in Freud, there are healthy and unhealthy responses to loss. For

both, mourning is the healthy response and melancholy the unhealthy. In Freud,
384
385

Ibid. p. 149.
Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. 20.
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melancholia marks a refusal of loss and grief via an internalization of the lost love

object within the ego in the form of an idealized representation. Along with this
idealized substitute the initial love for it and the hate at its departure from the real are

also internalized compelling a self-destructive narcissistic combination of self-love and
self-hate. In Freud the healthy response to loss is a conscious mourning which is

eventually replaced by the ability to substitute the lost object, to love again. Butler,
sensitive to the cold mathematical logic of substitution prefers an account of the healthy

response to loss as ‘submitting to a transformation’: 386 ‘one mourns when one accepts
that by the loss one undergoes one will be changed, possibly forever.’ 387 The alternative

– melancholy – incorporates the desires thwarted by loss into the ego. Rather than
accept vulnerability, interdependence, and the opacity and incoherence of the self the

desire for security, invulnerability, transparency, and coherence are internalized and
idealized. Just as in Butler’s analysis of homophobia, this ungrieved loss manifests

externally as a pre-emptive hatred for the disavowed. Therefore, the unhealthy
response to loss is the refusal to allow anything threatening the fantasy: anything

suggesting vulnerability, insecurity, dependence, incoherence, self-doubt, and self-

criticism.

With this theoretical foundation Precarious Life psychoanalyzes how America’s

failure to grieve 9/11 motivated a betrayal of human rights, the suppression of

criticism, and the resurgence of sovereign power. The suppression of criticism involved
a refusal to contextualize Islamic terrorism in the history of U.S. foreign intervention or
386
387

Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. 21.
Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. 21.
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global patterns of poverty and religiosity. Such attempts were delegitimized as

exculpations, a context within which any political criticism of American foreign policy
was immediately and uncritically defined as complicit such that a critical self-reflective

liberalism’s credibility withdrew from the media shaped collective consciousness.
Instead media coverage focused on the attackers' personal histories and on shadowy AI
Qaeda "masterminds" like Osama bin Laden. On Butler's understanding, this was largely
an effort to make sense of the events by situating them within a recognizable frame of
subjective agency and charismatic leadership. As Butler put it, ‘isolating the individuals

involved absolves us of the necessity of coming up with a broader explanation for

events,’388 and in "monumental" public commemoration critical modes of questioning
are drowned out and overwhelmed by rituals of ‘spectacular public grief.’ 389 On the

Butlerian analysis, that the national reckoning with vulnerability was followed by

misplaced retributive violence, racism, and islamophobia, and the reemergence of a

conservative authoritarianism was a result of refusing the aforementioned losses and

incorporating the fantasies into the collective imaginary. Although problematized by

this monumentality, the melancholic refusal to grieve related not primarily to the

victims of 9/11, but to the totalizable nature of the American identity, the omnipotence
of America, and the superiority of its “way of life.” These then are the desires which are

internalized and fantasized and which compel an urge to destroy that which threatens

the fantasy. Due to the super-egoic internalization of normative discourse mobilizing

melancholic denial, Islamic terror, Islamism and indirectly Islam itself became idealized
388
389

Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p.5
Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p.5
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as a threat which much be destroyed. Tragically, this idealization required another

layer of melancholic foreclosure, the refusal to grieve the loss of life which ensued. The

non-American lives which were lost in the name of shoring up the illusion of American

invulnerability were inadmissible because to acknowledge such losses would challenge
the fantasy of American moral superiority. However, this guilt could remain outside

consciousness if normative discourse enacted a thorough dehumanization of what was
lost so it never had to be lost at all. According to Butler this process was reinforced by

refusing humanization of those responsible for terrorism or those non-American

innocents who died in the attempts to eradicate it. In this way the “ungrievability” of

those who have died and continue to die because of American and allied military

interventions in the Middle East can be traceable back, in part, to the inability to grieve

the complex losses which the tragedy of 9/11 unleashed. This explains how the rash

and reckless military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the many violence acts
that comprise the “War on Terror” rest on insufficient analysis of the conditions that
compel terrorism and unleash a cavalcade of violence that tragically, but

unsurprisingly, in the effort to repress American vulnerability, have made America, and
everywhere else, less safe.

Thankfully, Butler’s new theory includes the view that grief can be used to

thwart its own foreclosure before it enters inaccessible regions of the psyche. This is

because for Butler grief discombobulates the ego and forces a deconstruction of the

illusion of an autonomous, independent, and coherent self, an experience which can
either compel a panicked even manic melancholic incorporation and foreclosure or be

used to short circuit its narcissistic circuity. In the context of the “War on Terror,” the
141

radically deconstructive effects of grief make possible a different response, that this
‘dislocation of First World privilege’ 390 could be met with a submission to a permanent
transformation, forgoing the illusions of American value superiority, omnipotence, and
invulnerability and instead realizing the dependence and vulnerability of all Americans

– as all people – on the non-violence of unknown others, a realization which connects
Americans to the victims of terrorism all over the world and could usher in an

appreciation of radical precariousness and the call to swap assuring mutual destruction
which the refusal of vulnerability compels for the rational ethic of minimizing violence.

This theory makes good on the hope in The Psychic Life of Power that ‘there is no

necessary reason for identification to oppose desire, or for desire to be fueled by

repudiation’ 391 for grief becomes the point where this possibility is actionable. The

breaking apart of the ego, the rendering our sense of self opaque, and laying bare the
sustaining but imperfectable illusions of power, mark the point where performative

freedom is most fecund. In the vulnerable undermining ‘the capacity of the subject to

"be" in a self-identical sense’ which grief makes possible, lies the way towards

imagining processes to retroactively destabilize the formative grip of foreclosures

poised to manifest as identitarian hatred, correcting pernicious downstream effects of

social foreclosure and marking out a new ‘direction for rethinking ethics’ 392 toward

inaugurations of ‘a more open, even more ethical kind of being.’ 393 While this optimism
is tempered by the consequent truth that the most powerful psychic urge in the face of
Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. xii.
Ibid. p. 149.
392 Ibid. p. 131.
393 Ibid.
390
391
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grief is denial, by promising gradual cultivation of skillful grieving, coupled with the

targeted critique of discourse which disenables it we have an actionable goal for
minimizing reactionary violence.

In Giving an Account of Oneself as well as Precarious Life, Butler develops the

humanistic possibilities of apprehending our constitutive “exposed” sociality though

grief, namely that this primal exposure whereby we are always and already in an ethical
relationship and where the desire for continued life is potentially at risk can be used to

develop a heightened sense of ethical responsibility. Adopting elements from
Emmanuel Levinas, Butler theorizes how our primary availability to the others is the
possibility for a new direction in ethics:

What binds us morally has to do with how we are addressed by others in
ways that we cannot avert or avoid; this impingement is against our will
or, perhaps put more appropriately, prior to the formation of our will. 394

Grief contains within it the possibility of apprehending the fundamental
sociality of embodied life, the ways in which we are from the start, and by
virtue of being a bodily being, already given over, beyond ourselves,
implicated in lives that are not our own. 395

This focuses on a feature of melancholia, the foreclosure of interdependence. The

ethical challenge is to accept rather than deny or “overcome” this ‘unwilled
susceptibility.’396 By using this knowledge of interdependence, incoherence, and
vulnerability afforded by grief one can become more responsive to the vulnerability of

others. On this view, respect for the inexhaustible unknown in the intersubjective
encounter, both of the “I” and the “Other,” prepares an ‘ethics based on our shared,
Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 chapter 5.
Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 22.
396 Ibid.
394
395
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invariable, and partial blindness to ourselves,’ 397 by revealing definitive incompleteness

and vulnerability as loci for human rights and instigating an experiential foundation for
inaugurating a normative culture sensitive to diverse and distinct forms of human
life: 398

If the narcissistic preoccupation of melancholia can be moved into a
consideration of the vulnerability of others, then we might critically
evaluate and oppose the conditions under which certain human lives are
more vulnerable than others. 399

This recognition provides a constant reminder of our constitutive sociality and

an avowal of a heretofore unspeakable vulnerability 400 that our lives and deaths are

granted by biological, psychic, and socio-cultural powers over which we have little
influence. This will in turn, Butler hopes, lead us to reflect on "precarity": 401 the

‘politically induced condition in which certain populations […] become differentially

Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham UP, 2005.
Through “bringing ourselves to grief” we acknowledge: ‘that the 'I,' first comes into being as a 'me'
through being acted upon by another, and this primary impingement is already and from the start an
ethical interpellation.’ Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham UP, 2005.
399 Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. 30.
400 Butler utilizes this theory to explain the processes producing the paucity of available means for the
public expression of certain losses and the inability of the marginalized to make their grief visible
because the full acknowledgement of their loss is prohibited by social stigma. For example, As Butler
argued, the losses from Aids could not rise above the stigma attached to homosexual desire, just as the
deaths of Muslim civilians caught up in the global war on terror had difficulty breaking through the
dominant administrative and media frames of the conflict. In these instances, melancholia is less an
individual pathology than a political and cultural phenomenon. As Butler put it, ‘where there is no public
recognition or discourse through which such [losses] might be named and mourned, then melancholia
takes on cultural dimensions’. Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, 2004. The prohibition of
public mourning, in effect, doubles the trauma of loss, and generates through the repression of foreclosed
possibilities collective social psychopathologies of discursively grounded dehumanizations deflecting the
libidinal energies channeled by prohibition into identitarian hatred. To confront these cultural
prohibitions Butler draws attention to the discursive frames by which experience is organized
specifically in a psychic explanation for how the internalization of heteronormativity compels
homophobic hatred. As she puts it: ‘a frame for understanding violence emerges in tandem with the
experience, and that frame works... to preclude certain kinds of questions.’ Ibid.
401 ‘The more or less existential condition of “precariousness” is thus linked with a more specifically
political notion of “precarity.”’ Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p.3.
397
398
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exposed to injury, violence, and death’ 402 generating presumptive empathy for the
marginalized and persecuted.

Although the dominant mode in the United States has been to shore up
sovereignty and security, to minimize or indeed foreclose this
vulnerability, it can serve another function and another ideal. The fact
that our lives are dependent on others, can become the basis for claims
for non-militaristic political solutions, one which we cannot will away,
one which we must attend to, even abide by, as we begin to think about
what politics might be implied by staying with the thought of corporeal
vulnerability itself. 403

Retaining fidelity to the “cynical” inheritance

Butler’s turn to ethics incorporates Freudian melancholy, the psychoanalysis of

sexed and gendered identity, and the theoretical innovations from performativity. The

elements thereof which ground the later theories include: 1) that the dominance of

social norms require performative iterations which sediment values through repeated

embodied endorsement. 2) That this “performative accomplishment” is always
accompanied by an acknowledged or unacknowledged panic which bears reliable
testimony to the contingency of norms. 3) That since mourning becomes melancholia

through socially compelled disavowal; melancholic narcissism is unintelligible without

reference to sociality. And 4), that melancholic foreclosure is contingent and
incomplete.

The reciprocity of mourning and melancholia presupposes that conscious

mourning ushers in the descent into the unconscious and its consequent psychic and

concrete effects. Furthermore, given that subjectivation is based on a panicked
performatively reified incomplete foreclosure of prohibited norms it is without

402
403

Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham UP, 2005.
Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 22-23.
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absolute grip. If it is without absolute grip, then the formation of the ego is never
finished, and the mechanisms compelling performativity are contestable. Finally, if
certain practices reinforce the contingent social norms which prefigure conscious and

unconscious foreclosures, it follows that we may influence the ways in which mourning
becomes melancholia by critiquing, imagining, and committing to different norms. Thus,

these later theories work out the transformative implications within the earlier
insights. 404 The work on performativity explained how iterative behavior retroactively

imbues prohibitive norms with a phenomenologically attestable but philosophically

unsound necessity. Bodies That Matter explained how this process functions both as
discourse and corporeally. Gender Trouble theorized how an original experience of loss
predates and inaugurates the ego, a loss which cannot be experienced but which
subsists at the unconscious level and haunts the subject it formed, and how melancholy

designates a failure to grieve in which loss is refused and internalized. And The Psychic
Life of Power theorized the passionate attachments compelling certain performative

commitments. In this way, the post-9/11 works complete the earlier projects to

mobilize a new direction for ethics and politics, via thwarting social and culturally

germinated prohibitions through a skillful appropriation of grief. This reading fits with
comments Butler made in an interview with Thomas Dunn:

The sections on performativity are not fully thought together with the
sections on melancholy, and so one might reflect upon a certain gap there,
one that I have been trying to attend to ever since. If grieving is refused
through a certain manic action, one that seeks to deny or magically
overcome the loss one has endured or, simultaneously, the blow to one's

404 Without the psychoanalytic architecture of pre-conscious subjectivation, the machinations whereby
unconscious withdrawal falls into the psychic reserve would be an untouchable part of the process of
inaugurating norms through iterative sedimentation.
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efficacy that loss entails, then maybe one must undergo the deprivation
and the humility that loss require. 405

As well as maintaining fidelity to this theoretical background, Butler’s later work

maintains and engages more positively with its “most cynical” moments. 406 For

example, in the work on abjection and materialization the commitment to the depth of

discursive constraints on intelligibility which dictates whose lives matter remains, as
does the politicization, and the critique thereof, even the goal of deconstructing

dominant logic from within its symbolic paradigm. Only here, once the shift has been
made to norms of recognition not apprehension, and guided by a very clear normative
aspiration, this radical deconstruction once purged of its problems, remain fruitful,

405 Dumm, Thomas. "Giving Away, Giving Over: A Conversation with Judith Butler." The Massachusetts
Review 49.1/2 (2008): 95-105. JSTOR. Web.
406 An objection to this view may be mounted that Butler contradicts a commitment from the most crucial
of her theoretical influences, the Foucauldian warning that the search for transcendental backing for
politics inevitably fails. The objection would be that since the search necessarily operates within and is
constituted by historical norms discerning any ultimate foundation from which to assess those norms
cannot work and in claiming the category of grievability as a given Butler appeals to a historically
invariant transcendental universalism about the structure of human vulnerability. Furthermore, that
vulnerability, grievability, and livability are only intelligible in the context Butler mounts her theory to
contest. We may reply firstly by saying that the vulnerability of life is neither culturally contingent or
need be transcendentally deduced. Secondly, we can reply that in our context of an increasingly global
interdependent intelligibility vulnerability, while a profoundly historically saturated contingent
phenomenon, is nevertheless ethically vital. A third response is that Foucault’s epistemic limitations on
universal claims don’t rule out the possibility of their being features of the human condition relatively
stable across time. Fourth; Butler accounts for the Foucauldian explicitly stating that vulnerability can
change its meaning and structure - ‘when a vulnerability is recognized, that recognition has the power to
change the meaning and structure of the vulnerability itself.’ (Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso,
London, UK 2004 p. 43) Fifthly, Butler doesn’t nominate vulnerability as a transcendental, rather as ‘one
precondition for humanization’ (Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. 43) amongst
many, and accepts that both norms and that which is foreclosed in their internalization are contingent.
Butler’s Levinasian developments in Precarious Life enable a sixth reply within which grief, along with a
variety of other dispossessive experiences, such as anger or desire sensitizes the subject to its own
stubborn opacity – its internal "unknowingness" – and this becomes the basis for tenuous claims of
commonality that can stitch together new communities and ways of life. Therefore, given that a
fundamental feature of the structure of interdependence is the essential unknowability of vulnerability,
Butler evades the Foucauldian objection that her theory assumes transcendental access to the human
condition as such. Furthermore, given the account whereby grief re-ignites our essential ethical
interdependence does not assume a substantive sympathetic connection to cross contingent cultural
boundaries, it also resists Foucault’s objection in that it does not require a problematic moral
universalism.
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limiting itself to the critique of that which features in dehumanizations and other means
to oppose sheltering and maintaining life.

The post-9/11 work also retains fidelity to the poststructuralist commitments

that normative violence and vulnerability are ontological truisms and that any ethics or

politics trying to negate, argue around, or remove it risks a dangerous denial. 407
However, the later works propose a skillful navigation of ubiquitous violence. In the

new account, the possibility for performative sedimentations of norms ushering in
alternative inaugurations of the subject is established through an appeal to the ‘psychic

mechanisms ordained in hominoid hostility’, employing destructive qualities in the

service of enlightened alternatives. This account also involves ‘marshalling the desire to
kill […] to kill one’s own aggression.’ In this way, the picture of the self from Psychic Life

persists – caught interminably turning back on itself to sustain the ego, driven by a

violent self-destructive passionate subordination to nevertheless unachievable

demands, compelled into a panicked reification of pernicious norms – but unlike

previously this passionate psychic self-berating can be consciously adopted, and “done”

in a manner less likely to manifest in hostility, aggression, and violence. In this way,
Later Butler does not propose a new theory which rejects and abandons that which

compelled our diagnoses instead, she maintains qualified fidelity to even its most
“cynical” moments.

‘the attempt to foreclose vulnerability, to banish it, to make ourselves secure at the expense of every
other human consideration, is surely also to eradicate one of the most important resources from which
we must take our bearings and find our way’. Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis
group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 23.

407
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Reinvigorating liberal ideals
As well overcoming the problems that permitted our association of her work

with Extreme Liberal Cynicism and retaining fidelity to the load bearing argumentative

claims of the “cynical moment,” Butler’s later work also reinvigorates the ideals which

guide the entire project. As we have seen, for Butler, appreciation of precarity and the

inexhaustibility of the human could enable us to develop radically open cosmopolitan

democratic politics: 408 ‘I want to ask how we might rethink [this] “we” in global
terms:’ 409

Any radically democratic self-understanding will have to come to terms
with the heterogeneity […] it is the condition by which a concrete and
expansive conception of the human will be articulated, the way in which
parochial and implicitly racially and religiously bound conceptions of
human will be made to yield to a wider conception of how we consider
who we are as a global community. We do not yet understand all these
ways, and in this sense human rights law has yet to understand the full
meaning of the human. It is, we might say, an ongoing task of human
rights to reconceive the human when it finds its putative universality
does not have universal reach. 410

Butler’s later work on agency and freedom repeats this pattern of detailing

political applications of reinvigorated progressive liberal ideals both respectful of the
liberal traditions and adopting a policed “cynical” critique of their potential naivety in

the service of ‘non-violent cooperative egalitarian international relations.’ While critical

of the liberal ideal of rational autonomy Butler recaptures and reinvigorates the notion

of freedom problematized in the earlier work by finding a place for it in a complex
psychological and socio-political picture. Butler has always understood that there is no

‘the category “human” […] is not captured once and for all,’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge,
Taylor & Francis Group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 13.
409 Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 38.
410 Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004, p. 90.
408
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way of imagining a social landscape without limiting norms so, she argues for a freedom

in the form of escaping our exaggerated dependency on them. 411 Butler thus

reinvigorates the classic liberal notion both in terms of removing the cruel optimism of

aspiring to a utopian vision of total self-governance and exposing naïve liberation as a
rouse and in allowing a glimpse from within a field of constraints enabling the

possibility of real freedoms. 412 Indeed, while Butler inherits the rejection of rational
A benefit of theorizing in light of the inevitable constraints within an existing context of intelligibility
is that the grounds for contestation are not located in some future realm we have to wait for or violently
create, for the resources for overcoming the more pernicious locutions of power are to be drawn from
within those very locutions, giving us hope with every injustice, and thus again, retaining fidelity to the
here and now; a sentiment Butler expressed in the Dumm interview: ‘I'm certainly not in favor of those
forms of radicalism that claim that any participation in existing structures is crude reformism and, hence,
to be resisted’ Dumm, Thomas. "Giving Away, Giving Over: A Conversation with Judith Butler." The
Massachusetts Review 49.1/2 (2008): 95-105. JSTOR. Web.
412 Butler’s discussion of the illusions of “coming out” highlight the emancipatory power of restricting the
notion of freedom. This reinvigorated notion of freedom is a resurrected form of that condemned in the
Psychic Life of Power, a form best articulated in “Imitation and Gender Insubordination” where Butler
warns that notion of coming out of “feigned heterosexuality” into “true homosexuality” risks perpetuating
the reification of sex and gender upon which homophobia depends. If understood as coming out from a
“false” identity into its “true” self the danger is that this blinds us to the truth that the experience of
sexuality cannot be reduced to the categories we use to describe it, that ‘the “I” exceeds its
determination.’ (Ibid). According to Butler, that there is some fixed identity category waiting to give us a
home, to dissolve our anxieties and provide completeness is an illusion perpetuated by the popular
narratives: ‘so we are out of the closet, but into what? What new unbounded spatiality? The room, the
den, the basement, the house, the bar, the university, some new enclosure whose door, like Kafka’s door,
produces the expectation of a fresh air and a light of illumination that never arrives.’ For Butler ‘being
“out” must produce the closet again and again in order to maintain itself as “out” […] the promise of a
disclosure that can, by definition, never come.’ Put simply ‘“coming out” […] is a return to the closet under
the guise of an escape’. (Ibid p. 123) The danger is that a romanticized notion of freedom when proved
false can be deeply psychologically damaging. A second danger of naïve liberation discourse is that it
forecloses the opportunity to do a therapeutic self-psychoanalysis of the panicked nature of all identity
the groundlessness of such a “transformation” reveals, and crucially, the freedom this realization makes
possible: ‘Is this infinite postponement of the disclosure of “gayness” produced by the very act of “coming
out” to be lamented? Or is this very deferral of the signified to be valued as a site for the production of
values, precisely because the term now takes on a life that cannot be, can never be, permanently
controlled?’ (Ibid p. 123) To realize this is to see the genuine freedom posed by the incompleteness
within the constraints placed on identity. A third danger is that this understanding of “coming out” may
fail to address this key issue that the possibility of gender change shows us that total gender
identification is itself impossible, and this essence-less-ness is a realization that can be used to expose in
homophobia both what it fears - the contingency or non-naturalness of heterosexuality - and the
impossibility of this fear being fixed through prohibition or foreclosure. To realize this, enables us to
envisage means to overcome the illusions that compel homophobia: ‘There is a political imperative to use
these necessary errors or category mistakes […] to rally and represent an oppressed political
constituency […] rallying points for a certain resistance to classification and to identity as such.’ (ibid) ‘To
411
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autonomy she develops a reinvigorated theory of agency compatible with the cutting
edge of psychological, neuroscientific, evolutionary biology and other disciplines

sensitive to the many forces that predispose action. While traditional liberalisms often

explicitly or implicitly ground solidarity and tolerance on accounts of chosen cooperation between distinct agents recognizing either selfish or selfless reasons to
coexist and employing their autonomy in response, Butler’s model entails a radical,

necessary, and participatory inclusivity resting on a recognition of radical
interdependence which transforms the question of whether to co-exist into the always

and already ethical question of how to coexist. Consequently, Butler’s theory grounds
solidarity in more helpful ways than classical liberalism. 413

That my agency is […] constituted in a sociality I do not fully author does
not spell the end to my political claims. It only means that when one
makes those claims, one makes them for much more than oneself. 414

This reinvigoration of solidarity is achieved while retaining the critical insights

of deconstruction. Therein Butler warns against the dangers of identitarianism from the

reveal the equal ephemerality of heterosexuality, that is by showing its apparently rigid status as weak
and mutually derivative of homosexuality, to panic gender norms by cofounding the origin-tocopy/heterosexual-to-lesbian line of causation, thereby exposing heterosexual claims to originality as
illusory’. (ibid) ‘To turn the homophobic construction of the bad copy against the framework that
privileges heterosexuality as origin and so “derive” the former from the latter’ (Ibid p. 123). This reading
also realizes theories form early works such as Butler, Judith. "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and
the Question of the “Postmodern”." Ed. Seyla Benhabib. Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange.
New York: Routledge, 1995. ‘If we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the
subject and its legacy are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of
refusing to inquire into its constitution […] the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or
agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative […] The
subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process,
one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own
possibility of being reworked.’
413 This move also calls for a rethinking of tolerance, ‘the injunction of tolerance, orders identity
according to its requirements […] recognition is a more robust and affirmative alternative.’ Butler, Judith
Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 141.
414 Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 16.
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perspective of a prescribed subversion policed by the call ‘for a renewal of the value of
life.’ 415

The task […] seems to me to be about distinguishing among the norms
and conventions that permit people to breathe, to desire, to love, and to
live, and those norms and conventions that restrict and eviscerate the
conditions of life itself […] What is most important is to cease legislating
for all lives what is livable only for some, and similarly, to refrain
proscribing for all lives what is unlivable for some […] guided by the
question of what maximizes the possibilities for a livable life, what
minimizes the possibility of unbearable life or, indeed, social, or literal
death. 416

This pattern continues throughout Undoing Gender; its central argument – that

gender, rather than expressing identity is a “mode of dispossession” 417 – evidences
commitment to both the recognizable liberal ideals and the critical insights of her
earlier work. We can for example return to a quote which we used in part 2 as

provisional evidence of Butler’s illiberalism. In a conversation published well into the

post 9/11 period Butler labelled liberal individualism’s agency “manic” and tied up with
an obsession with ‘the ego and its mastery’ 418 and questioned the idea of selfhood that

locates rights within the individual: ‘the "I" is bound up with the other and with
temporality in a way that resists the language of individual rights and the modes of

individualization that such a language entails.’ 419 Reading on we find the deeply
egalitarian motivation for such critique; ‘once we accept that we are called upon by

Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 12.
Ibid. p. 8.
417 ‘when we speak about my sexuality or my gender, […] both are to be understood as modes of being
dispossessed, ways of being for another or in deed by critique of another’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender
Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 1.
418 Dumm, Thomas. "Giving Away, Giving Over: A Conversation with Judith Butler." The Massachusetts
Review 49.1/2 (2008): 95-105. JSTOR. Web.
419 Ibid.
415
416
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others, we are bound ethically.’ 420 Furthermore, in rejecting atomic autonomous

individualism Butler rejects liberalism’s least plausible tenet while I argue, retaining its
most valuable core components. For example, where Butler seems to be arguing against

the liberal paradigm on closer inspection the theory of dispossession rests on a
deconstruction of liberalism that can revitalize it. For Butler, gender norms do not give

us individuality, rather they render us available to others: ‘The terms that make up

one’s own gender are, from the start, outside oneself, beyond oneself in a sociality that

has no single author’. 421 In virtue of a shift towards letting go of possession and identity
this theory of dispossession critiques a key feature of the liberal approach to sexual
liberation; the notion of sexuality as property, as integral. For Butler, to have a body is

not to have a possession that you exercise sovereignty over but to be made available in

a particular way. This move is repeated in Frames of War: ‘the body does not belong to
itself’. 422 This is a radical move to identity discourses including traditional liberalism,

because for many, civil rights movements autonomy, integrity, and identity are
sacrosanct. But Butler couples this radical move with a more robust defense of the

necessity of political applications of autonomy than in the early work. 423 The emphasis
Ibid.
Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 1.
422 Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 53 ‘War works to undermine a sensate democracy,
restricting what we can feel, disposing us to feel shock and outrage in the face of one expression of
violence and righteous coldness in the face of another’ Ibid. 52.
423 Whereas previously Butler described such utility as strategic, in Undoing Gender, Butler’s adoption is
more committed: ‘We ask that the state keep its laws off our bodies, and we call for principles of bodily
self-defense and bodily integrity to accepted as political goods, yet it is through the body that gender and
sexuality become exposed to others, implicated in social process inscribed by cultural norms, and
apprehended in our social meanings. In a sense to be a body is to be given over to others even as a body is
emphatically, one’s own, that over which we must claim rights of autonomy. This is as true for the claims
made by lesbians gays and bisexuals, in favor of sexual freedom, as it is for transsexual and transgender
claims to self-determination, as it is for intersex claims to be free of coerced medical, surgical and
psychiatric interventions, as it is for all claims to be free from racist attack, physical and psychical, as it is
420
421
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on dispossession then does not entail dismissing liberal ideals for Butler’s critique
stakes out ground for a normative theory which appeals to and buttresses key liberal

themes. Butler appreciates that a robust normative theory useful in buttressing human

rights movements must take their insufficiencies into account and aims for an
expansion of the notion of the human and for the creation of an inclusive and
representative normativity based on the decidedly liberal ideals of democracy, freedom,

equality, human rights, justice, and non-violence. 424 That this aspiration is liberal can be
seen in the further elaborations for political applications grounded in considerations of
vulnerability and dispossession. Contra the veiled adherence to ideals in the late middle

period Butler articulates precisely the way in which this application should function
and that its goal is genuinely inclusive ethical geopolitics:

To grieve and to make grief itself into a resource for politics, is not to be
resigned to a simple passivity or powerlessness. It is, rather to allow
oneself to extrapolate from this experience of vulnerability to the
vulnerability that others suffer through military incursions, occupations
suddenly declared wars, and police brutality. That our survival can be
determined by those we do not know and over whom there is no final
control means that life is precarious and the politics must consider what
forms of social and political organization seek best to sustain precarious
lives across the globe. 425

for claims to reproductive freedom. It is difficult if not impossible to make these claims without recourse
to autonomy, and specifically to a sense of bodily autonomy, but bodily autonomy is a lively paradox. I am
not suggesting though we cease to make these claims, we have to, we must, and I‘m not saying that we
have to make these claims reluctantly or strategically, they are part of the normative aspiration of any
movement that seeks to maximize the protection of freedoms of sexual and gender minorities and
women, defined with the broadest possible compass or racial and ethnic minorities especially as they cut
across all other categories.’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Abington,
UK, 2004, p. 20. [my italics]
424 ‘War works to undermine a sensate democracy, restricting what we can feel, disposing us to feel shock
and outrage in the face of one expression of violence and righteous coldness in the face of another.’
Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 52.
425 Ibid. p. 23.
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Here Butler extends the discussions from the oppression of gender norms to the

“justified violence” of war via pernicious norms of national, religious, and ethnic
identity and expands the radically interconnected social family beyond national, gender,

or ethnic boundaries in a skillful development of a compassionate non-invasive

globalism and internationalism which, while invoking the sheltering of life on a global
scale, doesn’t impose an ethical universalism and thus avoids value imperialism: 426 This

‘yields the radical potential for new modes of sociality and politics beyond the avid and
wretched bonds formed through settler colonialism and expulsion.’ 427

In developing a model of super-egoic cruelty Frames of War provides a “cynical

fortification” of equality and non-violence. Butler explicates a theory of non-violence
that works from within its psychic and discursive ubiquity arguing for ‘an ethical
prescription against the waging of violence’ which ‘does not disavow or refuse that

violence that may be at work in the production of the subject.’ 428 What follows is a

recognition that the impulse to violence is most likely a consequence of the injunction
to suppress one’s radical dependence on others. From our position ‘mired in
violence’ 429 we can nevertheless develop an ‘aggressive vigilance over aggression’s

tendency to emerge as violence.’ 430 Through a critical relationship to the ‘epistemic

inegalitarianism’ whereby norms render some human lives more grievable than others
‘It is crucial to understand the workings of gender in global contexts, in transnational formations, not
only to see what problems are posed for the term ‘gender’ but to combat false forms of universalism that
service a tacit or explicit cultural imperialism’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis
group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 9.
427 Butler, Judith “Precarious Life, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation” The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 2, SPECIAL ISSUE WITH THE SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY AND
EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY Penn State University Press, 2012, pp. 134-151.
428 Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 170.
429 Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 171.
430 Ibid. 170.
426
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we may embrace the “ethical task” 431 of ‘the defenders of egalitarianism;’ 432 to

apprehend a ‘vicissitude of equality that is enormously difficult to affirm’ 433 that all

lives always matter: ‘Non-violence is derived from the apprehension of equality in the

midst of precariousness.’ 434 Thus, from within the constraints of near ubiquitous
normative violence in moves consistent with the cynical moment Butler not only
overcomes the cynical impasse but does so in such a way that drags from the depths of

an open-eyed analysis of psychic, normative, and political power a radically aspirational
“critical humanism” based on a deeply fortified manifesto for an ethics of non-violence.
“Critical Liberal Humanism”

I would like to start, and end, with the question of the human. 435

Calling Butler’s post-9/11 position critical humanism is useful because it

highlights that she inherits the critique of naïve and ideologically compromised
humanism and that she nevertheless attaches prime importance to the category of the

human. 436 Butler’s usage rests on understanding the nature and necessity of
incorporating complex psychological and behavioral tendencies and needs into any

theory of human agency; a “new-humanism” or a “critical liberalism” which nominates a
redefinition that can survive the critical insights postmodern intellectual culture has

encountered and more importantly, better serve those considered peripheral to the
Ibid. 170.
Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 184.
433 Ibid. 184.
434 Ibid. 184.
435 Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 17.
436 For a discussion on the re-emergence of humanism in contemporary feminist philosophy of
embodiment and the most up to date elucidation of Butler’s alleged humanism see Murphy, Ann V.
"Corporeal Vulnerability and the New Humanism." Hypatia 26.3 (2011): 575-90.
431
432
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jurisdiction of fair and humane treatment. 437 On this reading post-9/11 Butler “owns

up” to critically informed liberal humanism without relinquishing the commitments
There will undoubtedly be objections to this characterization. Objectors may simply cite Butler’s
reluctance to identify with liberal humanism. ‘By insisting on a “common” corporeal vulnerability, I may
seem to be positing a new basis for humanism. That might be true, but I’m prone to consider it
differently.’ Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK 2004 p. 43. ‘The rethinking of the human in
these terms does not entail a return to humanism’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor &
Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 13. In response, we have distinguished “new humanism” as “new”
partly in opposition to the naïve liberal humanism Butler is rightly suspicious of. Objections may also rise
from within the terms of this dissertation, that reading Butler as a humanist may come from quarters
charging that the avowal of the “existential reading” alleged in this dissertation is problematic. There is
some support for this objection. While in the later work Butler explicitly critiques the transcendental
reading (see the first section of this chapter) she does not straightforwardly claim the existential reading.
Passages like the following for example, still seem incompatible with the existential reading. ‘To be called
unreal and have as it were institutionalized as a form of differential treatment, is to become the other
against whom (or against which) the human is made. It is the inhuman, the beyond the human, the less
than human, the border that secures the human in its ostensible reality, to be called a copy to be called
unreal is one way to be oppressed, but consider that it is more fundamental than that, to be oppressed
means that you already exist as a subject of some kind, you are there as the visible and oppressed other
for the master subject, as a possible or potential subject, but to be unreal is to something else gain. To be
oppressed you must first become intelligible. To find that you are fundamentally unintelligible indeed,
that the laws of culture and of language find you to be an impossibility, is to find that you have not
achieved access to the human, to find yourself speaking only and always as if you were human, but with
the sense that you are not, to find that your language is hollow, that no recognition is forthcoming
because the norms by which recognition takes place are not in your favor.' Butler, Judith Undoing Gender
Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 30. It seems then that the problematic slippage
between legibility and illegibility, intelligibility and unintelligibly, between the visible and invisible, the
grievable and ungrievable, and the taxonomical obsession with ranking the violence of epistemic and
concrete exclusion remains in later Butler. In response, I would say that, overall in the later work the
existential reading makes more and more sense to account for the more explicitly articulated ethical
commitments, and the refusal to settle these issues is due to a critical perspective that doesn’t allow us
the intellectual plateau of explanatory completeness emanating from the key Butlerian commitment that
follows from the linguistic structuralist view of discourse as fundamental and contingent, namely the
performativity of philosophy and the responsibility of the philosopher to resist the reification of
categories potentially complicit in pernicious varieties of normative violence. It is because of this
profound epistemic humility that if not the transcendental, the Kynical vein remains in later Butler, who
problematically sustains the radical openness of her later normative aspirations partly through retaining
fidelity to the dynamic argumentative strategy performatively contesting the assumptions of traditional
epistemologies and ontologies and subverting the foundations of language, reason, and intelligibility. For
this reason, a version of the tension that compelled our distinct heuristics remains. This is totally
consistent with the aspirations that discourse useful for democratic politics and human rights must
remain open to its most fundamental assumptions, the question, I suppose, is how persuasive this
methodology becomes, but I feel later Butler is, as I am doing in this dissertation, is speaking to an
audience deeply committed to the progressive political ideals I have labelled “critical liberalism” and that
because of these commitments, this willingness to push on the limits of intelligibility and to destabilize its
own foundations, will reinvigorate, improve, and keep open rather than erode these commitments. This
of course raises the question as to how to teach and disseminate this material for the sake of furthering
social justice. If reading Butler makes a teacher ask this question, I would hazard the guess that this too
probably has a positive effect. however I contest that Butler, working at the vanguard of a tradition at
pains to resist the ossification of normative structures and inauguration of alternative oppressive
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that norms are necessarily violent, ubiquitous, requisite, and intractable. Here, instead
of lamenting the ubiquity of normative violence or reifying oppressive forces Butler

adopts a preferred normative stance within this framework of constraints. While this
may appear perplexing and complicated – the most famous philosopher of normative

violence engaging it – it shouldn’t be, for throughout her career Butler has remained

committed to both the ubiquity of normative violence its necessary but insufficient

causal link with concrete identitarian hatred and violence and its contingency and

potential for self-subversion. 438 Indeed, if we read The Psychic life of Power as a

prolegomena to this “new humanist” critical liberal normative theory we can accept

both the necessary violence of norms commit norms which minimize the psychic

foreclosures which manifest in persecution, hatred, and violence.

One must make substantive decisions about what will be a less violent
future, what will be a more inclusive population, what will help to fulfill,
in substantive terms, the claims of universality and justice that we seek to
understand in their cultural specificity and social meaning. 439

through fidelity to modern or “postmodern” categories retains a degree of rhetorical illusiveness
precisely in service of resisting normative violence, and that nevertheless, alongside appreciating this
refrain, the existential humanist reading serves as a useful heuristic which captures Butler’s aspiration of
expanding the field of permitted embodiments, and the preoccupation with livability and grievability.
438 ‘The “being” of life is itself constituted through selective means; as a result, we cannot refer to this
“being” outside of the operations of power’ Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 1. ‘The
operation of state power takes place within an ontological horizon saturated by power that precedes and
exceeds state power’ Ibid. p. 149.
439 Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 225.
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Conclusion
Butler’s post-9/11 work maintains her commitment to the necessary violence

within materialization and performativity and punitive melancholic subjugation within
structurally melancholic subjectivity and addressed the problems therein. But as well as
overcoming these problems and retaining fidelity to the load bearing argumentative

claims of the “cynical moment,” Butler’s later work also reinvigorates the ideals which
guide the entire project. In this way, Butler’s post-9/11 serve as an analog for a solution
to Extreme Liberal Cynicism which meets our conditions laid out in chapter 5: that it

must be immanent, revitalize the constitutive ideals, and retain the rationale behind
their disavowal. It is immanent, it follows a clearly articulated normative aspiration in
line with its constitutive ideals, which it both reinvigorates and remains critical of, 440

sustaining the ‘tension between (a) expanding existing normative concepts […] and (b)

the call for alternative vocabularies’ an antagonism which ‘keeps the alliance open and

suspends the idea of reconciliation as a goal. 441 This qualified optimism can be seen in
Frames of War, where Butler analyses the discursive exacerbations of violent
predispositions:

The point is not to conclude that cynicism is the only option, but to […]
make better judgements. 442

It cautions against certain liberal values as naïve (individualism and autonomy) yet retains the
primary belief in political freedom justice, equality, human rights, and above all non-violence.
441 Butler, Judith Frames of War Verso, UK, 2009, p. 148
442 Ibid. 159
440
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Conclusion
The higher man must listen closely to every coarse or subtle cynicism
-

Nietzsche 443

Liberal Cynicism is torn between liberal ideals and the obstacles to their success.

These obstacles include critique of liberalism, our failure to realize its ideals, and the
necessary collective commitment required for realizing them. Because of this, it suffers.
This pain can compel the Liberal Cynic to extremes, fantasizing invulnerability through

disavowing the efficacy of its constitutive ideals. This pain can compel extremes which
fantasize invulnerability through repressively disavowing the efficacy of its ideals
which eclipses cynical pain. 444 This is supported by fantasies including absolutizing the

Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil #26 p. 38 Translated by Walter Kauffman, New York:
Vintage, 1966.
444 This relates to what something of a contentious issue running through this work, the question as to
whether and how Psychoanalysis can be applied to cynicism. Sloterdijk deals with this issue, perhaps
intuiting a concern I share, defending against the objection that he, as perhaps I, mistakenly offer a nonpsychoanalytic analysis of a condition that requires one. In a discussion on pages 404 - 408 Sloterdijk
references January-February and March April 1933 issues of the journal Psychoanalytische Bewegung,
specifically the article in two parts, Zur Psychoanalyse des Zynikers (I and II) by Edmund Bergler. Bergler
defines cynicism as unconscious in all but 4 of its sixty-four varieties, and as a “grave neuroses”. Per
Sloterdijk, cynicism, for Bergler, is a means by which people with extremely strong emotional
ambivalences psychically discharge and thus stands on the same level as classic neurotic mechanisms
such as hysteria, melancholy, and paranoia. For Bergler, through hostility to both itself and others as well
as through humor, cynicism escapes the world it feels is must hate and acts out infantile tendencies. For
Bergler, in Sloterdijk’s description, ‘cynicism belongs to the dynamic of cultural liberation struggles and
the social dialectics of values’ and ‘is one the most important methods of working through ambivalences
in a culture’ Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1987. p. 407.
Sloterdijk criticizes the notion of cynicism as unconscious. Specifically, Sloterdijk argues that the
‘mechanisms of the cynic’ are transparent to the cynic, this is the enlightened part of Enlightened False
Consciousness, (their contradictory statements are done so ironically, in full knowing of the condition
they sooth, and that the cynical choices are the result of a broken, but conscious compromise between
practical reason and hope) such that ‘the unconscious scarcely has to make any effort.’ Ibid. I find myself
between these views. As my analysis in chapter 1 hopefully showed, I disagree with Sloterdijk that
cynicism is entirely transparent and that it must function above the veil of unconscious mechanism.
However, I agree with three key claims Sloterdijk makes on Bergler’s behalf. 1, that cynicism attacks itself
and the world to solve an inner conflict and attempts an escape through humor. 2, that in its adolescent
form with which this dissertation does not deal it ‘acts out its infantile tendencies’ and most crucially 3,
that through hostility and masochism cynicism functions as a means by which people with extremely
strong emotional ambivalences psychically discharge. However, I agree with Sloterdijk that ‘the
443
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powers it opposes via reification of hopelessness, by assuming intellectual superiority,

and by refusing auto-critique. On this picture, cynicism’s need to attack ideologies,

ideals, and idealisms emanates from a latent inability to fully disregard its own hopes.
conscious participation of the ego is objective immoralism, and the obvious fragmentation of morals
explain the matter much more effectively than does the depth-psychological theory.’ I also believe that
the structure of cynicism can be made transparent to the cynic instead of/as well as the qualified
analysist (407) ‘the “ice-dogs” still have the energy to bark and still possess enough bite to want to make
things clear.’ (408) This belief requires justification: Although adopting terms and moves informed by
Butler’s Freudianism my conception of liberal melancholy needn’t extend to the neurotic depths of
Butler’s Freudian melancholia (i.e. beyond the reach of self-therapy) for 3 reasons. 1, because cynicism is
rarely central to one’s identity, certainly not as central as gender or ethnicity are, at least for Butler. This
is evinced by that fact that cynicism is an intermittent state of consciousness, it can take specific
referents, and is compatible with non-cynical attitudes (one can be cynical about politics but not love, or
visa-versa etc. Therefore, cynicism needn’t be the kind of psychic structure constitutive of subjectivity
which is often the condition for the obliviousness to pathologies that render people incapable of self-help.
Because of the consequent ability for the cynic to “over stand” their cynicism it need not exclude selfanalysis. There may well be cases where cynicism is constitutive of identity and therefore beyond the
scope of conscious transparency (I imagine this is more likely to be associated with Master Cynicism,
whose duplicity, through repression, manifests in the comfort of pathological lie.) 2, because the
transparency of Liberal Cynical pain is sign both of its complicity in psychic mechanisms related to the
unconscious and to mechanisms accessible to the consciousness and therefore, also its susceptibility to
the ameliorative efforts of the “host”. For a very crude but hopefully helpful analogy the stereotypical
homophobe does not experience grief concerning the lost homosexual desire let alone the cause of the
grief, nor do they tend to self-identify as homophobic. This is because on Butler’s model, they suffer from
a melancholia which is the result of unspeakable loss manifesting in unethical disregard or violent
hostility. Although panicked by those embracing its disavowed desires the suffering is not conscious. By
contrast even while the cause of cynical pain may remain hidden the pain is not. Furthermore, the cynic is
usually comfortable diagnosing themselves as cynical and is often aware of its harmfulness. It is for this
distinct phenomenological difference that this “condition” need not require psychoanalysis. 3. A further
reason to regard liberal cynicism as accessible to at least a philosophically informed self-consciousness if
not consciousness in general is the nature of the trauma that I argue compels it. Although I argue against
Sloterdijk’s solely intellectual cynicism caused by the legacy of critique and instead hold that worldly
disappointments are crucial, I still hold that liberal cynical grief is distinct to more immediate pain. To put
it another way, the Palestinian father who lost children to both Israeli military and Hamas attacks is
cynical about politics in a way beyond the scope of my analysis. That trauma is profound and immediate
and if it compels pathological complexes these are to be dealt with by highly psychoanalytically,
psychologically, and neuro-psychologically trained medical professionals. By contrast, for the liberal
cynics their trauma is less direct. The trauma of being invested in generally failing ideals tends to be
indirect and mediated from embodied existence. Indeed, as we have tried to make clear, Liberal Cynicism
is conditioned by ideology critique, a privilege of the highly educated and therefore Liberal Cynics are
less likely to have the “depth-cynicism” of our mourning Palestinian father. Since the trauma of Liberal
Cynicism is indirect the requirements for its alleviation are similarly superficial and accessible to the
consciousness whose repression of liberal ideals operates comparatively superficially. This picture
allows both for cynicisms functioning at depths requiring professional psychiatric care and the kinds of
adolescent cynicisms functioning at such superficial levels of trauma that a change in weather could be
sufficient for their “overcoming.” This dissertation aims somewhere between these poles, at a condition
which I argue, is nevertheless prevalent among the academically inclined liberals whom, I hope, will find
this this analysis interesting and maybe even a positive influence.
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Despite serving an immediately ameliorative purpose this leaves the cynic unhappy,

alienated, hostile, obstinate, and delusional. Thus, it is a failing self-defense mechanism.

Extreme Liberal Cynicism, itself on a spectrum, is signposted by failing to avow its

ideals, reifying their inefficacy, and restricting itself to unsatisfactory or impossible
solutions to its pain, while vehemently criticizing invested perspectives. This is the
hypocrisy and inauthenticity at the heart of Extreme Liberal Cynicism.

At these extremes, Liberal Cynicism is also rationally unjustifiable, as well as

intrinsically, and instrumentally harmful. The reification of hopelessness, assumption of

trans-idealism, the cynicalization of ideology critique, (the partial and negative
reification in the history of ideology critique,) and the refusal to engage in self-criticism

is irrational. It is intrinsically harmful because it is self-destructive and painful. It is
instrumentally harmful in virtue of enabling the problems that compel it, and
enablement which can be seen on the level of action, where the Extreme Cynic tends to

participate in the very system it bemoans, which through ritualized practical
reinforcement and absolutizing narrative performatively reifies the illusion of its

necessity. It is also instrumentally harmful in virtue of being both ill-equipped to

oppose, and vulnerable to succumbing to, Master Cynicism, a condition which couples a
disregard for liberal ideals with a disinhibited embrace of power, and an offer to

assuage cynical pain. For these reasons, a response is a desideratum. The dangers of

Liberal Cynicism then, are its painfulness, the extremes this pain can lead to, failing is

ideals, and either succumbing to, or enabling, Master Cynicism. However, cynical
painfulness also provides the impetus and evinces the resources for Liberal Cynicism to
avoid or overcome these extremes.
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To theorize this overcoming, we can turn to Peter Sloterdijk and Judith Butler.

Butler’s later work stays true to its critical inheritance and reinvigorates the

constitutive values of the earlier material while retaining the tension between ideals
and critique. In so doing Butler’s later work in relation to the middle and earlier work
meets our conditions for overcoming Extreme Liberal Cynicism. Further reflection
shows that within the theoretical frame in which this overcoming consisted, lies a
model for contesting the pernicious extremes of Liberal Cynicism in general.

Per Butler, subjectivation requires a libidinally invested repression through

which the energies once directed towards that which is prohibited provides the

impetus for an energetic disavowal. This involves an internalized loss which haunts the

ego through a failure to grieve. Butler develops a theory for “staying with grief,” 445 to

thwart this foreclosure and its harmful consequences. Liberal Cynicism also

internalized a loss, and underwent a libidinally invested repression through which the

energies once directed towards that which is lost compels a passionate disavowal.
Therefore, Butler’s theory of breaking the narcissistic circuitry of melancholia may

translate to Liberal Cynicism, specifically for short circuiting the structures whereby
liberal pain compels repression. If so, a reckoning with “liberal cynical grief” could bring

to the fore the loss: the value and efficacy of its ideals. If it is indeed a psychic defense

mechanism whereby a painful powerlessness, guilt, and vulnerability are eclipsed by
the fantasy of hopelessness, then staying with liberal grief might disengage this

445

Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 20.
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function. 446 Also for Butler, the overwhelming immensity of an original unbearable loss

triggered the thwarting mechanism. In the analysis of 9/11 this was the infinite loss of
innocent life. By analogy, for Liberal Cynicism the compulsion to repress also reflects
the profundity of the loss, the scope of the original investment. In this way, dwelling in
cynical grief could allow for an empowering re-affirmation of its constitutive ideals.

Secondly, from Sloterdijk. Our analysis of the structure of Liberal cynicism and

the failure of Sloterdijk’s romantic moralizing solution let us to conclude that if it is to
be persuasive any solution must draw from, and remain faithful to, cynicism’s critical

and emotional constitution. We can develop then, Sloterdijk’s proposal to use features
immanent to cynicism, against its pernicious extremes. By embracing its own ignorance

as the yard stick from which to mock human knowledge, Sloterdijk’s Neo-Kynicism
invites a self-implicating critique maintaining the ironicization of knowledge but

extending it to its assumed intellectual superiority. This could also destabilize the
legacy of cynicalization and encourage cynicism’s purported refusal of naiveté to be

used against its own. Cynical naivety includes unrealistic expectations for the
coherence, superiority, and success of its values. This contributes to the unbearability of
Liberal Cynical grief. The repeated and traumatic witnessing of the failures of an

absolutized idealism compels the further naivety of absolute hopelessness. A self-

directed Neo-Kynical critique of cynical naiveté then could both ameliorate the causes
If master Cynicism is the result of a melancholic foreclosure prefaced in the failure to grieve for a loss,
then our Butlerian solution may also apply here. If somehow the Master Cynic’s lack of autonomy could
be brought into consciousness and grieved, then this foreclosure might reveal ideals contrary to those
feeding its megalomania. Possible means to encourage openness to critique would be to highlight the
insatiability, mania, and panic associated with this incessant and impossible pursuit. The Butlerian
injunction that we deconstruct discourses mobilizing these pathological denials would call for
challenging the valorization of money and power.
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of trauma which compelled and enabled the reification of hopelessness and expose it as
an emotionally driven response to trauma.

Also from Row’s appropriation, we saw that by targeting all as potentially

complicit in the problems it seeks to overcome and by acquiring an openness to diverse

solutions, policed cheekiness could disrupt the inertia of argumentative stalemate by
avoiding the reduction of opposing views to “false consciousness.” This possibility of

rescinding on the necessity of agreement and focusing cross-ideological attention on

solving the problems the cynic laments may increase the possibility of a return to

dialectic and even of glimpsing the hallmarks of the united vision of justice for

which it desperately yearns. 447 Further grounds for adopting elements within

Sloterdijk’s solution are that while we concluded that without the policing influence of a

normative aspiration satirical insubordination was a dangerous response to
Enlightened False Consciousness, because Liberal Cynicism remains invested in ideals it

contains the resources for policing this libidinal release while remaining
immanent.

Thirdly, from Sloterdijk and Butler. Both advocate “turning on” the ego. Butler

analyzed foreclosures which allow a sense of security to remain during experiences of
vulnerability as reducible to a harmful form of ego-preservation. To challenge this

dangerous narcissism the ego must be subjected to “super-egoic cruelty.” 448 Sloterdijk’s
cynic wrestled with an unwillingness to reject the notion of a unified self, identified

As Row warns: ‘The alternative - which we all practice, every day, sometimes passively, sometimes as
principle - is to go on pretending […] that we speak private languages that never overlap […] that there is
no way of describing […] how we suffer together.’ Row, Jess. "American Cynicism." Home. Boston Review,
18 May 2015. Web. 10 Dec. 2015. <http://www.bostonreview.net/books-ideas/jess-row-americancynicism>.
448 Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Verso, London, UK, 2004, p. 138.
447
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with anti-idealism, and erred on the side of late capitalism; a complex manifest in crude

forms of material and psychic self-preservation, reducible to an obstinate egoism.

Sloterdijk thus called for a “liquidation” 449 of the cynical ego. Similarly, there is a
withdrawal into and desperate clinging onto the Liberal Cynical ego compelled by a

desire for self-preservation in the face of vulnerability. It stands to reason then, both

that the Liberal Cynical ego could benefit from critique, and that Sloterdijk and Butler’s
theories could be useful in detailing a methodology for mounting one.

Sloterdijk’s ego-critique proposes using the insights of existential angst and

deconstruction, both common companions to the cynic, to reveal the truth of
egolessness, an awareness of the precariousness of all life, and the unknown

possibilities for the future. Sloterdijk also proposes that satirical self-implicating ego
critique and deconstruction amounts to non-cooperation with the discursive forces of

materialization, objectification, and identification which can free the cynic from the

constraints of a panicked need to uptake constructed identity categories and idealistic
self-designations. All of which contribute to the trauma which compel cynical
repression. But Neo-Kynical ego critique would be different for Liberal Cynicism than

Enlightened False Consciousness because its traumatized self-preservation and fear has
not clouded from view the inchoate energies of a magical neo-Kynical yesbody, but the
value, efficacy, and responsibilities entailed by its constitutive idealism. Therefore, NeoKynical critique could reveal the efficacy of its ideals.

On later Butler’s account of mourning and melancholia, in addition to the desire

for the lost love object, a range of desires associated with the ego are also thwarted by
449

‘Verflüssigung’ - Ibid. 379.
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loss, specifically, the desires for security, autonomy, invulnerability, independence, and
the desire for the coherence and transparency of identity. Butler proposed thwarting
narcissistic withdrawal by cultivating vulnerability through acknowledging the source

of grief, submitting to being transformed by it, and allowing the ideals to be
transformed as well. This involves submitting to insecurity, dependency, vulnerability,
and uncertainty to respond more healthily to loss. Given that a similar range of desires

are also thwarted by Liberal Cynicism’s loss, then cultivating vulnerability could release
the pressure to identify with an absolute conception of ideals in a reality in which they

flounder, and thereby contribute to weakening the demand for repression. 450
Furthermore, given that Extreme Liberal Cynicisms reification of hopelessness is

compelled by the weight of hope’s inter-dependence, a grief induced acceptance of

necessary sociality could further dilute the force to deny and repress, and possibly
affirm the necessity of collaboration, compromise, and also the management of
expectations. This realization could also help sustain the difficult balance between
idealism and ideology critique by submitting to the reality that liberal ideals while

useful, are fallible, incomplete, and dependent. This in turn could further mitigate the

painfulness of the sociality of hope through conditioning a greater openness to
pluralism and diversity. This openness to an equally fallible other could problematize
the traumatizing conclusion of liberalism’s inefficacy, for the failure of “this”

understanding of liberal ideals could be compatible with the potential success of
alternative routes to its ends. Therefore, as well as contesting ego-withdrawal and

450 On this reading, once cynicism is associated with identity its perceived failure poses a threat to the
sense of self and is firmly resisted for psycho-emotional rather than intellectual reasons.
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reasserting the value of its ideals, dwelling in cynical grief could ground a collective and
inclusive dialectical critical commitment to equality, freedom, and justice.

We have begun to theorize why the cynic might want to overcome extremes and

what needs to happen for a successful overcoming. Put simply, pain is the motivation
for an overcoming achieved by grieving in the way liberal hope demands. But perhaps

we should say more about what could motivate the Liberal Cynic to swap the easiness
of hopelessness for the painfulness of hope. Since cynical trauma compelled a

repression our theory for thwarting it must include a way to make this pain bearable.
There is a level at which a willingness to endure the painfulness of idealistic
commitments is beyond argumentation, a feature of disposition, perhaps maturity,

maybe even strength, but my contention is that not only does Liberal Cynicism contains
these virtues, but that there are compelling reasons for the cynically inclined to submit

to such transformation, avoidance, and revitalization, and methods for making this pain
bearable. 451

The first set of reasons revolves around the fact that the value and efficacy of

liberal ideals was never successfully foreclosed, and in removing the failed attempts to

do so, these investments would again become motivating. Furthermore, critiquing the

contributions the cynic makes to their beleaguered condition destabilize them, and
revealing its delusions and germinations in a psycho-emotional imperative, its

This would defuse cynicism’s hostility towards idealism and, no longer a painful reminder of a lost
innocence, the critical liberal would appreciate liberal naivety as capable of contributing positively.
Indeed, a measure of the critical liberal’s successful self-discipline would be its ability to value as well as
critique liberal naivety.
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commitments to truth and independence from false consolation could also motivate the
avoidance of extremes.

On a more economical self-interested level, critique may reveal the calmer

sincerity of pained liberalism as preferable to the manic desperate melancholy of

unsuccessful foreclosure. Although the causes of cynical pain are non-transparent, it

suffers greatly. The Extreme Liberal Cynic is often joyless, insatiably hateful, isolated
through narcissistic withdrawal, bitter, pressured by precariousness, and gnawed at by

inadmissible guilt. The promise of a preferable pain may be sufficient to provoke
agentive participation in overcoming and/or avoiding cynical extremes.

Another way our response could abate the unbearability of Liberal Cynical pain

relates to Sloterdijk’s demand that cynicism deconstruct its refusal to self-critique. Our

analysis of cynical pain revealed fear as a condition for this obstinacy, traceable to the
fear that auto-critique would lead to losing the only thing of worth of in the cynic’s

baron ontology, itself. We developed this as including the fear of enlightenment, an
inchoate feeling that it would lead to a loss of self: to death-in-life. As well as removing a

cause of the cynical trauma potentially compelling repression, a critique which reveals
that cynical self-interrogation does not lead to impasse or abyss could remove this
obstacle to auto-critique.

Furthermore, this model also proposes a useful and empowering revitalization

of cynicism’s ideals and virtues. The ability to claim the willingness to face up to man’s

inhumanity without the false consolation of naïve hopes, and the nativity of

hopelessness, could further motivate forgoing hopelessness for the painfulness or
realistic hope, a pain with which the cynical ego could proudly identify, thus not just
169

offering an alternative pain, but an amelioration through ennoblement. This
ennoblement could by aided by validating, valorizing, and proposing the redeployment

of cynical guilt and conscience. As we saw, both our development of Žižek, Sloterdijk,

and Row diagnose an inadmissible guilt compelling the repressive functions of Extreme
Liberal Cynicism. Row developed Sloterdijk’s notion of shame with which postmodern

subjects view their enlightenment inheritance and its complicity in injustice. The

validation and valorization of guilt is simple: The guilt around enlightenment
liberalism’s complicity with colonial and imperialism is simultaneously a call to rethink
the enlightenment, to see how we have failed tolerance, equality, democracy, dignity,

and human rights. The cynical conscience which casts doubt on all ideals is
simultaneously a call to retain a critical distance concerning the totality and

actionability of any ideals, and to adopt an open-minded dialectic concerning their
future. And the perennial guilt that my actions and my ideals don’t always matchup is

obviously a call to correct this. Concerning redeploying cynical guilt, the repressed
desire for the realization of liberal ideals is reserved in the guilt which features in
liberal cynical pain, which is to say, the pain compelling the repression of liberal ideals

is simultaneously a reminder of their potential efficacy. 452 Valorizing cynical guilt,

This model of guilt draws from both Sloterdijk and Butler who, albeit within very different projects,
propose a productive use of guilt. Both develop guilt into recognition of shared precariousness and
vulnerability – both conditions for cynical repression – into an invitation to apprehend the suffering of all.
Such an appropriation can be theorized in relation to psychoanalytic themes familiar to this dissertation.
In our comparison of Freud and Butler’s accounts of mourning and melancholia we saw that while for
Freud guilt is a manifestation of desire thwarted by social prohibitions internalized into the super-ego
manifest in the form of conscience punishing the ego, we saw that for Butler, guilt preserves the desire as
well as the prohibition, and as such is ambivalent. Our redeployment of cynical liberal guilt adopts
Butler’s approach.
452
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might aid its entrance into consciousness, and thereby provide additional impetus for
overcoming its extremes. 453

Perhaps we need to still need to say more about how to get the Extreme Cynic to

mourn. To this end we can call on cynical irony. In simultaneously appealing to
cynicism’s mockery of naiveté and gritty realism and as well as providing cathartic

release, in turning minimally hostile critique inwards satirical humor could enable
cynicism’s vulnerability and grief to enter immediate consciousness. Neokynical
Satire’s willingness to face the worlds ills and endure mockery of hope and disarm the

453 We may also validate, valorize, and redeploy cynical fantasy. Compelled by an inability to disregard
and eradicate pain sown by latent ideals, cynical fantasy is the mean through which the cynic absolutizes
the superiority and inefficacy of its constitutive idealism and other doomed solutions to its own
melancholy. We saw that at extremes, cynical fantasy contributes to sustaining a subjectivity void of
responsibility and commitment to the structural conditions of the world. Firstly, the validation, our
critique has revealed that there is a logic and compulsion within Extreme Liberal Cynical fantasy which
shows that the Extreme Cynic is not exclusively irresponsible or even unhealthy, this respect could soften
the blow to the ego our critique demands. Concerning the valorization and redeployment, fantasy can
play a vital role in overcoming the problems in which it is complicit. Resources again come from Butler
for whom fantasy signposts ‘what reality forecloses.’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor &
Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 29. Following Butler, an employment requires rejecting where
fantasy has content - Benna’s naïve love, Susan’s negative reifications, and Sloterdijk’s romantic utopia –
and retaining it as a space holder for the bare possibility of a radically improved situation: ‘Fantasy is
what establishes the possible in excess of the real; it points elsewhere, and when it is embodied, it brings
the elsewhere home.’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK,
2004, p. 217. For the Liberal Cynic, the elsewhere yearning to come home is a world in which a qualified
liberalism succeeds. A “decynicalized liberal cynical fantasy” would amount to the courage to imagine an
improved global political situation guided by its critically open ideals and policed by the constant
reminder that our knowledge is incomplete and that this vision is merely a signpost of a reality it cannot
foresee. Fantasy would function then as cynical conscience, reminding us to be epistemically humble in
our aims to realize liberal ideals, while imagining their increased influence; and to remain open to exactly
what they amount to. Butler explains that fantasy as epistemic humility is ‘essential to the project of
international human rights discourse and politics’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor &
Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 36 and part of the ‘task of a radical democratic theory.’ Butler,
Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p. 225. In contrast to the
liberal cynical fantasy of the necessarily failure of liberalism, critical liberal fantasy would hold the space
open for its possible success: ‘That we cannot predict or control […] does not mean that we cannot
struggle for the realization of certain values, democratic, and nonviolent, international, and anti-racist.
The point is only that to struggle for those values is precisely to avow that one’s own position is not
sufficient to elaborate the spectrum of the human, that one must enter into a collective work in which
one’s own status as subject must, for democratic reasons, become disorientated, and exposed to what it
does not know.’ Butler, Judith Undoing Gender Routledge, Taylor & Francis group, Abington, UK, 2004, p.
3.
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need to evaluate and identify would simultaneously appeal to and challenge

cynicism, creating a space for welcoming grief, coupling is open-eyed realism with
auto-critique and world weary and wise willingness to laugh.

The Critique of Extreme Cynicism coupled with the libidinal release of

Neokynical

cheekiness,

a

Butlerian

reckoning

with

grief,

and

the

skillful

reappropriations of its complex desires and losses could compel the cynically inclined
to resist fatalism and embrace an ennobling self-transformation upholding a critical

commitment to, reinvigorating, and working for its constitutive ideals. This could

transform a condition beset by painful, destructive, and isolating delusions into the
warm-hearted and heartbroken honesty of a critical liberalism in a world that really

needs it. The painfulness of Liberal Cynicism evinces the failure of illiberalism and
contains the resource to develop an inclusive evolving conception of a better
alternative, it is a gift, a source of dignity in the face of and emancipatory resistance to
that which compels it. Within Liberal Cynicism then, a saving power grows.
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